NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
WILL THE EURO EVENTUALLY SURPASS THE DOLLAR
AS LEADING INTERNATIONAL RESERVE CURRENCY?
Menzie Chinn
Jeffrey Frankel
Working Paper 11510
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11510
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
July 2005
The authors would like to thank for helpful comments Jaewoo Lee and Ted Truman and other participants
at the NBER conference in Newport, RI. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
©2005 by Menzie Chinn and Jeffrey Frankel. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given
to the source.
Will the Euro Eventually Surpass the Dollar as Leading International Reserve Currency?
Menzie Chinn and Jeffrey Frankel
NBER Working Paper No. 11510
July 2005
JEL No. F02, F31, F33
ABSTRACT
Might the dollar eventually follow the precedent of the pound and cede its status as leading
international reserve currency? Unlike ten years ago, there now exists a credible competitor: the
euro. This paper econometrically estimates determinants of the shares of major currencies in the
reserve holdings of the world’s central banks. Significant factors include: size of the home country,
inflation rate (or lagged depreciation trend), exchange rate variability, and size of the relevant home
financial center (as measured by the turnover in its foreign exchange market). We have not found
that net international debt position is an important determinant. Network externality theories would
predict a tipping phenomenon. Indeed we find that the relationship between currency shares and
their determinants is nonlinear (which we try to capture with a logistic function, or else with a
dummy “leader” variable for the largest country). But changes are felt only with a long lag (we
estimate a weight on the preceding year’s currency share around .9). The advent of the euro
interrupts the continuity of the historical data set. So we estimate parameters on pre-1999 data, and
then use them to forecast the EMU era. The equation correctly predicts a (small) narrowing in the
gap between the dollar and euro over the period 1999-2004. Whether the euro might in the future
rival or surpass the dollar as the world’s leading international reserve currency appears to depend on
two things: (1) do the United Kingdom and enough other EU members join euroland so that it
becomes larger than the US economy, and (2) does US macroeconomic policy eventually undermine
confidence in the value of the dollar, in the form of inflation and depreciation. What we learn about
functional form and parameter values helps us forecast, contingent on these two developments, how
quickly the euro might rise to challenge the dollar. Under two important scenarios � the remaining
EU members, including the UK, join EMU by 2020 or else the recent depreciation trend of the dollar
persists into the future � the euro may surpass the dollar as leading international reserve currency
by 2022.
Menzie Chinn
Department of Economics
University of Wisconsin-Madison
1180 Observatory Drive
Madison, WI 53706
and NBER
mchinn@lafollette.wisc.edu
Jeffrey A. Frankel
Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
79 JFK Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
and NBER
jeffrey_frankel@harvard.edu
2
Will the Euro Eventually Surpass the Dollar
as Leading International Reserve Currency?
MENZIE CHINN, University of Wisconsin and NBER
JEFFREY FRANKEL, Harvard University and NBER
Might the dollar lose its status as unrivaled international reserve currency? Could it
be "going the way of sterling, the guilder, the ducat and the bezant." 1 Some authors argued
as much ten years ago.2 The international use of the yen and mark had risen rapidly in the
1970s and 1980s, reducing the share of the dollar. (See Table A or Figure 7.) Some in the
early 1990s suggested that the yen or mark might eventually overtake the dollar as the lead
international currency.
By the turn of the millennium, that idea had come to sound far-fetched. In the
meantime, both Japan and Germany had undergone a decade of remarkably low economic
growth, the yen had declined, and the mark had disappeared altogether. Fears that the
international currency status of the dollar was under challenge were premature, as should
have been obvious at the time. Indeed, the international role of the dollar, at least as
measured by its share of central banks international reserves, had stopped declining in 1990
and had begun to reverse in the early 1990s. (Again, refer to Table A or the graph.)
Meanwhile, dollarization was increasing in Latin America and elsewhere.
