核安全文化十大特征 核安全文化的十项特征

核安全文化十大特征 核安全文化的十项特征 档案 INPO12-012 2012年12月 INPO Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture 健全的核安全文化特征 OPEN DISTRIBUTION 公开发行 OPEN DISTRIBUTION: Copyright ? 2012 by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations. Not for sale or commercial use. All other rights reserved. 1 公开发行:版权?2012 美国核电运行研究所。非卖品。版 权所有。 NOTICE: This information was prepared in connection with work sponsored by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). Neither INPO, INPO members, INPO participants, nor any person acting on behalf of them (a) makes any warranty or representation, expressed or implied, with respect to the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of the information contained in this document, or that the use of any information, apparatus, method, or process disclosed in this document may not infringe on privately owned rights, or (b) assumes any liabilities with respect to the use of, or for damages resulting from the use of any information, apparatus, method, or process disclosed in this document. 注:该信息是由美国核电运行研究所发起准备的。无论是 INPO组织，INPO成员，INPO的代表，或者任何人，(a) 不对该文件的准确性，完整性或有效性做任何承诺。使用该 文件中的信息，仪器，方法或过程不得侵犯私人权利。(b) 因使用这些信息，仪器，方法或者过程，承担责任。 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS/目录 INTRODUCTION/介 绍................................................................................................................................ 4 BACKGROUND/背 景……………………………………………………………… ……………………...6 THE TRAITS AND THEIR ATTRIBUTES/特征及其特 点.................................................................... 11 Individual Commitment to Safety/个人对安全的承 诺...............................................................................11 Personal Accountability/个人职 责...........................................................................................................11 Questioning Attitude/质疑的态 度............................................................................................................11 Safety Communication/安全沟 通............................................................................................................12 Management Commitment to Safety/管理者对安全 的承诺.......................................................................14 Leadership Accountability/领导职 责.......................................................................................................14 Decision-Making/决 3 策.............................................................................................................................15 Respectful Work Environment/彼此尊重 的工作环境..............................................................................16 Management Systems/管理体 系..................................................................................................................17 Continuous Learning/持续学 习...............................................................................................................17 Problem Identification and Resolution/识别问题、 解决问题..................................................................17 Environment for Raising Concerns/关注的氛 围................................. ....................................................18 Work Processes/工作流 程.......................................................................................................................19 Acknowledgements/致 谢.............................................................................................................................21 INTRODUCTION Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture builds on the knowledge and experience developed since the publication of Principles of a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture in 2004. The change in the title reflects the commercial nuclear industry’ 4 s alignment of its own terminology with that used 介 绍 《健全的核安全文化特征》是基于2004年出版的核安全文 化原则的知识和经验而产生的。标题的变化，体现了核工业 的商业化与美国核管理委 by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This 员会的 一致。此文件由美国核行业人document was developed through a collaborative effort by 员和美国核电运行研究所 (INPO)成《健全的核安全文化U.S. industry personnel and the staff of the Institute of 员共同努力而成。 Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), with input from 特征》 整合了两套用于描述核安全文representatives of various regulatory agencies, the public, 化的术语:美国核电运行研 究所 and the nuclear industry worldwide. Traits of a Healthy (INPO)和核能产业以领导者的身份 Nuclear Safety Culture reflects an alignment in two sets of 定义了安全文化的主要原则和特征， terms that have been used to describe nuclear safety culture: 而美国核管理委员会定义了安全文化 INPO and the industry defined safety culture in leadership 5 terms of principles and attributes, and the U.S. Nuclear 的 组成。每一套术语都有其特定的功Regulatory Commission defined safety culture in regulatory 能，但两套术语同时使 用容易在运营terms of components and aspects. Whereas each set of terms 组织中引起混淆，这是一个健全的安 served its special function, the result created confusion 全文 化应当避免的。 within operating organizations as to the essential elements of a healthy safety culture. Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture describes the 《健全的核安全文化特征》描述 essential traits and attributes of a healthy nuclear safety 了一个健全的核安全文化的特征和他culture, with the goal of creating a framework for open 特点，目的在于在整个商用核电工业 discussion and continuing evolution of safety culture 领域中建立一个自由交流，持续改进 throughout the commercial nuclear energy industry. For the 安全文化的框架。根据该文件的目的， purposes of this document, a trait is defined as a pattern of 将特征定义为一种思维方式、感观、 6 thinking, feeling, and behaving such that safety is emphasized over competing priorities. Experience has 行 为，认为安全重于一切。经验表明，shown that the personal and organizational traits described 该文件中描述的个人和 组织的特征反in this document are present in a positive safety culture and 映在一个积极的安全文化中。缺少这that shortfalls in these traits and attributes contribute 些特征， 将对电厂事故产生重要影响。 significantly to plant events. Rather than prescribing a specific program or 该文件描述 的是基本特征，而不 implementation method, this document describes the basic 是特殊程序或者实施办法。一个组织traits. These traits and attributes, when embraced, will be 及其成员的价值观、理念、行为、信 reflected in the values, assumptions, behaviors, beliefs, and 念、将体现这些特征和特点。理 norms of an organization and its members. Ideally, the traits 想地讲，这里所述的特征描述的是在 will describe what it is like to work at a nuclear facility and 一个核电环境中，做什么工作及怎样 7 how things are done there. Traits appear in boldface. The 工作。 特征以黑体字出现。特点阐明attributes clarify the intent of the traits. 特征的含义。 Utility managers are encouraged to make in-depth 绩效经理应在该特征与其它日常 comparisons between these traits and their day-to-day 准 则之间做深入对比，并以此为基础， policies and practices and to use any differences as a basis 持续改进。 for improvements. In addition to the traits and attributes, two addendums are 除了这些特征和特点，还有两个 available. Addendum I: Behaviors and Actions That Support 附件可供参考。 附件1:《支持健全核a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture, describes executive, 安全文化的行为》，描述了总经理，高 senior manager, manager, supervisor, and individual 级经理，监查人员以及个人对核安全 contributor behaviors that contribute to a healthy safety 文化作用行为。另附有表格，描述了 culture. An additional table is provided to describe 8 detailed 每一个特征的具体行为和行动。附件 behaviors and actions for each attribute. Addendum II: 《交叉引用》，包括从INPO12-012，Cross-References, provides cross-references from INPO 2: 、以及之前12-012, Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture, to the 《健全的核安全文化特征》 previous Principles of a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture, U.S. 的《核安全文化准则》、美国核管理委Nuclear reactor 员会相关文件、及国际原子能机构安 assessment program cross-cutting area components, and the 全文化特征中的引用。 这些交叉引用 International Atomic Energy Agency safety culture 可以帮助员工理解这些通俗易懂的语 attributes. This cross-reference can help individuals 言是如何发展而来，以及怎样在这一 understand how the common language was developed and can be useful in change management efforts in this 重要领 域改变管理方式。 important area. Regulatory Commission operating 9 BACKGROUND Watershed events over the years have influenced the safety culture at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The industry had its first significant wake-up call in 1979 as a result of the accident at Three Mile Island Nuclear Station. Many fundamental problems involving hardware, 背 景 过去几年，一些转折性事故影响了美国商用核电站的核文 化。第一次警示是发生在1979年的三里岛核电站事故。这 次事故涉及许多基础性问题， procedures, training, and attitudes toward safety and 如 硬件、程序、培训、安全态度以及 监管。 