朝鲜的空战 另一边的故事

KOREAN AIR WAR THE STORY FROM THE OTHER SIDE PART I Sašo Knez, Slovenia Diego Fernando Zampini, Argentina In the sky above Northern Korea U.N. pilots encountered a vast array of piloting skills with the enemy pilots. They believed that the good pilots were Soviet. They named them Honchos. This article mostly focuses on the deeds of the Soviet pilots and their commanding officers. It is not an attempt to recount all the victories and losses of U.N. or United Air Army, while in turn it only gives a much more accurate overview of the aerial warfare. But to fully understand Korea in first place we must pick up things in the immediate post war Soviet Union. THE PAINS OF THE POST WAR VVS AND THE BIRTH OF THE SOVIET JET FLIGHT 24th April 1946 was a great day for Soviet Aviation. The MiG-9, the first domestic jet fighter powered with two British jet engines took-off and successfully completed its maiden flight. A. N. Grinchik piloted the MiG. Only few hours later M. I. Ivanov lifted the second jet fighter-the Yak-15 of the Zhukovsky tarmac. With this day the Soviet jet aviation was born. The basic test flight programme was successfully completed but not without accidents. One MiG-9 was lost killing test pilot "Lyosha" Grinchik. The aircraft and the pilot were quickly replaced and a new informal world record was set with the MiG-9 achieving M 0.79. The first trio of Soviet jet fighters compromising of the MiG-9, Yak-15 and the La-150 were ready. The concept of jet flight was then accepted into the VVS1. But there was a certain clandestine around the testing of these examples and later on the pre-production series of the type. This was broken only with an article in the VVS bulletin titled "The particularities of jet pilotage". In this article Mark Gallay soothed the fighter community with the assurance that there is really no great effort needed to master the first generation of Soviet jets. But these very first generation jets were rather experiments then true fighting machines. Test pilot Stepan A. Mikoyan explains: "To start the engine of those early jets, the mechanic would first pull the cord (like in an ordinary motorboat) of the small auxiliary engine, which acted as a starter for the main power plant. The service life of those engines did not exceed twenty-five hours before overhaul. Their fuel consumption was much larger then that of the piston engines, while the fuel tank capacity of these jet, particularly the Yaks, was not so large. To prolong the engine’s service life and to save on fuel we would glide down the final with engine shut out (something hard to believe today) – we would cut it off on the final when sure that the aircraft would touch down at, or close to the landing ‘T’. After that there was no way back; another circle was out of the question. In the MiG, which had two engines, one of them was shut down even earlier, on the base leg. At the end of the landing run we would turn off the runway to where a towing truck was waiting to take the aircraft back to the departure end of the strip, where the engine would be restarted for MiG-9 developed as a stop gap, but the MiG-15 lines are already evident. (Stepan Mikoyan) another flight. Another peculiarity of the MiG-9 was its tendency to ‘rear’ if you abruptly released the brakes at maximum power at take-off (because the jetwash that ran under the fuselage rarefied the air under the tail). To avoid its sinking on its tail, the brakes had to be released gradually." Soon after the student of Frunze Academy, but otherwise triple Hero of the Soviet Union and the second ranking allied ace Aleksandr I. Pokryshkin visited the jet flight test unit. The chief test pilot for the MiG-9 Mark Gallay was his guide around the new aircraft: "He carefully examined the exterior of the MiG-9, then he climbed into the cockpit and sat there for a long time. Then he started asking me questions very slowly. I wasn’t able to answer many of them from the top of my head. The purely technical aspects of jet flight had occupied me in such an extent that I didn’t even start contemplating the tactical and tactical-exploitative aspects. Time will come when we will have to deal with them too" And this time indeed came, but unfortunately the resulting problems were not optimally resolved. But there was another more important leap that the West enjoyed over the Soviet Union. While the Soviet scientist and engineers could base their aircraft on captured Jumo or Nene turbines, the license for which was won over a snooker game, they couldn’t exploit the greatest asset of the now dead Luftwaffe, namely tactical expertise. Among the group of pilots and leaders that survived probably the greatest war in the air there was a distinct aptitude towards the West. When confronted by an intelligence officer the statement Generalleutnant Galland is the epitome of this very reasonable inclination: "I am of the opinion