These developments were overshadowed by exchange rate movements: the
continuation of the dollar’s post-1985 trend of depreciation, which lasted until 1995.
Perhaps people have trouble distinguishing the question whether a currency like the
dollar is declining in international reserve currency status from the question whether its
foreign exchange value is falling. It seems that the question of whether the dollar might
lose its privileged status as lead international currency comes up each time the dollar
experiences a few years of depreciation (late 1970s, early 1990s). The dollar underwent a
new depreciation in 2002-04. On the basis of this fact alone, one could have predicted
that international economists might be once again called upon to try to answer questions
1
Kindleberger (1995, p.6)
2
Others who “cried wolf,” besides Kindleberger, include Kunz (1995). The February 25, 1995,
issue of The Economist included an article and leader arguing that "the dollar's dominance is
waning," at the expense of the DM in particular. Or Ramon Moreno, “Will the Yen Replace the
Dollar?,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, no. 96-30, Oct. 18, 1996.
3
regarding the international currency rankings. 3 Indeed, as the rise of the dollar/euro
exchange rate reached its third year in late 2004, the financial press began to report that
central banks were on the verge of large-scale diversification out of dollars.4
This time may be different than the earlier scares in the late 1970s and early
1990s. The difference is that the euro now exists as a plausible rival.5 Notwithstanding
the bumps in the road of European monetary integration and the doubts of many American
economists, EMU became a reality in 1999, and the euro appeared in physical form four
years later. The new currency passed the most fundamental tests: the transition was
relatively smooth, 12 countries today use the euro (and only the euro), and the new currency
has entered into international use as well.
In the first few years of its life, the euro did not receive much respect. This was
largely related to its substantial weakness against the dollar. Certainly anyone who had
predicted that on January 1, 1999, there would be a worldwide shift out of dollar reserves
into the new alternative, and that the increased demand for euros might cause a large
appreciation, was initially disappointed.6 But subsequently this depreciation was fully
reversed, and then some, in the strong appreciation of 2002-04.
This paper will seek to ascertain the determinants of international reserve currency
status, and to make some predictions as to whether the euro might under some conditions
eventually overtake the dollar, and if so when.
3
“Sometime soon, newspaper stories will begin reporting that central banks in Asia and
elsewhere are diversifying out of dollars into euros, and that the dollar is in danger of eventually
losing its status as premier international currency.” -- Frankel (2004).
4
E.g., Economist 12/04/04, 2/26/05; FT 1/24/05, 3/8/05, 3/11/05, 3/19/05, 5/17/05, 5/19/05,
5/21/05; NYT 3/11/05; and many others.
5
One of the present authors in the mid-1990s took what felt at the time like a minority position
regarding the prospects for the dollar (e.g., in Frankel, 1995): “It is unlikely that some other
currency will supplant the dollar as the world’s premier currency...There is no plausible alternative
for the number one position” (Eichengreen and Frankel (1996, p.363). But those papers also
acknowledged “the possibility of a single currency coming into use throughout Europe, which would
indeed pose a challenge to the supremacy of the dollar if it was to happen...” (p. 366). “And as the
euro becomes more important as a vehicle currency, it is likely to gain use as an intervention
currency and to become an increasingly popular form in which other counties hold their reserves.
Ultimately, the creation of the euro would mean a new and increasingly powerful rival for the dollar
as the international monetary system’s leading reserve currency.” (p.372).
6
“There will probably be a portfolio diversification of $500 billion to $1 trillion into euros. Most
of this shift will come out of the dollar. This in turn will have a significant impact on exchange
rates during a long transition period. The euro will move higher than will be comfortable for
many Europeans…The euro will probably be strong from its inception.” -- Bergsten (1997, p. 84-
85). Portes and Rey (1998), also writing at a time of dollar strength, suggested that American
policymakers had been overly pessimistic about the euro’s prospects. These authors were
exceptional in their counter-cyclical faith in the euro.
