IV.间接言语行为理论Indirect Speech Acts

Pragmatics-Teaching Plan (5) IV. Indirect Speech Acts 4.1 Primary and Secondary Illocutionary Acts 4.2 Inferential Process of Indirect Speech Acts 4.3 Searle’s Researches on Indirect Directives 4.3.1 Six Groups of Indirect Directives 4.3.2 Basic Ideas about Indirect Directives 4.3.2.1 Idiomatic, but not Idioms 4.3.2.2 Coexistence of the Indirect Directive Act and the Literal Illocutionary Act 4.3.3 Interpretation of Indirect Directives in terms of Speech Acts Theory 4.4 Some Problems in Searle’s Pattern of Indirect Speech Analysis 4.5 An Extended Analysis of Indirect Commissives Readings: Searle, J. R. Indirect speech acts [A]. P. Cole & J. Morgan (eds.) Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts. New York : Academic Press, 1975. Searle, J. R. Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts [M]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Huang Yan. 2009: 4.6 Indirect Speech Acts He Zhaoxiong, 2011: 3.3 Indirect Speech Acts 涂靖. Irony言语行为的研究[J]. 四川外语学院学报, 2004, (4). 丁风. 汉语请求言语行为中的性别差异[J]. 西外学报, 2002, (1): 46-50. 朱晓姝. 中美学生抱怨言语行为的差异研究[J]. 西外学报, 2008, (1): 51-55. 黄永红. 对言语行为“道歉”的跨文化研究[J]. 解放军外国语学院学报, 2001, (5): 33-36. 吴淑琼et al. 英汉批评言语行为策略对比研究[J]. 外语教学, 2004, (2): 22-25. 周启强, 白解红. 原型范畴与间接指令[J]. 外语与外语教学, 2004, (12): 1-4. 刘森林. 语用策略与言语行为[J]. 外语教学, 2003, (5): 10-15. 赵英玲,李洁芳. 虚假邀请(ostensible invitation)言语行为的语用研究[J]. 哈尔滨工业大学学报(社科版), 2004, (7).. Isaac, E. A. Ostensible Invitation [J]. Language in Society, 1999, (19) Song Yuan. On the Probing Speech Act in English Talk Shows —A Case Study of Oprah Show [D]. South-central University for Ethnic Communities, 2010. (英语脱口秀中的打探言语行为研究—以欧普拉脱口秀为个案) IV. Indirect Speech Acts 4.1 Primary and Secondary Illocutionary Acts Searle (1975: 60) initiated the notion of indirect speech act to indicate the illocutionary act which is performed indirectly by way of performing another. In some cases, what people say (locutionary act / literal meaning) are in consistence with what they do (illocutionary act), as in Example (1): (1) A: What’s your name? B: My name is Julia. B’s utterance is a direct reply to A’s question about her name. What B says is in complete agreement with what she intends to say. Indirect usage of speech is not involved here. But frequently, what people actually say do not agree with what they intend to say / what they do, as in Example (2): (2) It’s cold in here. If the speaker’s intention is only to inform the hearer of the temperature at the location and time of speaking and nothing else, his speech is direct. If, however, the speaker’s intention is, by virtue of telling the hearer of his own feelings about the temperature, to get the hearer to do something like closing the window, switching on the air-conditioner, his speech is indirect. In latter case, through this utterance, the speaker simultaneously performs two illocutionary acts: an assertive (陈述) and a directive (指令). He indirectly performs the illocutionary act of directive by means of performing the illocutionary act of assertive. Searle (1975) assigned the two terms, primary illocutionary act and secondary illocutionary act, respectively to the two illocutionary acts performed simultaneously in indirect speech acts. Primary illocutionary act, such as the directive act in (2), represents the real intention of the speaker; secondary illocutionary act, such as the assertive act in (2), is another illocutionary act performed in order to perform the primary illocutionary act. The secondary illocutionary act coincides with the literal meaning of sentence whereas the primary illocutionary act means more than the literal meaning (The speaker performs the secondary illocutionary act by way of uttering a sentence, the literal meaning of which is such that its literal utterance constitutes a performance of that illocutionary act). 4.2 Inferential Process of Indirect Speech Acts How is it possible for the speaker to mean the primary illocution when he only utters a sentence that means the secondary illocution? And how does the hearer understand the non-literal primary illocutionary act from understanding the literal secondary illocutionary act? Searle (1975) reconstructs a series of inference steps by means of which the hearer could, from the literal meaning of the sentence, draw the speaker’s real intention, and interprets the inferential apparatuses as follows: “In indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, together with the general powers of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer” (Searle, 1979: 31-32) Specifically, the apparatus necessary to explain the indirect part of indirect speech acts are: (i) a theory of speech acts; (ii) certain general principles of cooperative conversation (not limited to Grice’s principles); (iii) mutually shared factual background information of the speaker and the hearer; (iv) an ability on the part of the hearer to make inferences. In real communication, the hearer will resort to these apparatuses unconsciously in their interpretation of indirect speech