that Germany has lost the war but the future of all Europe lies in the hands of the Allies. I have no place to go and no desire to go anywhere. I will be at your wishes at all times." The few pilots who weren't able to reach the western front to surrender were submitted to bogus trails that included charges for killing non-combatants with stray bullets from their fighter aircraft and were all found guilty. With the prospect of a decade in labor camps ran by NKVD2 forces the VVS to say the least didn’t profit much from their knowledge and experience. In the post war years training wasn’t a priority for the VVS. There was a distinctive lack of training sorties in the soviet operational regiments since they were mostly "ironing air" with constant patrols along the vast SSSR borders. Many of the veterans and other younger instinctive fighter pilots opted for the task of a flying instructor where there was enough flying time there to keep oneself in flying trim. The transition from piston to jet engine aircraft took its toll in operational readiness of the VVS. The Soviet Aircraft industry was then struggling to replace the aircraft of the Great Patriotic War3 with their redesigned counterparts. The aircraft built in wartime had very low lifetime expectancy and many of their parts were built of cheap and readily available materials like wood. The all-metal Il-10 replaced the wooden Il-2, the same thing happened with the La-7 being replaced by the La-9. Soviet Strategic aviation made a huge leap forward with the fleet of carbon copied B-29s named the Tu-4. But even the prides of the Soviet aircraft industry, the MiG-9 and the Yak-15 were both only stopgaps anticipating a new and true jet propelled fighter that could climb higher then 10.000m and could stay in the air for at least an hour. This fighter resulted from the competition by Yakovljev, Lavockin and MiG OKB when the prototype of the MiG-15 flew for the first time on December 30, 1947. In the west a myth was born that the MiG- 15 was built from the plans of the Ta-183. While it is true that some preliminary sketches were inspired by that design the credit for the success of the aircraft goes only to the MiG OKB. Namely the Ta-183 was indeed further developed by Kurt Tank into Polqui II, but that aircraft turned out to be nothing special and far from the MiG-15. Polqui II, Argentinean MiG-15 (FAA) In those years the Air Force Academies across the Soviet Union had a unique group of students sitting in their classrooms, since the vast majority of most successful Soviet pilot attended the academies at this time. The three most successful aces; I. N. Kozedub finished the Air Force Academy in 1948, Pokryshkin finished the Frunze Academy in 1948 and Rechkalov the Air Force academy in 1951 respectively. While these academies were of the chalk and blackboard variety experience was not lacking since the students had themselves survived as many as one hundred and fifty aerial combats were not considered as "yes" men. Moreover during the bitter battles of the Eastern Front the higher-ranking VVS officers didn’t put too much effort in subscribing the tactics that were to be used. Each fighter pilot that had his own ideas about aerial warfare was welcome to try them out. Whatever eventually worked was allowed as Aleksandr I. Pokryshkin notes: "Innovations, for instance new forms of attack, almost invariably encountered obstacles one way or the other. The air division commanders much too often demanded strict observance of service regulations, which were also prescribing, forms of attack. Veteran pilots thus were unable to convey their combat experience to the beginners. This, however, did not prevent them from utilizing their personal formula in air combat!!!" Therefore at the end of the war the VVS had almost diametrically different fighter pilots within its rank. When these pilots meet in the academies their views were analysed and a unified tactics manual was issued. Such a surprising evolution persuaded even the old hand Grigorij A. Rechkalov. The third best Allied Ace was exceptionally talented; he is often compared with Hans Joachim Marseille of the "Star of Africa" fame. He scored most of his victories on his trusty and fiercely agile lend-lease P-39 Aircobra during the bitter fighting above Kuban river. He was a solitary fighter with almost no regard to mutual support. But his mastery of his aircraft and the incredible deflection angles at which he could clinically bring down his opponent made him a deadly man - unfortunately many times for the formation he was leading. The pilots that flew with him were not as good as him and were not able to follow Rechkalov and often they paid the ultimate price. For this at one time he came into a conflict with the founder of modern day fighter tactics, incidentally the second scoring ace of the war- "Sasha" Pokryshkin But a few years later even Rechkalov