4
Table A
Share of National Currencies in Total Identified
Official Holdings of Foreign Exchange, End of Year (in percent)
1965 1973 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2003
All countries
U.S. dollar 56.1 64.5 79.2 57.9 53.9 48.9 59.1 63.8
Japanese yen 0.0 0.1 2.2 4.1 6.8 7.4 5.1 4.8
Pound sterling 20.0 4.2 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.6 3.3 4.4
Swiss franc 0.0 1.1 1.9 2.3 1.7 0.8 0.5 0.4
Euro 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- -- -- -- 19.7
Deutsche mark 0.1 5.5 9.3 11.6 13.8 14 13.7 --
French franc 0.9 0.7 1.1 1 0.9 2.6 1.5 --
Netherlands guilder 0.0 0.5 0.7 1 1.2 0.7 0.5 --
ECUs 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.8 13.6 9.7 5 --
Unspecified currencies 22.9 23.6 4.1 6.5 6.4 13.3 11.3 6.8
Notes: Shares of total currency holdings by central banks. Source: IMF data--updated version of statistics
contained in the IMF Annual Report. 1997 and 2002 figures from 2004 Annual Report.
1. International Currency Rankings
First some definitions. An international currency is one that is used outside its
home country. Reserve currency status is the main subject of this paper, but it is just one of
a number of possible measures of international use. The others can be neatly summarized
by means of a simple 2x3 table originally introduced by Peter Kenen. (See Table B.) The
classic three functions of money domestically -- store of value, medium of exchange and
unit of account – can be transferred to the level of international money. Under each
function, there are important examples of how government authorities and private actors
sometimes choose to use a major international currency that is not their own. The subject of
this paper appears in the first cell, the decision of central banks to hold their reserves in the
form of particular currencies. But other possible criteria of an international currency also
appear in the table: currency substitution (e.g., the circulation of dollar currency in Latin
America and elsewhere), denominating or invoicing foreign trade, denominating or
invoicing international financial flows, pegs for smaller countries' currencies, and foreign
exchange trading.
We focus on reserve currency holdings for two reasons. First, annual data for all
relevant currencies are available over the last 30 years or more; the other international roles
that appear in Table B are nowhere near as comprehensively quantifiable. A second reason
for focusing on the reserve currency role is that it is more relevant than the others to the
important questions of whether the United States will continue to be able to finance its
current account deficit.
5
Table B: Roles of an International Currency
Function of money: Governments Private actors
Store of value International reserves Currency substitution
(private dollarization)
Medium of exchange Vehicle currency for foreign
exchange intervention
Invoicing trade and
financial transactions
Unit of account Anchor for pegging local
currency
Denominating trade and
financial transactions
Should we care about international currency rankings?
Is this question important? International currency status might seem to have fewer
direct implications for the real economy than does the currency’s exchange rate. But it is
important nevertheless. To begin with, the exchange rate question and the international
currency question have always been causally inter-related [notwithstanding some periods
such as the early 1990s when they have moved in opposite directions]. But the topic has
become newly urgent in light of the question whether the US current account deficit is
sustainable. How long can it continue? The historical experiences of other countries with
current account thresholds and reversals are not particularly relevant, in that the argument
for sanguinity relies on the special role of the dollar in the world financial system. This
paper was written for a conference on the sustainability of the G-7 current account
imbalances, following two years when the major source of financing of the deficit was
purchases of dollar assets by foreign central banks, especially in Asia. Unless foreign
private investors resume willingness to accumulate ever-greater quantities of US assets, the
sustainability of the US current account deficit depends on the willingness of foreign central
banks to do so. That, in turn, depends on two factors: (1) the desire of foreign central banks
to continue intervening in foreign exchange markets to try to dampen or prevent the
appreciation of their currencies against the dollar, and (2) the willingness of central banks to
continue to hold the lion’s share of their reserves in the form of dollars as opposed to some
rival currency, i.e., the euro. While the former question received a fair amount of attention
in 2003-04,7 the latter question did not until 2005.8
ADVANTAGES OF HAVING AN INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY
One can think of four advantages to a country of having its currency play a large role in
the world.
