上层阶级的自我毁灭（中英文）

上层阶级的自我毁灭 描绘十七世纪威尼斯风物的画作，画中的景物包括大运河银行和总督官邸，该画作者为Leandro Bassano 14世纪初，威尼斯是欧洲最富裕的城市。它经济的核心是“伙会”，是股份合作公司的一种基本形式，他们为贸易远征队提供经费。伙会的光辉之处在于它向新进入者开放，允许具有冒险精神的企业家和资助商船航行的伙会商人共担财务风险。 威尼斯的精英们是（这种模式的）主要受益者。像所有的开放经济一样，他们的（开放经济也）是动荡的。今天，我们认为社会流动是个好东西。但是如果你处于社会的顶层，流动也意味着竞争。在1315年，当威尼斯这个城市共和国处于其经济势力的鼎盛时期，上层阶级沉湎于他们所拥有的特权，发行Libro d’Oro，亦即“黄金宝典”（Book of Gold）——一部贵族们编制的官方登记册——来停止社会流动。如果你的名字不在上面，那么你将不能进入统治集团。 这种政治上的转变，早在20年前就已经开始。它是如此具有打击性以至于威尼斯人都称它为关闭条例（La Serrata），不久之后这份政治上的文件开始影响经济层面。在统治集团的控制下，威尼斯逐渐切断新进入者的商业机会，最后，伙会被禁止。统治阶级的精英们不断攫取他们自身的短期利益，但从长远的角度看，关闭条例的是统治阶级灭亡的开端，更广泛来说，是终结威尼斯繁荣的起点。到了1500年，威尼斯的人口比它1330年所拥有的还少。在17和18世纪，欧洲的其它地区开始崛起，威尼斯则继续萎缩。 威尼斯兴衰的故事在经济学家达龙·阿森莫古（Daron Acemoglu）和詹姆斯A.罗宾逊（James A. Robinson）的著作——《国家为何衰亡——权力、繁荣和贫困的起源》中被论及。威尼斯的故事佐证了他们的论点——一个国家的兴盛或者衰亡，关键看这个国家的管理机构是普惠性还是榨取性的。在压榨性的国家里，统治阶级的精英们的目的是从社会的其他部分榨取尽可能多的财富。而普惠性国家则会给予每个人获得经济机会的渠道；通常来说，更多的普惠性带来更大繁荣，而更大的繁荣又为更大的普惠性提供激励。 美国的历史可以被看做这么一种良性循环。但正如威尼斯的故事所昭示的，良性的循环也可以被打破。从普惠性体系中发家的精英们可能忍不住要抽掉当初让他们爬上社会顶端的梯子。最终，社会变成了压榨性的，经济也会失去活力。 那是一种被马克思所预言的未来，他说资本主义本身包含着自我毁灭的种子。而这正是现在美国所面临的危险——占总数1%的精英们脱离大众，追求一种加大二者鸿沟的经济、政治和社会议程——最终摧毁缔造美国繁荣以及让这1%先富起来的开放体系。 上层和其他人之间的社会尤其是教育裂口在不断加大，你会发现美国社会正在逐步走向封闭。美国社会中的底层和中层正在不断遭受侵蚀。在学校里，这些苦苦挣扎的家庭的孩子们已经被远远抛在后头。 经济学家指出，中产阶级的苦恼很大部分是全球化和技术革新的造成的。文化可能也产生了一定的影响。自由主义作家查理斯·穆雷（Charles Murray）在他最近一本关于白人工人阶级的书中将中产阶级空心化的原因归结为富人群体对传统家庭价值观的背离以及旧式职业道德的盛行。 这两种说法都有道理。但是面对美国社会日益加重的分歧，占总数1%的富人不能逃避他们应负的责任。不平等加剧的背后就有经济的力量在驱动，但正如奥巴马总统的前预算科科长彼得R.奥尔扎格（Peter R. Orszag）所告诉我的那样，公共政策加重而不是缓解了这种趋势。 当“胜者全拿”的经济模式让那些处于社会顶端的人获益时，他们的税负也在减轻。当工会的合法权利正在弱化，反对他们（指“财团”）的理论依据被财团资助的智库无情地驳倒时，（公共政策）对高层薪资水平的容忍度正在加大。在50年代，那些处于收入分配顶端的人的边际所得税税率飙升了90%——一个甚至会让今天的民主党人退缩的数字。与此同时，在2009年度的400个最为富有的纳税人中，有6人完全没有缴纳联邦所得税，27人只交了10%或者更少。没有一个人的税负超过其所得的35%。 从历史的观点上看，美国社会拥有比欧洲更高的社会流动性，无论是左派还是右派，都将这种经济的开放性看作是这个国家经济活力的重要来源。但是近期的几项研究已经表明：在当今美国，一个人若要摆脱其所出生的阶级，难度要高于欧洲。加拿大经济学家迈尔斯·克拉克（Miles Corak）发现：随着收入不平等的加剧，社会的流动性会减弱——这种现象，白宫经济顾问委员会主席艾伦B.克鲁格（Alan B. Krueger）称之为了“不起的盖茨比曲线”。 催生美国中产阶级的受教育程度不再上升。超级精英们将社会资源无节制地用在他们自己的孩子身上，而公立学校则严重缺乏资金。这是一种新的封闭。精英教育仅为社会上层阶级所享有的趋势越来越严重。比尔·克林顿和巴拉克·奥巴马让他们的女儿在专门的私立学校上学；我也是如此。 今年早些时候，我在瑞士达沃斯举行的世界经济论坛上采访了布朗大学校长鲁思•西蒙斯(Ruth Simmons),一个哈佛出身的文学学者，他致力于让更多的穷学生能够进入布朗大学，但当我问及现在是否到了废除靠馀荫入学名校制度——这本常春藤盟校自己的“黄金宝典”时，他耸肩笑着对我说：不，我还有一个孙女。现在还不是时候。 美国的封闭表现出一种更为隐秘的模式：让经济规律的天平倾向有利于上层的那一端。如今，寡头政治集团成员间的裙带资本主义比威尼斯时代的更为隐秘。它主要通过两种途径实现： 首先是将国家稀缺资源的控制权掌握在自己的手中。米特·罗姆尼说：“大约47%的人是靠政府供着的”——此言是相当荒谬的。事实是，处于社会顶端的人，尤其是处于经济金字塔最顶端的那一小撮人——他们是最善于从政府那里攫取资助并让其他人为其埋单的。 证据A是在两党在对待2008年华尔街救市的7000亿救市款问题上采取联立的政策。证据B是裙带复苏。经济学家伊曼纽尔·赛斯（Emmanuel Saez）和托马斯·皮克迪（Thomas Piketty）发现93%来源于2009至2010年度经济复苏的股利收入进入了前1%的最富有纳税人的腰包。而前0.01%最富有纳税人更是占有了这些额外收入的37%，平均每一户家庭进账420万美元。 其次是裙带资本主义的表现形式更加直接：他们获得税收特别待遇、贸易保护和政府津贴外加部门保护。企业这块肥肉就像是两党合作烹调出来的一道菜：在当前的政府体系下，绿色能源公司和医疗保险公司已成赢家，而石油和钢铁公司则在乔治W.布什的掌控之下。 当权者变本加厉地加剧这一局面，其动因是不出人意料的。竞争和公平的竞争环境对我们全社会都有好处，但这对个体工商户而言是困难的。沃伦·巴菲特深刻地认识到这一点。“一桩真正伟大的生意一定要有经久耐用的护城河来保障其出色的资本回报率”，他在2007年给投资者的年度信函中这样解释道，“尽管资本主义的‘创造性破坏’特点对社会大有裨益，但它排除了投资的确定性。”微软曾试图仅仅通过将竞争者排除在外的方式挖掘自己的护城河，但此举遭到法院的制止。甚至连苹果，这个开放平台经济的巨大受益者，也忍不住试图将自己劣质的地图应用程序强加给iPhone5的购买者。 商人喜欢将自己标榜为自由市场经济的捍卫者，但是芝加哥大学商学院的经济学家路易吉·津加莱斯（Luigi Zingales）驳斥称：“从提升现有商业利益的意义上讲，绝大多数的游说集团是利商的；但是如果从培育真正自由和开放竞争的角度上看，他们不是亲市场的。” 在19世纪早期，美国社会是这个星球上最平等的社会之一。“我们没有穷人”，托马斯·杰佛逊在1814年的一封信中吹嘘道，“我们人口中的绝大部分人是劳动者；能够不通过体力或者脑力劳动过活的富人很少，其所拥有的财产数量也适中。劳动阶级的大部分人占有财产，在自家的土地上劳作、拥有家庭。（社会）对劳动的需求也使他们能够从富人和有能力者手中获得足以让他们过的富足、穿得体面、适度劳作并供养家庭的金钱。 对杰佛逊而言，这种平等是美国例外主义的核心：“还有没有其他的社会比美国更令人满意的？”但这一切伴随着工业化而改变。正如1932年罗斯福在联邦俱乐部演讲时辩称的那样，工业革命得以完成，多亏了“一群金融寡头，没人对他们的致富手段加以深究，他们获得和生产成果成比例的尊崇，无论他们采取的是何种方式。”美国也可能需要有自己的强盗贵族；罗斯福说，对美国而言，“甜的苦的都要接受，不能只要甜的（经济成果），不要苦的（不正当的致富手段）”。 但是随着这些巨头财富和权力的不断累积，加之美国边远的自由地已经用完，它将面临着自我封闭的危险。正如罗斯福所言：“正如我们所知道的，机会均等已经不复存在。”事实上，“我们正稳步走向经济寡头政治，即便我们现在还没达到那种程度。” 今天的美国，极富者与普通人之间的鸿沟比镀金时代以来的任何时候都大，这决非偶然。现在就如同当年一样，巨型财团谋求与他们经济实力相匹配的更大的政治发言权，他们对自身利益和公共福祉的混淆成了一种不可避免的危险。