recognised the lone wolf days are over in air combat. When he was asked what did he think new types of aircraft should posses in terms of agility, climbing performance, speed or ceiling he simply replied: "Above all they should have a good, reliable radio". In air combat the "para" or the pair was accepted as the basic formation while two "paras" made up a "zveno". Pokryshkin’s "vysota-skorost-manevr-ogon"4 rule was made sacred. With the end of the war the doors of the academies were wide opened. Despite many failures of the Stalinistic regime, Soviet war heroes were treated far better then their counterparts in Europe and America. As the 41 kill ace Vitalij I. Popkov remembers: "In many respects our postwar fates were probably similar. Most combat pilots remained in the ranks. They became familiar with new technologies and studied at military academies. For us, simple youths from families of modest means, a broad road into the future opened itself." THE SHANGHAI GRADUATION Transforming the VVS from piston to jet force, unifying the training and maintaining combat readiness along the borders that stretched literary from Port Arthur to Berlin was no small task. And in that time in history the Soviet-Sino negotiations took place in late 1949. In these negotiations a decision was reached to send a group of Soviet advisors to provide air defence of Shanghai protecting it from the Kuomintang raids. The other part of these negotiations was to send a group of Soviet naval officers to raise a modern Chinese Navy and to make all the necessary strategic and operational planning for the invasion of this island Formosa, nowadays known as Taiwan. Starshij Lejtenant Karelin in the cockpit of his La-11 in China summer 1950. Karelin will later see service with the jet MiG-15. (Perov-Jakubovich) These Soviets advisors were actually complete combat formations from the ranks of the newly formed PVO5 forces. The cores of the two divisions sent were three aviation regiments. One was equipped with MiG-15 and assigned for bomber interception, the second equipped with La-11 fighters for night fighting and the last one was the mixed ground attack regiment with Tu-2s and Il-10s. Since the loss and kill claims for the Kuomintang forces for that period are unavailable we can only submit the Soviet advisors kill tally which finals at no losses in combat, admitting one Tu-2 was lost to friendly fire5 while a MiG-15 and a La-11 were lost in accidents. The La-11 scored over two B-25s and shot down a pair of Mustangs. The first victory for the MiG-15 came when Kapitan Kalinikov shot down a P-38 Lightning on the 28th April 1950. Another Liberator fell to the MiG’s cannon in the night of 11/12 May, this time the victorious pilot was Kapitan Schinkarenko who was awarded the Order of Lenin for his feat. Apart from seriously hampering the Kuomintang operations the Soviet personnel logged close to 2600 hours spent in training the members of the Chinese Air Defence members. At the beginning of August 1950 the Soviet advisors started to decrease their role in Shanghai’s defence. Everything that the Soviets brought with them including the first model MiG-15 with red and white- stripped rudder was transferred into the Chinese PLA ranks on 19th October 1950. This ended the active participation of the Soviet airmen in the Chinese civil war. For detailed information regarding the beginning of the conflict we now know as China versus Taiwan see the appropriate section here. But we are back in the summer of 1950. A STRICTLY NORTH KOREAN AIR FORCE On June 25 1950, as a lone American C-54 cargo plane was set on fire at Seoul international airport by several strafing Yak-9s, the Army of the People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) crossed the 38th Parallel and entered the territory of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) in an attempt to unify the Korean peninsula under one rule. With the initial stamped over the weak South Korean resistance the Korean War had begun. Initially it seemed that the North Korean forces would obtain a rapid victory due to its evident superiority in men, armored vehicles and the sheer quantity of firepower. Such superiority also extended to the aerial element of warfare. According to US intelligence, at that time the North had 132 combat aircraft, 70 of them were the Yakovlev Yak-9P, which enjoyed immense popularity with the pilots in the Great patriotic war. Quite interestingly they were noted as heavy fighters most probably in the comparison to the earlier wooden Yaks. Of course the term heavy fighter would fade when pitted against the P-47 Thunderbolt or Hawker Tempest. The remaining 62 airframes were the Ilyushin Il-10 and Lavockin La-9. Again metalizing and somewhat improving their wooden ancestors, the Il-2M3 and the La-7, derived these two aircraft. School under the wings of their mount. North Korean pilots and a NKAF