regulation contributed to the event. In 1986, the Chernobyl accident was a stark reminder of the 1986年，切诺贝利事故是对核技 hazards of nuclear technology. This accident resulted from 10 术危害的另一个重要提醒。这次事故 many of the same weaknesses that led to the Three Mile 由许多与三里岛事故相同的原因造 Island accident. In addition, it highlighted the importance of 成。此外，它强调了设计结构，核电 maintaining design configuration, plant status control, line 站运行控制，核反应堆安全业务权限， authority for reactor safety, and cultural attributes related to 以及安全文化特点的重要性。 safety. Response from industry and regulatory organizations to both 核工业领域以及监管组织对这两 these events was sweeping. Improvements were made in 次事故的反应是彻底的。对安全的改standards, hardware, emergency procedures, processes, 进体现在许多方面，如、硬件、 training (including simulators), emergency preparedness, 应急措施、程序、培训(包括模拟的)、 design and configuration control, testing, human 11 应急、设计与结构控制、测试、 performance, and attitudes toward safety. 人员绩效、安全态度等。 The 2002 discovery of degradation of the Davis-Besse 2002年发现戴维斯-贝 斯核电站Nuclear Power Station reactor vessel head highlighted 反应堆压力容器封头老化，这表明，problems that develop when the safety environment at a 如果不重视 安全环境，便可能出现问plant receives insufficient attention. Most recently, the 2011 nuclear accident at the Fukushima 题。 最近的一次事故，2011年日本福 Daiichi power plant illustrates the importance of thoroughly 岛核电站核事故，证实了对假设可能assessing possible nuclear safety impacts of a hypothetical, 发生的极端外部事故全面评估的重要 yet credible, extreme external event. It also illustrates the 性。它也证实了对类似事故紧急反应 importance of emergency response command and control, 指挥与控制，培训，资源有效性是非 training, and resource availability for such an event. 常重要的。 A theme common in these events is that, over time, 12 这些事故的一个共性就是，一段 problems crept in, often related to or a direct result of the 时间内问题不知不觉出现。这经常与plant culture. Had these problems been recognized, 电站的核文化有着直接的关系。如果 challenged, and resolved, the events could have been 人们认识到这些问题，勇于挑战这些 prevented or their severity lessened. The series of decisions 问题，解决这些问题，那么这些事故 and actions that resulted in these events can usually be 是可以避免的，或者这些事故的严重 traced to the shared assumptions, values, and beliefs of the 性是可以降低的。通常可以从共有的organization. 理念，价值观，以及组织的信条中找到这些决策及行为的 某些踪迹。 These events and the notion that culture is a key ingredient 这些事故、以及文化是核电站全 in the overall success of the plant form the basis for this 面成功的关键因素的概念，形成了本 document. 文件的基础。 Organizational culture is the shared basic assumptions that are developed in an organization as it 13 learns and copes with problems. The basic assumptions that have worked well enough to be considered valid are taught to new members of 组织文化是一个组织在其学习和解决问题过程中形成的共 有理念。这些理念之前运用的很好，因此组织的 the organization as the correct way to perceive, think, act, 新成员会继续学习，认为这些信念是and feel. Culture is the sum total of a group’s learning. 理解、思考、以及感受的 正确方法。Culture is for the group what character and personality are 文化是一个组织学习的总和。文化对for the individual. 于一个企业而言，就如同性格对于一个人的意义。 In addition to a healthy organizational culture, each nuclear 由于核电站的特殊性和技术的特 station, because of the special characteristics and unique 殊危害性——副产品有辐射、核反应hazards of the technology—radioactive byproducts, 堆能量集中、衰变热，除了有一个健 concentration of energy in the reactor core, and decay 全的组织文化，每个核电站还需要有 heat—needs a healthy safety culture. 14 一个健全的安全文化。 Nuclear safety culture is defined as the core values and leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over 核安全文化定义为，领导及个人 behaviors resulting from a collective commitment by 为了 保护员工和环境，集体做出“安 competing goals to ensure protection of people and the 全 高于一切”的核心价值观和行为。 environment. This updated definition was developed to apply broadly 该定义广泛地适用于所有运用核 across all industries that use nuclear technologies. For the 技术的工业。对于商用核电工业，核commercial nuclear power industry, nuclear safety remains 安全具有至高的重要性。尽管放射安 the overriding priority. Although the same traits apply to 全，工业安全，环境安全具有相同的 radiological safety, industrial safety, security, and 特征，核安全是核电站的第一价值观， environmental safety, nuclear safety is the first value 并且永不废弃。 adopted at a nuclear station and is never abandoned. Nuclear safety is a collective responsibility. The concept of 15 核安全是集体的责任。