财阀在政治上的崛起，其讽刺性就在于，和威尼斯的统治阶层一样，他们正在威胁着缔造他们的开放体系。 The Self-Destruction of the 1 Percent IN the early 14th century, Venice was one of the richest cities in Europe. At the heart of its economy was the colleganza, a basic form of joint-stock company created to finance a single trade expedition. The brilliance of the colleganza was that it opened the economy to new entrants, allowing risk-taking entrepreneurs to share in the financial upside with the established businessmen who financed their merchant voyages. Venice’s elites were the chief beneficiaries. Like all open economies, theirs was turbulent. Today, we think of social mobility as a good thing. But if you are on top, mobility also means competition. In 1315, when the Venetian city-state was at the height of its economic powers, the upper class acted to lock in its privileges, putting a formal stop to social mobility with the publication of the Libro d’Oro, or Book of Gold, an official register of the nobility. If you weren’t on it, you couldn’t join the ruling oligarchy. The political shift, which had begun nearly two decades earlier, was so striking a change that the Venetians gave it a name: La Serrata, or the closure. It wasn’t long before the political Serrata became an economic one, too. Under the control of the oligarchs, Venice gradually cut off commercial opportunities for new entrants. Eventually, the colleganza was banned. The reigning elites were acting in their immediate self-interest, but in the longer term, La Serrata was the beginning of the end for them, and for Venetian prosperity more generally. By 1500, Venice’s population was smaller than it had been in 1330. In the 17th and 18th centuries, as the rest of Europe grew, the city continued to shrink. The story of Venice’s rise and fall is told by the scholars Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, in their book “Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty,” as an illustration of their thesis that what separates successful states from failed ones is whether their governing institutions are inclusive or extractive. Extractive states are controlled by ruling elites whose objective is to extract as much wealth as they can from the rest of society. Inclusive states give everyone access to economic opportunity; often, greater inclusiveness creates more prosperity, which creates an incentive for ever greater inclusiveness. The history of the United States can be read as one such virtuous circle. But as the story of Venice shows, virtuous circles can be broken. Elites that have prospered from inclusive systems can be tempted to pull up the ladder they climbed to the top. Eventually, their societies become extractive and their economies languish. That was the future predicted by Karl Marx, who wrote that capitalism contained the seeds of its own destruction. And it is the danger America faces today, as the 1 percent pulls away from everyone else and pursues an economic, political and social agenda that will increase that gap even further — ultimately destroying the open system that made America rich and allowed its 1 percent to thrive in the first place. You can see America’s creeping Serrata in the growing social and, especially, educational chasm between those at the top and everyone else. At the bottom and in the middle, American society is fraying, and the children of these struggling families are lagging the rest of the world at school. Economists point out that the woes of the middle class are in large part a consequence of globalization and technological change. Culture may also play a role. In his recent book on the white working class, the libertarian writer