美国国会研究服务-中国海军现代化的含义美国海军的能力

CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress Ronald O'Rourke Specialist in Naval Affairs July 17, 2009 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL33153 China Naval Modernization Congressional Research Service Summary In the debate over future U.S. defense spending, including deliberations taking place in the current Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a key issue is how much emphasis to place on programs for countering improved Chinese military forces in coming years. Observers disagree on the issue, with some arguing that such programs should receive significant emphasis, others arguing that they should receive relatively little, and still others taking an intermediate position. The question of how much emphasis to place in U.S. defense planning on programs for countering improved Chinese military forces is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy, because many programs associated with countering improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy’s budget. China’s naval modernization effort encompasses a broad array of weapon acquisition programs, including programs for anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), surface-to-air missiles, mines, aircraft, submarines, destroyers and frigates, patrol craft, and amphibious ships. In addition, observers believe that China may soon begin an aircraft carrier construction program. China’s naval modernization effort also includes reforms and improvements in maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education, and training, and exercises. Although China’s naval modernization effort has substantially improved China’s naval capabilities in recent years, observers believe China’s navy continues to exhibit limitations or weaknesses in several areas. DOD and other observers believe that the near-term focus of China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, has been to develop military options for addressing the situation with Taiwan. Consistent with this goal, observers believe that China wants its military to be capable of acting as a so-called anti-access force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict involving Taiwan, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. naval and air forces. DOD and other observers believe that, in addition to the near-term focus on developing military options relating to Taiwan, additional goals of China’s naval modernization effort include improving China’s ability to do the following: assert or defend China’s claims in maritime territorial disputes and China’s interpretation of international laws relating freedom of navigation in exclusive economic zones (an interpretation at odds with the U.S. interpretation); protect China’s sea lines of communications to the Persian Gulf, on which China relies for some of its energy imports; and assert China’s status as a major world power, encourage other states in the region to align their policies with China, and displace U.S. regional military influence. A decision to place a relatively strong defense-planning emphasis on countering improved Chinese military forces in coming years could lead to one more of the following: increasing activities for monitoring and understanding developments in China’s navy, as well as activities for measuring and better understanding operating conditions in the Western Pacific; assigning a larger percentage of the Navy to the Pacific Fleet; homeporting more of the Pacific Fleet’s ships at forward locations such as Hawaii, Guam, and Japan; increasing training and exercises in operations relating to countering Chinese maritime anti-access forces, such as antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations; and placing a relatively strong emphasis on programs for developing and procuring highly capable ships, aircraft, and weapons. China Naval Modernization Congressional Research Service Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................1 Issue for Congress.................................................................................................................1 Scope, Sources, and Terminology..........................................................................................1 Background ................................................................................................................................2 Overview of China’s Naval Modernization............................................................................2 Date of Inception ............................................................................................................2 Elements of Modernization Effort ...................................................................................2 Limitations and Weaknesses............................................................................................2 Reasons for Modernization Effort....................................................................................3 Selected Elements of China’s Naval Modernization...............................................................4 Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs).............................................................................4 Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs)................................................................................4 Submarines .....................................................................................................................5 Aircraft Carriers..............................................................................................................8 Surface Combatants ...................................................................................................... 10 Amphibious Ships......................................................................................................... 13 Maritime Surveillance and Targeting Systems ............................................................... 14 Operations Away From Home Waters ............................................................................ 14 Comparing U.S. and Chinese Naval Capabilities ................................................................. 17 Potential Oversight Issues for Congress..................................................................................... 