核安全的 nuclear safety culture applies to every employee in the 概 念适用于所有工作在核电组织的人nuclear organization, from the board of directors to the 员，从董事长到每一位员工。组织中 individual contributor. No one in the organization is exempt 的任何人都有责任确保“安全第一”， from the obligation to ensure safety first. 无一例外。 The performance of individuals and organizations can be 个人及组织的表现具有可监测性 monitored and trended and, therefore, may serve as an 和 可跟踪性，因此可以做为一个组织indicator of the health of an organization’s safety culture. 安全文化的指标。然而，根据安全文 However, the health of a facility’s safety culture could lie 化推广程度不同，一个健全的安全文 anywhere along a broad continuum, depending on the 化存在于一个广泛的连续范围内。尽 degree to which the attributes of safety culture are 管安全文化是一个无形的概念，但确 16 embraced. Even though safety culture is somewhat of an intangible concept, it is possible to determine whether a 认 一个核电站是否持续发展还是可能station tends toward one end of the continuum or the other. 的。 Commercial nuclear power plants are designed, built, and 商用核电站是为了发电而设计、 operated to produce electricity. Safety, production, and cost 建造和运行的。安全、生产、成本控control are necessary goals for the operation of such a plant. 制对于此类核电站来说是必要目标。 These outcomes are quite complementary, and most plants 而这些目标是互补的，现代的核电站 today achieve high levels of safety, impressive production 大多从长远的眼光来做决策和行动， records, and competitive costs, reinforced by decisions and 因此核电站运营较为安全、产出高、 actions made with a long-term view. This perspective keeps safety as the overriding priority for each plant and for each 成本低。这种远见使每一个电站和个 individual associated with it. Nuclear safety culture is a leadership responsibility. 人将安全放在第一位。 17 核安全文化是一种领导层的责 Experience has shown that leaders in organizations with a 任。经验证实，组织中具有健全的安healthy safety culture foster safety culture through activities 全文化观的领导在生产活动中注重以 such as the following: 下方面: Leaders reinforce safety culture at every opportunity. The health of safety culture is not taken for granted. 领导利用每一次机会强化安全文化。领导不会理所当然地 认为安全文化是健全的。 Leaders frequently measure the health of safety culture with a focus on trends rather than absolute values. 领导经常是通过关注趋势，而不是根据绝对值来检验安全 文化的健全度。 Leaders communicate what constitutes a healthy safety culture and ensure everyone understands his or her role in its promotion. 领导就构成健全的安全文化与他人交流，确保每一个人理 解他/她在促进安全文化中的角色。 领导认识到安全文化并 不是全部，但也不是无足轻重，而是认识到，它是连续的， 不断变化的。因此，在组织内部和外部(如监管机构)讨论 18 安全文化是非常必要的。 The traits described in this document are divided into three 本文所描述的特征分为三个类 Leaders recognize that safety culture is not all or nothing but is, rather, constantly moving along a continuum. As a result, there is a comfort in discussing safety culture within the organization as well as with outside groups, such as regulatory agencies. categories that are similar to the three categories of safety 别，与《国际核安全顾问团(INSAG)culture in International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group -4——安全文化》中的分类相似。分 (INSAG)-4, Safety Culture. The categories and their 类及其主要特征如下: primary traits are as follows: Individual Commitment to Safety — Personal Accountability — Questioning Attitude — Safety Communication Management Commitment to Safety — Leadership Accountability — Decision-Making 19 — Respectful Work Environment Management Systems — Continuous Learning — Problem Identification and Resolution — Environment for Raising Concerns — Work Processes 个人安全承诺 —个人职责 —质疑的态度 —安全沟通 管 理者安全承诺 —领导职责 —决策 —彼此尊重的工作环境管理体系 —持续学习 —识别问题、解决问题—关注的氛围 —工作流程 THE TRAITS AND THEIR ATTRIBUTES Individual Commitment to Safety PA. Personal Accountability All individuals take personal responsibility for safety. 特征及其特点 个人对安全的承诺 PA. 个人职责 每个人对安全负责。明确理解自 Responsibility and authority for nuclear safety are well 己 的核安全职责和权限。在隶属关系，defined and clearly understood. Reporting relationships, 职位权力，团队职责中强调核安全重 positional authority, and team responsibilities emphasize 20 the 于一切。 overriding importance of nuclear safety. Attributes: 特点: PA.1 Standards: Individuals understand the importance PA.1标准:个人理解遵守核电标of adherence to nuclear standards. All levels of the 准的重要性。对不满足标准的情 形，organization exercise accountability for shortfalls in meeting 各级组织应履行相应职责。 standards. PA.2 Job Ownership: Individuals understand and PA.2 工作主导权:个人理解和践demonstrate personal responsibility for the behaviors and 行自己有利于核安全的 行为和工作。 