Charles Murray blames the hollowed-out middle for straying from the traditional family values and old-fashioned work ethic that he says prevail among the rich (whom he castigates, but only for allowing cultural relativism to prevail). There is some truth in both arguments. But the 1 percent cannot evade its share of responsibility for the growing gulf in American society. Economic forces may be behind the rising inequality, but as Peter R. Orszag, President Obama’s former budget chief, told me, public policy has exacerbated rather than mitigated these trends. Even as the winner-take-all economy has enriched those at the very top, their tax burden has lightened. Tolerance for high executive compensation has increased, even as the legal powers of unions have been weakened and an intellectual case against them has been relentlessly advanced by plutocrat-financed think tanks. In the 1950s, the marginal income tax rate for those at the top of the distribution soared above 90 percent, a figure that today makes even Democrats flinch. Meanwhile, of the 400 richest taxpayers in 2009, 6 paid no federal income tax at all, and 27 paid 10 percent or less. None paid more than 35 percent. Historically, the United States has enjoyed higher social mobility than Europe, and both left and right have identified this economic openness as an essential source of the nation’s economic vigor. But several recent studies have shown that in America today it is harder to escape the social class of your birth than it is in Europe. The Canadian economist Miles Corak has found that as income inequality increases, social mobility falls — a phenomenon Alan B. Krueger, the chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, has called the Great Gatsby Curve. Educational attainment, which created the American middle class, is no longer rising. The super-elite lavishes unlimited resources on its children, while public schools are starved of funding. This is the new Serrata. An elite education is increasingly available only to those already at the top. Bill Clinton and Barack Obama enrolled their daughters in an exclusive private school; I’ve done the same with mine. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, earlier this year, I interviewed Ruth Simmons, then the president of Brown. She was the first African-American to lead an Ivy League university and has served on the board of Goldman Sachs. Dr. Simmons, a Harvard-trained literature scholar, worked hard to make Brown more accessible to poor students, but when I asked whether it was time to abolish legacy admissions, the Ivy League’s own Book of Gold, she shrugged me off with a laugh: “No, I have a granddaughter. It’s not time yet.” America’s Serrata also takes a more explicit form: the tilting of the economic rules in favor of those at the top. The crony capitalism of today’s oligarchs is far subtler than Venice’s. It works in two main ways. The first is to channel the state’s scarce resources in their own direction. This is the absurdity of Mitt Romney’s comment about the “47 percent” who are “dependent upon government.” The reality is that it is those at the top, particularly the tippy-top, of the economic pyramid who have been most effective at capturing government support — and at getting others to pay for it. Exhibit A is the bipartisan, $700 billion rescue of Wall Street in 2008. Exhibit B is the crony recovery. The economists Emmanuel Saez and Thomas Piketty found that 93 percent of the income gains from the 2009-10 recovery went to the top 1 percent of taxpayers. The top 0.01 percent captured 37 percent of these additional earnings, gaining an average of $4.2 million per household. The