acts. Take the following verbal exchange as an example: (3) Student X: Let’s go to the movies tonight. Student Y: I have to study for an exam. X’s utterance constitutes a proposal in virtue of its meaning, in particular because of the meaning of Let’s, and the normal response to a proposal is an acceptance or rejection, but in virtue of the literal meaning, Y’s reply is neither acceptance nor rejection, it is simply a statement about Y. The questions then arise: How does X know that Y’s response is a rejection of his own proposal? And how is it possible for Y to mean his response as a rejection of the proposal? Searle’s (1979: 33-34) interpretation of the question is: the primary illocutionary act performed in Y’s utterance is the rejection of X’s proposal, and Y does that by way of performing a secondary illocutionary act of making a statement to the effect that he has to prepare for the exam. He performs the secondary illocutionary act by way of uttering a sentence, the literal meaning of which is such that its literal utterance constitutes a performance of that illocutionary act. Alternatively, the secondary illocutionary act is literal; the primary illocutionary act is not literal. Then the above questions can be re-expressed as: How does X understand the non-literal primary illocutionary act from understanding the literal secondary illocutionary act? And how is it possible for Y to mean the primary illocution when he only utters a sentence that means the secondary illocution? Searle reconstructed ten inferential steps necessary for X to derive the non-literal primary illocution from the literal secondary illocution as follows:` Step 1: I (X) have made a proposal to Y, and in response he has made a statement to the effect that he has to study for an exam (facts about the conversation). Step 2: I assume that Y is cooperative in the conversation and that therefore his remark is intended to be relevant (principles of conversational cooperation) Step 3: A relevant response must be one of acceptance, rejection, counterproposal, further discussion, etc. (theory of speech acts). Step 4: But his literal utterance was not one of these, and so was not a relevant response (inference from Step 1 and 3). Step 5: Therefore, he probably means more than he says. Assuming that his remark is relevant, his primary illocutionary point must differ from his literal one (inference from Step 2 and 4).(This step is crucial. Unless a hearer has some inferential strategy for finding out when primary illocutionary points differ from literal illocutionary points, he has no way of understanding indirect illocutionary acts.) Step 6: I know that studying for an exam normally takes a large amount of time relative to a single evening, and I know that going to the movies normally takes a large amount of time relative to a single evening (factual background information). Step 7: Therefore, he probably cannot both go to the movies and study for an exam in one evening (inference from Step 6). Step 8: A preparatory condition on the acceptance of a proposal, or on any other commissive, is the ability to perform the act predicted in the propositional content condition (theory of speech acts). Step 9: Therefore, I know that he has said something that has the consequence that he probably cannot consistently accept the proposal (inference from Step 1, 7, and 8). Step 10: Therefore, his primary illocutionary point is probably to reject the proposal (inference from Step 5 and 9). (Searle, 1979: 34-35) Through these steps, any indirect illocutionary points can be drawn by the hearer, no matter what kind of literal forms they take on. 4.3 Searle’s Researches on Indirect Directives 4.3.1 Six Groups of Indirect Directives In the field of indirect illocutionary acts, Searle shows largest interest in the area of indirect directives because, to him, ordinary conversational requirements of politeness normally make it awkward to issue flat imperative sentences (e.g. Leave the room!) or explicit performatives (e.g.I order you to leave the room!). In directives, politeness is the chief motivation for indirectness. Searle collected six categories of sentences that are conventionally used in the performance of indirect directives and indicated, with bold type, the generality of the syntactic forms of the sentences in question: Group 1: Sentences concerning H’s ability to perform A: Can you reach the salt? Can you pass the salt? Could you be a little more quiet? You could be a little more quiet. You can go now (this may also be a permission=you may go now). Are you able to reach the book on the top shelf? Have you got change for a dollar? Group 2: Sentences concerning S’s wish or want that H will do A: I would like you to go now. I want you to do this for me, Henry. I would/should appreciate it if you would/could do it for me. I would/should be most grateful if you would/could help us out. I’d rather you didn’t do that any more. I’d be very much obliged if you would pay me the money back soon. I hope you’ll do