18 China as a Defense-Planning Priority .................................................................................. 18 Potential Navy-Related Program Implications ..................................................................... 22 Potential Implications in General................................................................................... 22 Actions Already Taken .................................................................................................. 23 Highly Capable Ships and Aircraft ................................................................................ 24 Pacific Fleet’s Share of the Navy................................................................................... 24 Homeporting Pacific Fleet Ships in Forward Locations ................................................. 25 Fleet Architecture—Larger vs. Smaller Ships ................................................................ 25 Legislative Activity for FY2010 ................................................................................................ 26 FY2010 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 2647/S. 1390) .................................................... 26 House ........................................................................................................................... 26 Senate ........................................................................................................................... 29 Tables Table 1. PLA Navy Submarine Commissionings..........................................................................7 Table 2. New PLA Navy Destroyer Classes ............................................................................... 11 Table 3. New PLA Navy Frigate Classes ................................................................................... 12 Appendixes Appendix. Prior-Year Legislative Activity ................................................................................. 30 China Naval Modernization Congressional Research Service Contacts Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 32 China Naval Modernization Congressional Research Service 1 Introduction Issue for Congress In the debate over future U.S. defense spending, including deliberations taking place in the current Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a key issue is how much emphasis to place on programs for countering improved Chinese military forces in coming years. Observers disagree on the issue, with some arguing that such programs should receive significant emphasis, others arguing that they should receive relatively little, and still others taking an intermediate position. The question of how much emphasis to place in U.S. defense planning on programs for countering improved Chinese military forces is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy, because many programs associated with countering improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy’s budget. In terms of potential impact on programs and spending, the Navy might have more at stake on this issue than the Army and Marine Corps, and perhaps at least as much, if not more, than the Air Force. Decisions that policymakers make on the issue of how much emphasis to place on programs for countering improved Chinese military forces could significantly affect the future size, composition, and capabilities of the Navy; Navy funding requirements; and the shipbuilding industrial base. Scope, Sources, and Terminology This report focuses on the potential implications of China’s naval modernization for future required U.S. Navy capabilities. Other CRS reports address separate issues relating to China. This report is based on unclassified open-source information, such as the annual Department of Defense (DOD) report to Congress on China’s military power,1 and published reference sources such as Jane’s Fighting Ships. For convenience, this report uses the term China’s naval modernization to refer to the modernization not only of China’s navy, but also of Chinese military forces outside China’s navy that can be used to counter U.S. naval forces operating in the Western Pacific, such as land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), land-based surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), land-based air force aircraft armed with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and land-based long-range radars for detecting and tracking ships at sea. China’s military is formally called the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA. Its navy is called the PLA Navy, or PLAN, and its air force is called the PLA Air Force, or PLAAF. The PLA Navy includes an air component that is called the PLA Naval Air Force, or PLANAF. China refers to its ballistic missile force as the Second Artillery Force. 1 U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009. Washington, 2009. (Hereafter 2009 DOD CMP. Editions for earlier years cited similarly.) China Naval Modernization Congressional Research Service 2 Background Overview of China’s Naval Modernization2 Date of Inception Observers date the beginning of China’s naval modernization effort to various points in the 1990s.3 Design work on some of China’s newer ship classes appears to have begun in the later 1980s.4 Some observers believe that China’s naval modernization effort may have been reinforced or accelerated by a 1996 incident in which the United States deployed two aircraft carrier strike groups to waters near Taiwan in response to Chinese missile tests and naval exercises near Taiwan. Elements of Modernization Effort China’s naval modernization effort encompasses a broad array of weapon acquisition programs, including programs for anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), surface-to-air missiles, mines, manned aircraft, unmanned aircraft, submarines, destroyers and frigates, patrol craft, amphibious ships and craft, mine countermeasures (MCM) ships, and supporting C4ISR5 systems. In addition, observers believe that China may soon begin an aircraft carrier construction program. Some of these acquisition programs have attracted particular interest and are discussed in further detail below. China’s naval modernization effort also includes reforms and improvements in maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education, and