车臣战争总结

59 Appendix C THE TWO SIDES OF GROZNY Arthur L. Speyer, III Marine Corps Intelligence Activity CHECHNYA: Urban Warfare Lessons Learned Marine Corps Intelligence Activity—Arthur Speyer The strategies and tactics employed by the Chechen resistance in the battle of Grozny offer outstanding lessons for future urban opera- tions. Grozny, the capital of the breakaway Russian republic of Chechnya, is the site of the largest urban warfare operation since the end of World War II. The Chechen resistance that continues to fight a prolonged conflict against Russian forces provides a model of the 21st-century urban insurgency. Chechen tactics are being studied by 60 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century insurgent groups worldwide and may one day be used against U.S. forces in the streets of Kosovo, Bosnia, Indonesia, or Liberia. Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 61 Why Chechnya Matters • Largest urban battle since World War II • Russia employed all aspects of conventional military power within an ubran environment “The future of war is not the son of Desert Storm, but the stepchild of Chechnya.” −General Krulak USMC (ret.) The Chechens keenly demonstrated how a small, decentralized, and lightly-armed insurgency can defend against a larger, conventionally organized military in an urban environment. 62 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century The Chechen Resistance • Textbook example of the modern urban guerilla • Conducted asymmetric warfare • Nationalistic/religious/ political • Ties to international organizations The Chechens knew they could not defeat the Russians in a direct conflict. To counter Russian strength, the Chechens attacked Rus- sian weaknesses. They moved throughout the city and denied the Russians a true front line. The Chechens attacked again in the Rus- sian rear and denied the Russians a decisive battle. The Chechens also used contacts abroad, mainly in the Middle East and Turkey, to acquire equipment and seasoned fighters. Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 63 The Chechens are an Islamic, clan-based ethnic group that inhabits the mountainous Caucasus region of southern Russia, one of the most ethnically diverse areas of the world. The group is fighting for independence from Russia for a mix of political, cultural, religious, and economic reasons. The Russians and the Chechens fought two major battles for control of Grozny; one during the winter of 1994–95 and the second during the winter of 1999–2000. 64 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century Background to the Conflict • Chechnya is part of the Russian Federation • Long history of resisting Russian control • Began latest drive for independence in 1990 The Chechen people have a long history of resisting Russian control. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, they began in earnest to seek full independence. In 1994, Chechnya became a civil war bat- tleground between pro-independence and pro-Russian factions. In December 1994, Russia sent approximately 40,000 troops into Chechnya to restore Russian primacy over the breakaway republic. Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 65 Grozny—Pre-War 50,000 people 68 square miles High rises Industrial areas Suburbs Modern by Soviet standards The Chechens • Clan-based mountain people • Long history of fighting Russian aggression • Islamic • Trader/dealer culture 66 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century • Inflict Russian casualties • Extend the conflict • Attack in rear areas • Bring the fight to advantageous geography Chechen Strategy The Chechens had no illusions about fighting the Russians. They knew they could not conduct conventional combat operations against them and win. However, they believed they could inflict serious damage if they could draw the Russians into the urban envi- ronment. As the battles for Grozny progressed, the Chechens began to realize the distinct advantages the urban environment gave to their decentralized operations. While the Russians concentrated on securing territory, the Chechens aimed to inflict Russian casualties and extend the conflict. Chechen leadership sought to cause one hundred Russian casualties daily; the Chechens believed if they could continue the war and inflict high numbers of Russian casualties, Russia would eventually pull out. Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 67 Russian Strategy • Seize and hold key terrain • Destroy Chechen resistance • End war quickly The Russian strategy was simple and direct: gain control over the territory of Chechnya and destroy Chechen resistance. 68 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century Order of Battle Russians 45,000 men—1995 95,000 men—2000 Chechens 15,000 men During the first war in 1995, the Russians deployed over 45,000 troops from across the wide range of Russian security services to the Chechen theater. In 2000, that number doubled to approximately 95,000 troops. Chechen numbers are hard to judge due to the large number of part-time fighters. The Chechens likely had 15,000 men under arms though they rarely had more than 2,000–3,000 fighters in the city of Grozny at any one time. Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 69 The Chechen Defense of Grozny • Chechens planned city defense for two years • City manager and city engineer involved • Intimate knowledge of streets, buildings, and strategic intersections The Chechens knew that the Russians would send armor units directly into Grozny to destroy the Chechen resistance. The Chechens used the urban geography to plan their defense. City offi- cials who controlled Grozny’s roads, telephones, and power advised the Chechen military leadership. The Chechens drew on their inti- mate knowledge of local streets, buildings, and key intersections to defeat their enemy. 