it. I wish you wouldn’t do that. Group 3: Sentences concerning H’s doing A: Officers will henceforth wear ties at dinner. Will you quit making that awful racket? Would you kindly get off my foot? Won’t you stop making that noise soon? Aren’t you going to eat your cereal? Group 4: Sentences concerning H’s desire or willingness to do A: Would you be willing to write a letter of recommendation for me? Do you want to hand me that hammer over there on the table? Would you mind not making so much noise? Would it be convenient for you to come on Wednesday? Would it be too much (trouble) for you to pay me the money next Wednesday? Group 5: Sentences concerning reasons for doing A: You ought to be more polite to you mother. You should leave immediately. Must you continue hammering that way? Ought you to eat quite so much spaghetti? Should you be wearing John’s tie? You had better go now. Hadn’t you better go now? Why not stop here? Why don’t you try it just once? Why don’t you be quiet? It would be better for you (for us all) if you would leave the room. It wouldn’t hurt if you left now. It might help if you shut up. It would be better if you gave me the money now. It would be a good idea if you left town. We’d all be a good off if you’d just pipe down a bit. This class also contains many examples that have no generality of form but obviously, in an appropriate context, would be uttered as indirect requests, e.g.: You’re standing on my foot. I can’t see the movie screen while you have that hat on. Group 6: Sentences embedding one of these elements inside another; also, sentences embedding an explicit directive illocutionary verb inside one of these contexts. Would you mind awfully if I asked you if you could write me a letter of recommendation? Would it be too much if I suggested that you could possibly make a little less noise? Might I ask you to take off your hat? I hope you won’t mind if I ask you if you could leave us alone? I would appreciate it if you could make less noise. (Searle, 1979: 36-39) 4.3.2 Basic Ideas about Indirect Directives 4.3.2.1 Idiomatic, but not Idioms To some speech act theorists, some syntactic structures can be taken as the idioms of conventionally performing certain indirect directives, just like using kick the bucket to mean die. According to them, Can you + V? / Would you please + V? / Would you mind + V-ing? are all idioms for indirect requests. An indirect request on sb. to open the door, for example, can be realized by the idiomatic forms (4), (5) and (6): (4) Can you open the door? (5) Would you please open the door? (6) Would you mind opening the door? Contrastive to this understanding, Searle’s (1979: 40-41) viewpoint is that indirect directives are idiomatic, but not idioms. To him, sentences like (7) are not idioms like kicked the bucket in (8): (7) Can you pass the salt? (8) Jones kicked the bucket. Searle (1979: 41) presents two reasons, indicating why the indirect requests like (7) are not idioms: First, when these sentences are used as requests, they still have their literal meaning, so that literal responses are also appropriate (e.g. Sure, I can. Here it is. or No, sorry, I can’t.It’s down there at the end of the table.) Idioms, however, cannot be understood literally. In response to (8), it’s inappropriate to say (9): (9) Really? Did he hurt his leg? Second, a word-for-word translation of the sentences like (7) into other languages will often produce sentences with the same indirect illocutionary act potential, but a word-for-word translation of Jones kicked the bucket into other languages will not produce a sentence meaning “Jones died.” However, Searle also admits that indirect directives are idiomatic, though they are not idioms. Sentences like (4)-(7) are idiomatic or conventional ways of making requests. In general, their non-idiomatic equivalents or synonyms would not have the same indirect illocutionary act potential. Thus, the idiomatic structure “Do you want to hand me the hammer over there on the table?” can be uttered as a request, but its non-idiomatic equivalent “Is it the case that you at present desire to hand me that hammer over there on the table?”has a formal and unnatural character that would prevent it from becoming a candidate for an indirect request potential. 