work practices that support nuclear safety. PA.3 Teamwork: Individuals and work groups PA.3 团队协作:为确保维持核安communicate and coordinate their activities within and 全，个人和团体在组织内外就所 从事across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is 的活动进行沟通和协调。 maintained. 21 QA. Questioning Attitude QA. 质疑的态度 Individuals avoid complacency and continuously challenge 为了识别可能导致错误或不适当existing conditions, assumptions, anomalies, and activities 操作的差异，个人应 避免自满,不断质in order to identify discrepancies that might result in error or 疑现有状况、假设、异常和活动。所 inappropriate action. All employees are watchful for 有员工警惕可能对电厂安全造成不良 assumptions, values, conditions, or activities that can have 影响的理念、价值观、情况或活动。 an undesirable effect on plant safety. Attributes: QA.1 Nuclear is Recognized as Special and Unique: 特点: QA.1认为核技术是特殊的和独特 Individuals understand that complex technologies can fail in 的:个人应认识到，复杂的技术可能unpredictable ways. 在不可预知的情况下失效。 QA.2 Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when QA.2质疑不明情况:个人面临不 22 faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and 确定性时应停止操作。工作前应评估managed before work proceeds. 和控制风险。 QA.3 Challenge Assumptions: Individuals challenge QA.3质疑假设:当人们认为某件 assumptions and offer opposing views when they believe 事不正确时，应质疑假设，并提出相something is not correct. 反观点。 QA.4 Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and QA.4避免自满:即使认为有成功 plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and 的结 果，个人也应意识到错误、潜在inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. 问题、内在风险可能存在，并做好应 CO. Safety Communication Communications maintain a focus on safety. Safety communication is broad and includes plant-level communication, job-related communication, worker-level communication, equipment labeling, operating experience, and documentation. Leaders use formal and informal 23 communication to convey the importance of safety. The as the flow of information down the organization. Attributes: CO.1 Work Process Communications: Individuals 对计划。 CO. 安全沟通 沟通时应以安全为中心。有关安全的沟通非常广泛，包括 电厂级沟通、工作相关的沟通、工人级沟通、设备标识、操 作经验和文档管理。领导利用正式和非正式的沟通传达安全 的重 flow of information up the organization is seen as important 要性。组织中上行和下行的信息流同 等重要。 特点: CO.1工作过程沟通:个人在工作过程中就安全信息进行沟 通。 CO.2 决策依据:领导确保运营和 incorporate safety communications in work activities. CO.2 Bases for Decisions: Leaders ensure that the bases for operational and organizational decisions are communicated 24 in a timely manner. CO.3 Free Flow of Information: Individuals communicate openly and candidly, both up, down, and across the organization and with oversight, audit, and regulatory organizations. CO.4 Expectations: Leaders frequently communicate and reinforce the expectation that nuclear safety is the organization’s overriding priority. 组织决策的基础及时地得以沟通。 CO.3信息自由流通:个人开放、坦率地在组织中进行上行 和下行的沟通。监督、审核和管理机构时也如此。 CO.4预期:领导经常沟通和强化预期:在组织中核安全高 于一切。 Management Commitment to Safety LA. Leadership Accountability Leaders demonstrate a commitment to safety in their decisions and behaviors. Executive and senior managers are the leading advocates of nuclear safety and demonstrate their commitment both in word and action. The nuclear safety 25 message is communicated frequently and 管理者安全承诺 LA.领导职责 领导在决策和行为中体现承诺。总经理和高级经理是核安 全文化的倡导者，他们在言行上对核安全起到模范作用。应 经常和不间断地对核安全 consistently, occasionally as a stand-alone theme. Leaders 信息进行交流，偶尔做为一个独立主throughout the nuclear organization set an example for 题进行交流。领导在整个核 电组织中safety. Corporate policies emphasize the overriding 确立一个安全案例，公司法规强调核importance of nuclear safety. 安全重于一切。 特点: LA.1资源:为支持核安全，领导 Attributes LA.1 Resources: Leaders ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available 确保提供足够和适当的人员、设备、 26 程序和其他资源。 and adequate to support nuclear safety. LA.2 Field Presence: Leaders are commonly seen in LA.2巡视现场:领导经常巡查工 working areas of the plant observing, coaching, and 作场 所:观察、指导，强化标准和预 期。对于偏离标准和预期的情况，迅 reinforcing standards and expectations. Deviations from 速纠正。 standards and expectations are corrected promptly. LA.3 Incentives, Sanctions, and Rewards: Leaders LA.3激励、惩罚和奖励:领导确 ensure incentives, sanctions, and rewards are aligned with 保激励、惩罚和奖励与核安全方针一 致，并强调，行为和结果体现出安全 nuclear safety policies and reinforce behaviors and 重于一切。 