second manifestation of crony capitalism is more direct: the tax perks, trade protections and government subsidies that companies and sectors secure for themselves. Corporate pork is a truly bipartisan dish: green energy companies and the health insurers have been winners in this administration, as oil and steel companies were under George W. Bush’s. The impulse of the powerful to make themselves even more so should come as no surprise. Competition and a level playing field are good for us collectively, but they are a hardship for individual businesses. Warren E. Buffett knows this. “A truly great business must have an enduring ‘moat’ that protects excellent returns on invested capital,” he explained in his 2007 annual letter to investors. “Though capitalism’s ‘creative destruction’ is highly beneficial for society, it precludes investment certainty.” Microsoft attempted to dig its own moat by simply shutting out its competitors, until it was stopped by the courts. Even Apple, a huge beneficiary of the open-platform economy, couldn’t resist trying to impose its own inferior map app on buyers of the iPhone 5. Businessmen like to style themselves as the defenders of the free market economy, but as Luigi Zingales, an economist at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, argued, “Most lobbying is pro-business, in the sense that it promotes the interests of existing businesses, not pro-market in the sense of fostering truly free and open competition.” IN the early 19th century, the United States was one of the most egalitarian societies on the planet. “We have no paupers,” Thomas Jefferson boasted in an 1814 letter. “The great mass of our population is of laborers; our rich, who can live without labor, either manual or professional, being few, and of moderate wealth. Most of the laboring class possess property, cultivate their own lands, have families, and from the demand for their labor are enabled to exact from the rich and the competent such prices as enable them to be fed abundantly, clothed above mere decency, to labor moderately and raise their families.” For Jefferson, this equality was at the heart of American exceptionalism: “Can any condition of society be more desirable than this?” That all changed with industrialization. As Franklin D. Roosevelt argued in a 1932 address to the Commonwealth Club, the industrial revolution was accomplished thanks to “a group of financial titans, whose methods were not scrutinized with too much care, and who were honored in proportion as they produced the results, irrespective of the means they used.” America may have needed its robber barons; Roosevelt said the United States was right to accept “the bitter with the sweet.” But as these titans amassed wealth and power, and as America ran out of free land on its frontier, the country faced the threat of a Serrata. As Roosevelt put it, “equality of opportunity as we have known it no longer exists.” Instead, “we are steering a steady course toward economic oligarchy, if we are not there already.” It is no accident that in America today the gap between the very rich and everyone else is wider than at any time since the Gilded Age. Now, as then, the titans are seeking an even greater political voice to match their economic power. Now, as then, the inevitable danger is that they will confuse their own self-interest with the common good. The irony of the political rise of the plutocrats is that, like Venice’s oligarchs, they threaten the system that created them. The editor of Thomson Reuters Digital and the author of “Plutocrats: The Rise of the New Global Super-Rich and the Fall of Everyone Else,” from which this essay is adapted. PAGE 1