training, and exercises. Limitations and Weaknesses Although China’s naval modernization effort has substantially improved China’s naval capabilities in recent years, observers believe China’s navy continues to exhibit limitations or weaknesses in several areas, including capabilities for sustained operations by larger formations in distant waters, joint operations with other parts of China’s military, C4ISR systems, anti-air warfare (AAW), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), MCM, and a dependence on foreign suppliers for certain key ship components. DOD states that 2 Unless otherwise indicated, shipbuilding program information in this section is taken from Jane’s Fighting Ships 2008-2009, and previous editions Other sources of information on these shipbuilding programs may disagree regarding projected ship commissioning dates or other details, but sources present similar overall pictures regarding PLA Navy shipbuilding. 3 China ordered its first four Russian-made Kilo-class submarines in 1993, and its four Russian-made Sovremenny- class destroyers in 1996. China laid the keel on its first Song (Type 039) class submarine in 1991, its first Luhu (Type 052) class destroyer in 1990, its Luhai (Type 051B) class destroyer in 1996, and its first Jiangwei I (Type 053 H2G) class frigate in 1990. 4 First-in-class ships whose keels were laid down in 1990 or 1991 (see previous footnote) likely reflect design work done in the latter 1980s. 5 C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. China Naval Modernization Congressional Research Service 3 As China’s capabilities for local and regional operations have increased in certain areas since 2000, a number of limitations appear to have persisted. The PLA has developed new doctrine for joint warfighting and implemented organizational changes, such as including service commanders on the Central Military Commission, to facilitate the transition to a more “joint” force. However, joint integration still lags. Similarly, PLA air and amphibious lift capacity has not improved appreciably since 2000 when the Department of Defense assessed the PLA as capable of sealift of one infantry division. Likewise, China’s current ability to deliver about 5,000 parachutists in a single lift (less if equipment is carried at the same time) is similar to previous assessments. China’s at-sea replenishment has improved with experience since 2000, but the PLA Navy today remains limited by a small number of support vessels – much as it did then. In 2000, the Department of Defense projected aerial refueling as an operational capability by 2005. Today, while China has a few aerial refueling aircraft, it does not have the number of tankers, properly equipped combat aircraft, or sufficient training to employ this capability for power projection.6 Reasons for Modernization Effort DOD and other observers believe that the near-term focus of China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, has been to develop military options for addressing the situation with Taiwan. Consistent with this goal, observers believe that China wants its military to be capable of acting as a so-called anti-access force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict involving Taiwan, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. naval and air forces. ASBMs, attack submarines, and supporting C4ISR systems are viewed as key elements of China’s emerging anti-access force, though other force elements—such as ASCMs, LACMs (for attacking U.S. air bases and other facilities in the Western Pacific), and mines—are also of significance. DOD and other observers believe that, in addition to the near-term focus on developing military options relating to Taiwan, additional goals of China’s naval modernization effort include improving China’s ability to do the following: • assert or defend China’s claims in maritime territorial disputes7 and China’s interpretation of international laws relating freedom of navigation in exclusive economic zones (an interpretation at odds with the U.S. interpretation); • protect China’s sea lines of communications to the Persian Gulf, on which China relies for some of its energy imports; and • assert China’s status as a major world power, encourage other states in the region to align their policies with China, and displace U.S. regional military influence. The three additional goals above are potentially significant for at least three reasons. First, they imply that if the situation with Taiwan were somehow resolved, China could find continuing reasons to pursue its naval modernization effort. 6 2009 DOD CMP, p. viii. 7 For more on this topic, see CRS Report RL31183, China's Maritime Territorial Claims: Implications for U.S. Interests, by Kerry Dumbaugh et al. For an additional discussion, see James Manicom, “China’s Claims to an Extended Continental Shelf in the East China Sea: Meaning and Implications,” China Brief, July 9, 2009: 9-11; and Peter Dutton and John Garofano, “China Undermines Maritime Laws,” Far Easter Economic Review (online), April 3, 2009. Available online at http://www.feer.com/essays/2009/april/china-undermines-maritime-laws. China Naval Modernization Congressional Research Service 4 Second, they would imply that if China completes its planned buildup of Taiwan-related naval force elements, or if the situation with Taiwan were somehow resolved, the composition of China’s naval modernization effort could shift to include a greater emphasis on naval force elements that would be appropriate for supporting these additional goals, such as aircraft carriers, a larger number of nuclear-powered attack submarines, serial production of destroyers, underway replenishment ships, and overseas bases or support facilities. Third, these additional goals suggest that even if China’s military were never to engage in combat with an opposing military, China’s military forces, including in particular its naval forces, would still be used on a day-to-day basis to promote China’s political position in the Pacific. This would create an essentially political (as opposed to combat-related) reason for the United States or other countries to maintain a competitive presence in the region with naval and other forces that are viewed by observers in the Pacific as capable of effectively countering China’s