公正课件07

Justice 07 A Lesson in Lying / A Deal is a Deal 1 Justice 07 A Lesson in Lying / A Deal is a Deal Funding for this program is provided by Additional funding provided by Last time we began trying to we began by trying to navigate our way through Kant's moral theory. Now, fully to make sense of Kant moral theory in the groundwork requires that we be able to answer three questions. How can duty and autonomy go together? What's the great dignity in answering to duty? It would seem that these two ideas are opposed duty and autonomy. What's Kant's answer to that? Need someone here to speak up on Kant's behalf. Does he have an answer? Yes, go ahead, stand up. Kant believes you the only act autonomously when you are pursuing something only the name of duty and not because of your own circumstances such as ®C like you're only doing something good and moral if you're doing it because of duty and not because something of your own personal gain. Now why is that acting°≠ what's your name? My name is Matt. Matt, why is that acting on a freedom? I hear what you're saying about duty? Because you choose to accept those moral laws in yourself and not brought on from outside upon onto you. Okay, good. Because acting out of duty ®C Yeah.- is following a moral law That you impose on yourself. That you impose on yourself. That's what makes duty compatible with freedom.- Yeah. Okay, that's good Matt. That is Kant's answer. That's great. Thank you. So, Kant's answer is it is not in so far as I am subject to the law that I have dignity but rather in so far as with regard to that very same law, I'm the author and I am subordinated to that law on that ground that I took it as much as at I took it upon myself. I willed that law. Justice 07 A Lesson in Lying / A Deal is a Deal 2 So that's why for Kant acting according to duty and acting freely in the sense of autonomously are one and the same. But that raises the question, how many moral laws are there? Because if dignity consists and be governed by a law that I give myself, what's to guarantee that my conscience will be the same as your conscience? Who has Kant's answer to that? Yes? Because a moral law trend is not contingent upon seductive conditions. It would transcend all particular differences between people and so would be a universal law and in this respect there'd only be one moral law because it would be supreme. Right. That's exactly right. What's your name? Kelly. Kelly. So Kelly, Kant believes that if we choose freely out of our own consciences, the moral law we're guarantee to come up with one and the same moral law. -Yes. And that's because when I choose it's not me, Michael Sandel choosing. It's not you, Kelly choosing for yourself? What is it exactly? Who is doing the choosing? Who's the subject? Who is the agent? Who is doing the choosing? Reason? - Well reason°≠ Pure reason. Pure reason and what you mean by pure reason is what exactly? Well pure reason is like we were saying before not subject to any external conditions that may be imposed on that side. Good that's' great. So, the reason that does the willing, the reason that governs my will when I will the moral law is the same reason that operates when you choose the moral law for yourself and that's why it's possible to act autonomously to choose for myself, for each of us to choose for ourselves as autonomous beings and for all of us to wind up willing the same moral law, the categorical imperative. But then there is one big and very difficult question left even if you accept everything that Matt and Kelly had said so far. How is a categorical imperative possible? How is morality possible? Justice 07 A Lesson in Lying / A Deal is a Deal 3 To answer that question, Kant said we need to make a distinction. We need to make a distinction between two standpoints, two standpoints from which we can make sense of our experience. Let me try to explain what he means by these two standpoints. As an object of experience, I belong to the sensible world. There my actions are determined by the laws of nature and by the regularities of cause and effect. But as a subject of experience, I inhabit an intelligible world here being independent of the laws of nature I am capable of autonomy, capable of acting according to a law I give myself. Now Kant says that, "Only from this second standpoint can I regard myself as free for to be independent of determination by causes in the sensible world is to be free." If I were holy and empirical being as the utilitarian assume, if I were a being holy and only subject to the deliverances of my senses, to pain and pleasure and hunger and thirst and appetite, if that's all there were to humanity, we wouldn't be capable of freedom, Kant reasons because in that case every exercise of will would be conditioned by the desire for some object. In that case all choice would be heteronomous choice governed by the pursued of some external end."When we think of ourselves as free," Kant writes, "we transfer ourselves into the intelligible world as members and recognize the autonomy of the will." That's the idea of the two standpoints. So how are categorical imperatives possible? Only because the idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world? Now Kant admits we aren't only rational beings. We don't only inhabit the intelligible world, the realm of freedom. If we did -- if we did, then all of our actions would invariably accord with the autonomy of the will. But precisely because we inhabit simultaneously the two standpoints, the two realms, the realm of freedom and the realm of necessity precisely because we inhabit both realms there is always potentially a gap between what we do and what we ought to do between is and ought. Another way of putting this point and this is the point with which Kant concludes the groundwork, morality is not empirical. Whatever you see in the world, whatever you discover through science can't decide moral questions. Morality stands at a certain distance from the world, from the empirical world. And that's why no science could deliver moral truth. Now I want to test Kant's moral theory with the hardest possible case, a case that he raises, the case of the murderer at the door. Kant says that lying is