4.3.2.2 Coexistence of the Indirect Directive Act and the Literal Illocutionary Act In his research on indirect directives, Searle (1979: 42-43) proposes the idea that when one of the sentences like (4)-(7) is uttered with the primary illocutionary point of a directive, the literal illocutionary act is also performed. In every one of these cases, the speaker issues a directive by way of asking a question or making a statement. The fact that his primary illocutionary point is directive does not alter the fact that he is asking a question or making a statement. In cases where these sentences are uttered as requests, they still have their literal meaning. Evidence that these sentences keep their literal meanings when uttered as indirect requests is that responses that are appropriate to their literal utterances (as demonstrated in B1 and B2) are also appropriate to their indirect speech act utterances. For example: A: Can you pass the salt? B1: No, sorry, I can’t. It’s down there at the end of the table. B2: Yes, I can. (Here it is.) Additional evidence for the existence of the literal meaning in indirect speech is that a subsequent report of the utterances can truly report the literal illocutionary act. For example, the utterance of “I want you to leave now, Bill” can be reported by an utterance of “He told me he wanted me to leave, so I left”, and the utterance of “Can you reach the salt?” can be reported by an utterance of “He asked me whether I could reach the salt”. Similarly, an utterance of “Could you do it for me, Henry; could you do it for me and Cynthia and the children?” can be reported by an utterance of “He asked me whether I could do it for him and Cynthia and the children” 4.3.3 Interpretation of Indirect Directives in terms of Speech Acts Theory Searle’s categorization of indirect directives is mainly based on the felicity conditions on performing illocutionary acts, as are mentioned in the Theory of Speech Acts. Searle (1979: 44) illustrates the felicity conditions necessary for the performance of directive class of illocutionary acts as follows: Preparatory condition: H is able to perform A. Sincerity condition: S wants H to do A. Propositional content condition: S predicates a future act A of H. Essential condition: Counts as an attempt by S to get H to do A. Based on these conditions, the six groups of indirect directives collected by Searle can be reduced to three types: (1) those having to do with felicity conditions on the performance of a directive illocutionary act; (2) those having to do with reasons for doing the act; (3) those embedding one element inside another one. All of Groups 1-3 indirect directives concern felicity conditions on directive illocutionary acts since: Group 1: The ability of H to perform A concerns the preparatory condition; Group 2: The desire of S that H perform A concerns the sincerity condition; Group 3: The prediction of A of H concerns the propositional content condition. Group 4 and 5 both concern reasons for doing A, since desire or willingness to do something (Group 4) is “a reason par excellence for doing it”. (Searle, 1979: 45) Group 6 is a special class only by courtesy, since its elements either are performative verbs or are already contained in the other two categories of felicity conditions and reasons. Group 1-6 sentences of indirect directives demonstrate that the syntactic structures for indirect directives are either statements or questions. Searle (1979: 45) generalizes four strategies of making indirect directives (primary illocutionary acts) by means of the illocutionary acts of making a statement or asking a question: Generalization 1: S can make an indirect request (or other directive) by either asking whether or stating that a preparatory condition concerning H’s ability to do A obtains. (Group 1) Generalization 2: S can make an indirect directive by either asking whether or stating that the propositional content condition obtains. (Group 3) Generalization 3: S can make an indirect directive by stating that the sincerity condition obtains, but not by asking whether it obtains. (Group 2) Generalization 4: S can make an indirect directive by either stating that or asking whether there are good or overriding reasons for doing A, except where the reason is that H wants or wishes, etc., to do A, in which case he can only ask whether H wants, wishes, etc., to do A. (Groups 4 & 5) Why is it a general tendency that people like to issue directives in an indirect way? To this problem, Searle’s (1979: 48) answer is that the chief motivation for using indirect directives is politeness. The indirect directive form Can you (pass the salt), for example, is polite in at least two aspects: First, its speaker does not presume to know about the hearer’s abilities, as he would if he issued an imperative sentence (e.g. Pass the salt, please!); second, the form gives the hearer the option of refusing, since yes-no question allows no as a possible answer. Thus, the hearer’s compliance (obedience) can be made to appear a free act rather than obeying a command. 