outcomes that reflect safety as the overriding priority. LA.4 Strategic Commitment to Safety: Leaders ensure LA.4安全战略承诺:领导确保电 plant priorities are aligned to reflect nuclear safety as the 厂的优先考虑的事与核安全高于一切 27 的信念相一致。 overriding priority. LA.5 Change Management: Leaders use a systematic LA.5 变化管理:为确保安全重于 process for evaluating and implementing change so that 一切，领导使用一个系统的过程评估 和实施变化。 nuclear safety remains the overriding priority. LA.6 Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities: Leaders LA.6角色、责任和权力:为保证 clearly define roles, responsibilities, and authorities to 核 安全，领导明确定义角色、责任和 权力。 ensure nuclear safety. LA.7 Constant Examination: Leaders ensure that nuclear LA.7持续检查:为确保对核安全 safety is constantly scrutinized through a variety of 进行 持续检查，领导使用多种监测技 术，包括核文化评估。 monitoring techniques, including assessments of nuclear safety culture. LA.8 Leader Behaviors: Leaders exhibit behaviors that set 28 the standard for safety. DM. Decision-Making Decisions that support or affect nuclear safety are LA.8领导者行为:领导演示为安全确立标准的行为。 DM. 决策 决策可以系统、严格、彻底地支 systematic, rigorous, and thorough. Operators are vested 持或影响核安全。当面对非预期或不 确定的情况时，为确保电厂臵于安全 with the authority and understand the expectation, when 状态，操作者拥有权限，并且了解预 faced with unexpected or uncertain conditions, to place the 期。高层领导支持和强化做出保守决 plant in a safe condition. Senior leaders support and 策。 reinforce conservative decisions. Attributes: DM.1 Consistent Process: Individuals use a consistent, 特点: DM.1一致的过程:个人使用一个 systematic approach to make decisions. Risk insights are 一致的、系统的方法来作决策。适当incorporated as appropriate. 29 DM.2 Conservative Bias: Individuals use 地洞察风险。 DM.2保守的偏见:个人在决策时 decision-making practices that emphasize prudent choices 谨慎选择那些简单可行的选项。不是 over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is 为了工作进行，而确认一个建议活动determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe 是安全的，也不是为了 停工而确认其 不安全。 in order to stop. DM.3 Accountability for decisions: Single-point accountability is maintained for nuclear safety decisions. WE. Respectful Work Environment Trust and respect permeate the organization, creating a WE.彼此尊重的工作环境 组织中应存在信任和尊重，创造一DM.3决策职责:有关 30 核安全决策的单点责任应保持下来。 respectful work environment. A high level of trust is 个彼 此尊重的工作环境。通过及时准established in the organization, fostered, in part, through 确地沟通，高度信任 可以局部地在一个组织中建立，培养起来。鼓励和讨 timely and accurate communication. Differing professional 论不一致的专业观点并及时解决矛 opinions are encouraged, discussed, and resolved in a timely 盾。对于员工的关注应给予回应。 manner. Employees are informed of steps taken in response to their concerns. Attributes: WE.1 Respect is Evident: Everyone is treated with dignity and respect. WE.2 Opinions are Valued: Individuals are encouraged to voice concerns, provide suggestions, and raise questions. 提出建议和问题。尊重不同观点。 Differing opinions are respected. WE.3 High Level of Trust: Trust is fostered among individuals and work groups throughout the organization. WE.4 Conflict Resolution: Fair and objective methods are used to resolve conflicts. 31 工作团队之间培养信任。 WE.4解决冲突:解决冲突时使用公平和客观的方法。 WE.3高度信任:在组织中的个体和 特点: WE.1尊重是明显的:尊重每个人。 WE.2重视意见:鼓 励个人说出顾虑， Management Systems CL. Continuous Learning CL.持续学习 管理体系 Opportunities to continuously learn are valued, sought 评估、寻求、实现持续学习的机out, and implemented. Operating experience is highly 会。重视操作经验，提高从 以往经验valued, and the capacity to learn from experience is well 学习的能力。为了激励学习和提高能 developed. Training, self-assessments, and benchmarking 力，可以应用培训、自我评估、对照 are used to stimulate learning and improve performance. 管理。用不同的监测技术对核安全进 Nuclear safety is kept under constant scrutiny through a 行持续的、详细的审查，其中的一些 variety of monitoring techniques, some of which provide 32 an 技术可以提供独立的新视角。 independent “fresh look.” Attributes: CL.1 Operating Experience: The organization systematically 特点: CL.1操作经验:组织适时、系统、 and effectively collects, evaluates, and implements lessons 有效地收集、评估和应用内部和外部 from relevant internal and external operating experience 的操作经验信息。 information in a timely manner. CL.2 Self-Assessment: The organization routinely conducts CL.2自我评估:组织例行地对程 self-critical and objective assessments of its programs, 序、 实践和表现进行自我批评和客观practices, and performance. 