wrong. Justice 07 A Lesson in Lying / A Deal is a Deal 4 We all know that. We've discussed why. Lying is at odds with the categorical imperative. A French Philosopher, Benjamin Constant wrote an article responding to the groundwork where he said, "This absolute probation online What if a murderer came to your door looking for your friend who was hiding in your house? And the murderer asked you point blank, "Is your friend in your house?" Constant says, "It would be crazy to say that the moral thing to do in that case is to tell the truth." Constant says the murderer certainly doesn't deserve the truth and Kant wrote to reply. And Kant stuck by his principle that lying even to the murderer at the door is wrong. And the reason it's wrong, he said is once you start taking consequences into account to carve out exceptions to the categorical imperative, you've given up the whole moral framework. You've become a consequentialist or maybe a rule utilitarian. But most of you and most to our Kant's readers think there's something odd and impossible about this answer. I would like to try to defend Kant on this point and then I want to see whether you think that my defense is plausible, and I would want to defend him within the spirit of his own account of morality. Imagine that someone comes to your door. You were asked that question by this murder. You are hiding your friend. Is there a way that you could avoid telling a lie without selling out your friend? Does anyone have an idea of how you might be able to do that? Yes? Stand up. I was just going to say if I were to let my friend in my house to hide in the first place, I'd probably make a plan with them so I'd be like, "Hey I'll tell the murderer you're here, but escape," and that's one of the options mentioned. But I'm not sure that's a Kantian option. You're still lying though. No because he's in the house but he won't be. Oh I see. All right, good enough. One more try. If you just say you don't know where he is because he might not be locked in the closet. He might have left the closet. You have no clue where he could be. Justice 07 A Lesson in Lying / A Deal is a Deal 5 So you would say, I don't know which wouldn't actually be a lie because you weren't at that very moment looking in the closet. Exactly.-So it would be strictly speaking true. Yes. And yet possibly deceiving, misleading.-But still true. What's your name?-John. John. All right, John has...now John may be on to something. John you're really offering us the option of a clever evasion that is strictly speaking true. This raises the question whether there is a moral difference between an outright lie and a misleading truth. From Kant's point of view there actually is a world of difference between a lie and a misleading truth. Why is that even though both might have the same consequences? But then remember Kant doesn't base morality on consequences. He bases it on formal adherence to the moral law. Now, sometimes in ordinary life we make exceptions for the general rule against lying with the white lie. What is a white lie? It's a lie to make...you're well to avoid hurting someone's feelings for example. It's a lie that we think of as justified by the consequences. Now Kant could not endorse a white lie but perhaps he could endorse a misleading truth. Supposed someone gives you a tie, as a gift, and you open the box and it's just awful. What do you say? Thank you. You could say thank you. But they're waiting to see what you think of it or they ask you what do you think of it? You could tell a white lie and say it's beautiful. But that wouldn't be permissible from Kant's point of view. Could you say not a white lie but a misleading truth, you open the box and you say, "I've never seen a tie like that before. Thank you." You shouldn't have. That's good. Justice 07 A Lesson in Lying / A Deal is a Deal 6 Can you think of a contemporary political leader who engaged...you can? Who are you thinking of? You remember the whole carefully worded denials in the Monica Lewinsky affair of Bill Clinton. Now, those denials actually became the subject of very explicit debate in argument during the impeachment hearings. Take a look at the following excerpts from Bill Clinton. Is there something do you think morally at stake in the distinction between a lie and a misleading carefully couched truth? I want to say one thing to the American people. I want you to listen to me. I'm going to say this again. I did not have sexual relations with that woman Miss Lewinsky. I never told anybody to lie not a single time, never. These allegations are false. Did he lie to the American people when he said I never had sex with that woman? You know, he doesn't believe he did and because of the °≠ Well he didn't explain it. He did explain that, explain congressman. What he said was to the American people that he did not have sexual relations and I understand you're not going to like this congressman because you will see it as a hair-splitting evasive answer. But in his own mind his definition was not... Okay, I understand that argument.-Okay. All right, so there you have the exchange. Now at the time, you may have thought this was just a legalistic hair-splitting exchange between a Republican who wanted to impeach Clinton and a lawyer who is trying to defend him. But now in the light of Kant, do you think there is something morally at stake in the distinction between a lie and an evasion, a true but misleading statement? I'd like to hear from defenders of Kant. People who think there is a distinction. Are you ready to defend Kant? Well I think when you try to say that lying and misleading truths are the same thing; you're basing it on consequentialist argument which is that they achieve the same thing. But the fact to the fact to the matter is you told the truth and you intended that people would Justice 07 A Lesson in Lying / A Deal is a Deal 7 believe what you are saying which was the truth which means it is not morally the same as telling a lie and intending that they believe it is the truth even though it is not true. Good. What's your name?