4.4 Some Problems in Searle’s Pattern of Indirect Speech Analysis Searle (1979: 48) points out that several problems still exist in his own pattern of indirect speech analysis, even though it might be successful in many more cases. Problem 1: Why is it that some syntactical forms work better than others for indirect speech acts, if the apparatuses by which indirect speech acts are meant and understood are perfectly general—having to do with the theory of speech acts, the principles of cooperative conversation, and shared background information, and having nothing to do with any particular syntactical form? Why can I ask you to do something by saying “Can you hand me that book on the top shelf?”, but not by saying “Is it the case that you at present have the ability to hand me that book on the top shelf?” To the first part of the problem, Searle’s answer is this: The theory of speech acts and the principles of conversational cooperation do, indeed, provide a framework within which indirect illocutionary acts can be meant and understood. However, within this framework certain forms will tend to become conventionally established as the standard idiomatic forms for indirect speech acts. While keeping their literal meanings, they will acquire conventional uses as, e.g., polite forms for requests. Searle (1979: 49) argues that there can be conventions of usage that are not meaning conventions. For instance, can you, could you, I want you to, and numerous other forms are conventional ways of making requests, but at the same time they do not have an imperative meaning. Politeness is the most prominent motivation for indirectness in requests, and certain forms naturally tend to become the conventionally polite ways of making indirect requests. To the second part of the problem, Searle (p50) also gives an explanation: In order to be a plausible candidate for an utterance as an indirect speech act, a sentence has to be idiomatic to start with. The utterance “Can you hand me that book on the top shelf?”will naturally gives the hearer an impression that he is requested to do something whereas the utterance “Is it the case that you at present have the ability to hand me that book on the top shelf?” will fail to do so. Why? This is because in general, if one speaks unidiomatically, the hearer will assume that there must be a special reason for it, and thus various assumptions of normal speech are suspended. Based on this consideration, Searle (1979: 50) suggests that besides the maxims (in Cooperative Principles) proposed by Grice, there seems to be an additional maxim of conversation: “Speak idiomatically unless there is some special reason not to.” Problem 2: Why is there an asymmetry between the sincerity condition and the others such that one can perform an indirect request only by asserting the satisfaction of a sincerity condition, but not by querying it, whereas one can perform indirect directives by either asserting or querying the satisfaction of the propositional content and preparatory conditions? For example, an utterance of “I want you to do it” can be a request, but not an utterance of “Do I want you to do it?”. The former can take please, the latter cannot. This phenomenon may be attributed to the fact that in normal cases, it is odd to ask other people about the existence of one’s own elementary psychological states. 4.5 An Extended Analysis of Indirect Commissives The general approach to indirect directives will also work for other types of indirect speech acts. Among them, indirect commissives constitute a good type of examples. Consider the following sentences that are conventionally used to perform indirect commissives (offers or promises): Group 1: Sentences concerning the preparatory conditions (A) that S is able to perform the act: Can I help you? I can do that for you. I could get it for you. Could I be of assistance? (B) that H wants S to perform the act: Would you like some help? Do you want me to go now, Sally? Wouldn’t you like me to bring some more next time I come? Would you rather I came on Tuesday? Group 2: Sentences concerning the sincerity condition: I intend to do it for you. I plan on repairing it for you next week. Group 3: Sentences concerning the propositional content condition: I will do it for you. I am going to give it to you next time you stop by. Shall I give you the money now? Group 4: Sentences concerning S’s wish or willingness to do A: I want to be of any help I can. I’d be willing to do it (if you want me to). Group 5: Sentences concerning (other) reasons for S’s doing A: I think I had better leave you alone. Wouldn’t it be better if I gave you some assistance? You need my help, Cynthia. (Searle, 1979: 54-55) The above analysis can be summed up by the following generalizations: Generalization 1: S can make an indirect commissive by either asking whether or stating that the preparatory condition concerning his ability to do A obtains. (Group 1A) Generalization 2: S can make an indirect commissive by asking whether, though not by stating that, the preparatory condition concerning H’s wish or want that S do A obtains. (Group 1B) Generalization 3: S can make an indirect commissive by stating that, and in some forms by asking whether, the propositional content condition obtains. (Group 3) Generalization 4: S can make an indirect commissive by stating that, not by asking whether, the sincerity condition obtains. (Group 2) Generalization 5: S can make an indirect commissive by stating that or by asking whether there are good or overriding reasons for doing A, except where the reason is that S wants or desires to do A, in which case he can only state but not ask whether he wants to do A. (Groups 4 & 5) (Searle, 1979: 56)