评价。 CL.3 Benchmarking: The organization learns from other CL.3对照:为不断提高知识、技 organizations to continuously improve knowledge, skills, 能及安全表现，组织向其它组织学习。 and safety 33 performance. CL.4 Training: High-quality training maintains a CL.4培训:高质量的培训可以维 knowledgeable workforce and reinforces high standards for 持一个学识渊博的员工团队，利于保maintaining nuclear safety. 持核安全的高标准。 PI. Problem Identification and Resolution PI.识别问题、解决问题 Issues potentially impacting safety are promptly 迅速 识别、彻底评估影响安全的identified, fully evaluated, and promptly addressed and 潜在问题，根据重要性迅速处理和 纠corrected commensurate with their significance. Identification and resolution of a broad spectrum of 正。为 加强安全和提高表现，应识别problems, including organizational issues, are used to 和解决包括组织问题在内 的广泛问strengthen safety and improve performance. 题。 Attributes: PI.1 Identification: The organization implements a 特点: PI.1识别:为识别问题，组织可执 corrective action program with a low threshold for 行一个 34 低门槛的纠正措施计划。个人 identifying issues. Individuals identify issues completely, 按照程序及时、彻底、准确地识别问 accurately, and in a timely manner in accordance with the 题。 program. PI.2 Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates PI.2评估:为确保问题的解决措 issues to ensure that problem resolutions and solutions 施、原因阐述和范围状况与其安全重address causes and extents of conditions commensurate with 要性一致，组织应彻底评估问题。 their safety significance. PI.3 Resolution: The organization takes effective corrective PI.3解决问题:为解决问题，组 actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate 织及时采取与问题安全重要性相一致with their safety significance. 的纠正措施。 PI.4 Trending: The organization periodically analyzes PI.4趋势:组织定期分析纠正措 35 information from the corrective action program and other 施计划和其它评估结果，以此识别不assessments in the aggregate to identify adverse trends or 利趋势和状况。 conditions. RC. Environment for Raising Concerns A safety-conscious work environment (SCWE) is RC.提出顾虑的氛围 建立一个有安全意识的环境 maintained where personnel feel free to raise safety (SCWE)，个人可以自由地提出顾虑，concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation, 而不用担心遭到报复、威胁、侵 扰或harassment, or discrimination. The station creates, maintains, and evaluates policies and processes that allow personnel to freely raise concerns. Attributes: 歧视。电厂建立、维护、评估相关政策和程序，允许员工 提出顾虑。 特点: RC.1 SCWE Policy: The organization implements a policy RC.1SCWE原则:组织鼓励个人提 that supports individual rights and responsibilities to raise 出安全顾虑，并不会受到报复、威胁、safety concerns and 36 does not tolerate harassment, 侵扰或歧视。 intimidation, retaliation, or discrimination for doing so. RC.2 Alternate Process for Raising Concerns: The RC.2提出关注的其他程序:组织 organization implements a process for raising and resolving 执行一套不受管理影响的鼓励提出顾concerns that is independent of line management influence. 虑的程序。员工可以自信地提出安全 Safety issues may be raised in confidence and are resolved 问题，并被及时有效地解决问题。 in a timely and effective manner. WP. Work Processes WP.工作程序 The process of planning and controlling work activities 为保证安全，执行计划和控制工is implemented so that safety is maintained. Work 作。工作管理是一个特定程序。 该程management is a deliberate process in which work is 序对工作进行识别、选择、计划、进 identified, selected, planned, scheduled, executed, closed, 度、执行、完成和评审。整个组织参 and critiqued. The entire organization is involved in and 与并支持该程序。 37 fully supports the process. Attributes: WP.1 Work Management: The organization implements 特点: WP.1工作管理:组织执行一套计 a process of planning, controlling, and executing work 划、 控制和执行工作活动的程序，以activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. 确保核安全重于一切。工作程序包括 The work process includes the identification and 识别和管理与工作相关的风险。 management of risk commensurate to the work. WP.2 Design Margins: The organization operates and WP.2设计裕量:组织在设计裕量 maintains equipment within design margins. Margins are 内操作并维护设备。只有通过谨慎、carefully guarded and changed only through a systematic 系统的程序才可以监视和改变裕量。 and rigorous process. Special attention is placed on 对保持裂变产品屏障、纵深防御和安 maintaining fission product barriers, defense-in-depth, and 全相关设备要保持特别注意。 38 safety-related equipment. WP.3 Documentation: The organization creates and maintains complete, accurate, and up-to-date WP.3文件:组织建立和保持完整、 documentation. WP.4 Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work instructions. 