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Agency problems and the theory of the firm(fama,1980)

2012-11-19 22页 pdf 439KB 38阅读

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Agency problems and the theory of the firm(fama,1980) Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm Eugene F. Fama The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 88, No. 2. (Apr., 1980), pp. 288-307. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28198004%2988%3A2%3C288%3AAPATTO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4 The Journal of Politica...
Agency problems and the theory of the firm(fama,1980)
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm Eugene F. Fama The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 88, No. 2. (Apr., 1980), pp. 288-307. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28198004%2988%3A2%3C288%3AAPATTO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4 The Journal of Political Economy is currently published by The University of Chicago Press. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/ucpress.html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. http://www.jstor.org Tue Sep 4 18:57:53 2007 Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm Eugene F. Fama C nz11c~rr2fi( I / f h>ta,gn This paper attempts to explain how the separation of security own- ership and control, typical of large corporations, can he an efficient form of econornic organization. \.Ve first set aside the presumption that a corporation has olvners in any meaningful sense. The entre- preneur is also laid to rest, at least for the purposes of the large modern corporation. The two functions usually attributed to the entrepreneur-management and risk bearing-are treated as natu- rally separate hctor5 Lvithin the set of contracts calletl a f ~ rm . The firm is disciplinetl by cornpetition frorn other firrns, which fi)~.ces the evolution of devices for efficiently monitoring the performance of the entire team and of its individual mernbers. Intlividual partici- pants in the firrn, and in particular its managers, face both the tliscipline and opportunities providetl Ily the markets for their ser- vices, both within ant1 outside the firm. Econo~nists have long been concerned with the incentive problems that arise when decision ~nak ing in a firm is the province of managers who are not the firm's securit) holders.' One outcome has been the development of "behavioral" and "managerial" theories of the firm which reject the classical model of an entrepreneur, o r olvner- ?-his research is supported by the Sational Science Foundation. Roger Kormendi has contributed much, and the comments of A. Alchian, S. Bhattacharya, C;. Becker, F. Black, h1. Blurne, hl. Bradley, D. Breeden, N. Gonedes, B. Horwit7, G. Jarrell, E. f1. Kim, J . I.ong, H. hlanne, W. hleckling, hl. H. Sliller, 51. Scholes, C. Smith, C;.J. Stigler, R. Wattb, '1'. Whisler, and,]. Zimmerman are gratefull\ acknorvledged. Presentations at the finance, labor economics, and industrial organiration workshops of the Unilersity of' Chicago and the workshop of the Managerial Economics Research Center of the Cniversity of Rochester have been helpful. I 'he paper is largely an outgrowth of discussioi~s with hlichael (:. Jensen. ' Jensen and hleckling (1976) quote from Adam Smith (1776). 7-he modern literature on the problem datrs back at least to Berle and Sleans (1932). [/ourno/ IV P*i/ili
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