-Diana. So Diana says that Kant has a point here and it's a point that might even come to the aid of Bill Clinton and that is °≠ well what about that? There's someone over here. For Kant motivation is key, so if you give to someone because primarily you want to feel good about yourself Kant would say that has no moral worth. Well with this, the motivation is the same. It's to sort of mislead someone, it's to lie, it's to sort of throw them off the track and the motivation is the same. So there should be no difference. Okay, good. So here isn't the motive the same Diana? What do you say to this argument that well the motive is the same in both cases there is the attempt or at least the hope that one's pursuer will be misled? Well that ®C you could look it that way but I think that the fact is that your immediate motive is that they should believe you. The ultimate consequence of that is t hat they might be deceived and not find out what was going on. But that your immediate motive is that they should believe you because you're telling the truth. May I help a little?-Sure. You and Kant. Why don't you say...and what's your name, I'm sorry? Wesley. Why don't you say to Wesley it's not exactly the case that the motive in both cases is to mislead? They're hoping, they're hoping that the person will be misled by the statement "I don't know where they are" or "I never had sexual relations." You're hoping that they will be misled but in the case where you're telling the truth, you're motive is to mislead while at the same time telling the truth and honoring the moral law and staying within the bounds of the categorical imperative. I think Kant's answer would be Diana, yes?-Yes. You like that?-I do. Okay. So I think Kant's answer would be unlike a falsehood, unlike a lie, a misleading truth pays a certain homage to duty. And the homage it pays to duty is what justifies that the work of even the work of the evasion. Justice 07 A Lesson in Lying / A Deal is a Deal 8 Diana, yes you like? Okay. And so there is something, some element of respect for the dignity of the moral law in the careful evasion because Clinton could have told an outright lie but he didn't. And so I think Kant's insight here is in the carefully couched but true evasion. There is a kind of homage to the dignity of the moral law that is not present in the outright lie and that, Wesley, is part of the motive. It's part of the motive. Yes, I hope he will be misled. I hope the murderer will run down the road or go to the mall looking for my friend instead at the closet. I hope that will be the effect. I can't control that. I can't control the consequences. But what I can control is standing by and honoring however I pursue the ends, I hope will unfold to do so in a way that is consistent with respect for the moral law. Wesley, I don't think, is entirely persuaded but at least this brings out, this discussion brings out some of what it's at stake, what's morally at stake in Kant's notion of the categorical imperative. As long as any effort this involved I would say that the contract is valid then. It should take effect. But why? What was...what morally can you point to? For example two people agreed to be married and one suddenly called the other in two minutes say I changed my mind. Does the contract have obligation on both sides? Well I am tempted to say no. Fine. Last time we talked about Kant's categorical imperative and we considered the way he applied the idea of the categorical imperative to the case of lying. I want to turn briefly to one other application of Kant's moral theory and that's his political theory. Now Kant says that just laws arise from a certain kind of social contract. But this contract he tells us is of an exceptional nature. What makes the contract exceptional is that it is not an actual contract that happens when people come together and try to figure out what the constitution should be. Justice 07 A Lesson in Lying / A Deal is a Deal 9 Kant points out that the contract that generates justice is what he calls an idea of reason. It's not an actual contract among actual men and women gathered in a constitutional convention. Why not? I think Kant's reason is that actual men and women gathered in real constitutional convention would have different interests, values, aims, and it would also be differences of bargaining power and differences of knowledge among them. And so the laws that would result from their deliberations wouldn't necessarily be just, wouldn't necessarily conform to principles of right but would simply reflect the differences a bargaining power, the special interests the fact that some might know more than others about law or about politics. So Kant says, "A contract that generates principles of right is merely an idea of reason but it has undoubted practical reality because it can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by the united will of the whole nation." So Kant is a contractarian, but he doesn't trace the origin or the rightness of law to any actual social contract. This contrives to an obvious question. What is the moral force of a hypothetical contract, a contract that never happened? That's the question we take up today but in order to investigate it, we need to turn to a modern philosopher, John Rawls, who worked out in his book, A Theory of Justice, in great detail and account of a hypothetical agreement as the basis for justice. Rawls' theory of justice in broad outline is parallel to Kant's in two important respects. Like Kant, Rawls was a critic of utilitarianism."Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice," Rawls' writes, "that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. The rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus social interests." The second respect in which Rawls' theory follows Kant's is on the idea that principles of justice properly understood can be derived from a hypothetical social contract. Not an actual one. And Rawls works this out in fascinating detail with the device of what he calls the "veil of ignorance". The way to arrive at the rights...the basic rights that we must respect, the basic framework of rights and duties is to imagine that we were gathered together trying to choose the principles to govern our collective lives without knowing certain important particular fact about ourselves. That's the idea of the veil o