准确和最新的文件。 WP.4遵守程序:个人遵守工艺流程、程序和工作指导。 Acknowledgements 致谢 The following individuals participated in advisory groups that developed the traits and attributes in this document. 以下个人参与了顾问团并对本文档作出了贡献。 Jeffrey B. Archie Senior Vice President and David F. Garchow 39 Vice President, Plant Technical Bernard Jeannin Safety Standards Advisor Kevin J. Mulligan Vice President, Operations Chief Nuclear Officer South Carolina Electric & Gas Company Ronald A. Barnes Director, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Arizona Public Service Company Elizabeth Beswick Nuclear Professionalism Consultant Nuclear Generation EDF Energy Susan Brissette Manager, Management System Department Bruce Power Annick Carnino Director Energy Strategists Consultancy Limited Conrad Dube Project Manager WANO Paris Center Randall K. Edington Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Arizona Public Service Company Edwin J. Eilola Director, Nuclear Oversight PSEG Nuclear LLC Jose Manuel Diaz Francisco Communication and Safety Coordinator Electronuclear Preston D. Swafford 40 Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Tennessee Valley Authority Carin Sylvander Human Performance, RQH and Safety Culture Vattenfall AB; Ringhals NPP Alexandra Tudor Engineer, Performance Monitoring Section Safety and Compliance Department CNE Cernavoda, S.N. Nuclearelectrica Eduard Volkov Director Prognoz - Obninsk Science Research Center Andrew J. Vomastek Fleet Manager, Dominion Nuclear Employee Concerns Programs Dominion Generation Support Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Ronald Gaston Licensing Manager Exelon Corporation Billie Garde, Esq. Partner Clifford & Garde, LLP Pierre Francois Gest Senior Safety Officer Operational Safety Section International Atomic Energy Agency Edward D. Halpin 41 Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Pacific Gas and Electric Company Jun Hamada General Manager & Group Leader Japan Nuclear Technology Institute Lori Hayes Manager, Corporate Nuclear Oversight Progress Energy, Inc. Albert R. Hochevar Deputy Director, OR Team Leaders Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Tom Houghton Senior Director, Safety Focused Regulation Nuclear Energy Institute William R. Illing Senior Program Manager Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Safety and Security Coordination International Atomic Energy Agency Molly Keefe Human Factors Analyst Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Anne Kerhoas Senior Safety Specialist Division of Nuclear Installation Safety Department of Nuclear Safety and Security International Atomic Energy Agency G. Kenneth Koves, Ph.D. Principal Program Manager 42 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Johann Kritzinger Corporate Consultant: Human Performance Nuclear Operating Unit Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd Valérie Lagrange Safety Management & Human Factors Advisor Nuclear Operation Division Electricité de France James E. Lynch Vice President, Assistance Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Kamishan Martin Human Factors Engineer Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Stephanie Morrow, Ph.D. Human Factors Analyst Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 21 Support Entergy Nuclear Michael J. Pacilio President and Chief Nuclear Officer Exelon Nuclear Exelon Corporation Ray Powell 43 Chief, Technical Support and Assessment Branch Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Gregory Rolina Researcher Mines ParisTech Philip K. Russell Team Leader Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Jack Rutkowski Reactor Inspector Region III U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Eric Ruesch Senior Reactor Inspector Region IV U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Diane Sieracki Senior Safety Culture Program Manager Office of Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Undine Shoop Chief, Health Physics and Human Performance Branch Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 百度搜索“就爱阅读”,专业资料,生活学习,尽在就爱阅读网 92to.com,您的在线图书馆 44