(1) Convenience for the country's residents. It is certainly more convenient for a
country's exporters, importers, borrowers and lenders to be able to deal in its own currency
than foreign currencies. The global use of the dollar, as with the global use of the English
language, is a natural advantage that American businessmen tend to take for granted.
7
E.g., Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003); Goldstein (2004).
8
Perhaps the question whether the currency preferences of central banks will continue to assign a
special role to the dollar is not as important as the analogous question for private investors. But
this is still a matter of the dollar’s place as premier international currency, of which the reserve
holdings is the most easily quanitified aspect.
6
(2) More business for the country's banks and other financial institutions. There need be
no firm connection between the currency in which banking is conducted and the nationality
of the banks (nor between the nationalities of the savers and borrowers and the nationality of
the intermediating bank). Nevertheless, it stands to reason that U.S. banks have a
comparative advantage at dealing in dollars, British banks at dealing in pounds, etc.
(3) Seignorage. This is perhaps the most important advantage of having other countries
hold one's currency. They must give up real goods and services, or ownership of the real
capital stock, in order to add to the currency balances that they use. Seignorage is not
necessarily large if defined narrowly, as the low-interest loan accruing to the US when
foreign central banks hold their reserves as dollars. But it is much more important if defined
broadly as America’s “exorbitant privilege” of being able to borrow abroad large amounts in
its own currency, especially while simultaneously earning much higher returns on FDI and
other investments in other countries. This was the basis of European resentment against the
U.S. basic balance deficit in the 1960s, and against the dollar standard to the extent that the
European need to acquire dollars was the fundamental origin of the deficit, as will be seen
below. The willingness of Asians and others to continue financing the US current account
deficit in the future is certainly related to the dollar’s continued role as premier international
reserve currency. We are not necessarily talking about seignorage narrowly defined
(foreign holdings of US currency, which doesn’t pay interest). More important is the US
ability to run up huge debts denominated in its own currency at low interest rates. The
US has consistently earned more on it investments overseas than it has had to pay on its
debts, a differential of about 1.2 per cent per annum (e.g., Cline, p. 45), Possibly this
American role of the world's banker (taking short-term liquid deposits, and lending long
term in riskier higher-return assets) would survive the loss of the dollar as leading
international currency. But it seems possible that the loss of one would lead to the loss
of the other.
(4) Political power and prestige. Britain's gradual loss of key currency status was
simultaneous with its gradual loss of political and military pre-eminence. As with most of
the other benefits and conditions mentioned above, causality here flows in both directions.
We shall come back to this issue in Section 3.
DISADVANTAGES OF HAVING AN INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY
One can think of two disadvantages from the viewpoint of a key-currency country. They
explain why Japan and Germany were in the past reluctant to have their currencies held and
used widely, and why China worries about the implications of beginning to internationalize
its currency.
(1) Larger fluctuations in demand for the currency. It is not automatically clear that
having one's currency held by a wide variety of people around the world will result in
greater variability of demand. Such instability is probably more likely to follow from an
increase in the degree of capital mobility, than from key currency status per se.
Nevertheless, the two are related. Central banks are sometimes concerned that
internationalization will make it more difficult to control the money stock. This problem
need not arise if they do not intervene in the foreign exchange market. But the central bank
may view letting fluctuations in demand for the currency be reflected in the exchange rate as
being just as undesirable as letting them be reflected in the money supply.
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(2) An increase in the average demand for the currency. This is the other side of
seignorage. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Japanese and German governments were
particularly worried about the possibility that if assets were made available to foreign
residents, an inflow of capital would cause the currency to appreciate and render exporters
less competitive on world markets. Again, this is also China’s prob