La-9 (Perov-Jakubovich) While the fact is that the late fifties were already deep jet age and on paper these types were obsolete, but still they had no trouble gaining air superiority over the South Koreans. The South Korean arsenal consisted of 3 unarmed T-6 Texan trainers and 13 liaison aircraft. That is a total of sixteen aircraft none of which were combat ready. However it had soon become clear that the North Korean Air Force (NKAF) would face a very different enemy. During an U.N. council it was decided that the U.N. forces would intervene in the Korean peninsula. The United States FEAF (Far East Air Force) was composed of the 5th, 13th and 20th Air Forces, which were based in Japan, Philippines and Okinawa respectively. The World War Two veteran of the China- India-Burma theatre Lt. Gen. George A. Stratemeyer commanded the whole FEAF. The 5th AF commanded by Maj. Gen. Earle E. Partridge received the responsibility of taking on the NKAF in an effort to help the South Korean war effort. The FEAF as a whole had more then enough assets to accomplish the mission at hand. 1172 aircraft, almost half of which were the jet F-80 Shooting Stars, while the other aircraft were 47 F-51s, 42 F-82s, 73 B-26s, 27 B-29s, 179 transports, 48 reconnaissance aircraft, and 252 miscellaneous types (T-6, SB-17, T-33, etc.). However, of these 1,172 aircraft only 657 of the 5th AF were spoken for the use in Korea and moreover not all of these were combat types and the FEAF at large was geared for air defense of Japan, Okinawa and Philippines and far from optimally prepared both in technology and in doctrine to provide valuable ground support. HIGH NOON AT KIMPO AND THE NKAF AIRFIELD ATTACKS The opening round of the NKAF against the USAF battle was fought over the airfields of Suwon and Kimpo where the USAF Mustangs, Twin Mustangs and Shooting Stars were flying defensive patrols against the North Korean strafers. Initially the NKAF piston driven fighters showed very aggressive flying and on 25th of June 1950 two Yaks engaged the Twin Mustang patrol over Kimpo. This combat ended with a draw, but the tone had been set. The first decisive clash of the 5th AF fighters and the NKAF planes took place just two days later when eleven Twin Mustangs of the 4th, 68th and 339th FIS and a high cover of 8th FBW Shooting Stars were covering the evacuation of Kimpo airbase. Suddenly the F-82G piloted by 1st Lt. Charles Moran was bounced by a group of Yak-9s. The Yaks didn’t profit much from the bounce only damaging Moran’s Twin Mustang they were immediately engaged by a Twin Mustang crewed by 1st Lt. William Hudson with 1st Lt. Carl Fraser as the radar operator. Despite the use of the clouds by the NKAF fighter the first USAF victory in Korea had been recorded. The Twin Mustangs piloted by Charles Moran and Major James W. Little also claimed one Yak each. Despite losing three fighters for a shot up tail the NKAF later that same day sent eight Ilyushin Il-10s, which attacked Kimpo airfield and destroyed seven South Korean aircraft on the ground. When heading back north they were intercepted by a four-ship formation of F-80C of 35th FBS, 8th FBW. The Shooting Star pilots claimed four destroyed Il-10s two of which by 1st Lt. Robert E. Wayne. Despite these losses to the American fighters the North Koreans were not about to stop their offensive against the airfields in the south. The strikes against Suwon on June 28th were most successful. During the first effort two pairs of Yak-9s destroyed a Twin Mustang and a B-26 in a strafing run. Three pairs of Yak-9s revisited Suwon the same day destroying another two C-54s. Yet a third strafing trip to Suwon the next day proved largely unsuccessful since a mixed formation of Yaks, Lavockins and Iljushins were intercepted by several F- 51D Mustangs of the 35th, 36th and Shooting Stars of the 80th FBS whish gave them a 'hot' welcome: three Il-10s, one La-9 and two Yak-9s were claimed as shot down by the USAF pilots. A few days later on 3rd July US Navy opened its score in Korea when two F9F Panther pilots of VF-51 claimed a Yak kill each. During the same day strafing attacks were directed against the HMS Black Swan and two ROK vessels while four Yaks dropped anti-personnel bombs on ROK troops south of Kimpo, killing 68 ROK soldiers. On 4 July aircraft knocked out a communications repeater station near Osan. Four planes also strafed and bombed Chonju on 11 July. Despite the losses inflicted on the NKAF and hampering their airfield offensive to some extent the South Koreans were losing the ground war. Seoul fell and the North Korean offensive seemed unstoppable. Since July USAF and USN fighters and fighter-bombers began a series of ground attacks on North Korean troops and materiel to stem the tide from the north. And still on July 20 Taejon fell but by early August the first signs of the losses inflicted by the US ground support efforts of the US