70 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century Basement Ammo, Food, Supplies Hand-Dug Sub-Basement Conical Shelter 1st Floor Entrances Blocked Attack Positions Top Floor Empty Chechen Urban Modifications Underground The Chechens would use urban structures as defensive positions. As the conflict progressed, they became expert at further modifying urban structures to give themselves extra protection against Russian forces. The Chechens would board up the first floor windows and doors to prevent their use by Russian ground troops. The top floor would be left empty for fear of Russian artillery or air attack. The Chechens would use basements and dig sub-basements to store supplies and survive massive Russian artillery strikes. Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 71 Initial Assault • December 31, 1994 • City approached from east, west, and north • Light resistance for Northern Group • Northern Group convoys to center of city at dusk • Long armored columns, no supporting infantry After reaching the Chechen capital of Grozny, approximately 6,000 Russian soldiers mounted a mechanized attack into the urban area. The attack was launched simultaneously from three directions and featured tanks supported by infantry riding in BMP infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). Instead of the anticipated “cake walk,” Russian forces encountered heavy resistance from Chechen forces armed with large quantities of antitank weapons. The Russian attack was repulsed with shockingly high Russian casualties. It took another two months of heavy fighting and adapting Russian tactics to finally capture Grozny. 72 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century • Attacked at sundown • Chechens drew Russian forces into city center • Chechen scouts monitored progress through suburbs • Russian forces panicked Russians lost 102 of 120 APC/IFV and 20 of 26 tanks The Chechen Counter-Attack The Russians used a combination of vehicles during the first attack to include BMPs, BTRs, and MTLBs. The Chechens monitored Russian movement through the city using small, hand-held, off-the-shelf Motorola radios. They intentionally drew the Russians into urban canyons where they could ambush them and reduce Russian combat advantages. Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 73 Russian Combined Arms STORM GROUP Motorized Infantry Company Tank Platoon Artillery Platoon Mortar Platoon AGS-17 Platoon Engineer Platoon Chemical Troops Russian Infantry/Conscripts • Young, unhealthy, untrained • Over 2/3 had less than 6 months military experience • Low morale • Basic fire and maneuver skills lacking • NCO and junior officer leadership weak • Many hid, ran, panicked, or deserted 74 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century Infantry Fighting Vehicles • High attrition rates • Many lost at point-blank ranges to RPGs and heavy machine guns • Increased ammunition needs due to nature of urban warfare Air Defense Vehicles • High-elevation weapons were excellent for urban combat • 4,000–5,000 rounds per minute • Excellent anti-sniper weapon • Light armor proved vulnerable, became a prime target for Chechens 2S6 Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 75 Russian Artillery • Massed artillery used to devastate large areas of Grozny • Used to compensate for poor infantry performance • Russian artillery units outnumbered maneuver units around Grozny 76 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century Russian Objective: Bridge Russian Area of Control 2km Russian Artillery Barrage Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 77 Semi- Rubbleized Urban Corridor Russian Storm Group 78 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century Intelligence • Limited accurate maps • Underestimated threat • Cultural arrogance • Did not conduct proper reconnaissance of city • Value of imagery limited Throughout the conflict, the Chechens had a well-developed human intelligence (HUMINT) network in the city. Chechen fighters rarely wore military uniforms and could easily blend into the city popula- tion. The locals were an excellent information source for the Chechens; they would routinely report Russian movements using small hand-held radios and couriers. Young women were particu- larly useful intelligence agents as they could easily move throughout the city. Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 79 Rotary Wing • Employed weapons at stand-off range on city ring • Would rarely venture into urban canyon for fear of attack • Mainly used for logistic support Airpower • Hampered by poor weather • Little direct support of ground troops • Used free-fire zones • Employed laser-guided bombs against high value targets 80 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century Why Chechnya 1999? • Internal Security and the “Near Abroad” • The military wanted to avenge loss in 1996 • Re-establish Russia as a legitimate superpower • Stabilize/control oil region • Fight “terrorism” • Election year politics Mozdok Urus Martan Grozny Gudermes Kizlyar Khasavyurt Botlikh Prokhladny Malgobek Nadterechnaya Kalinovskaya Kamyshev Kargalinskaya Chervlennaya Argun Shali KirovauyaSovetskoyeVladikavkaz Alagir BeslenTerek Terek Terek Novyy Terek Staryy Terek Assa Sunzha Argun Sula k And iysk oye Ka ysu October–December 1999 Vedeno Serzhen-Yurt Russians in Region MoD 40-55K MVD 30-45K West Army Group East Army Bamut Shatili PHASE ONE Light Resistance North Army Group Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 81 Mozdok Urus Martan Grozny Gudermes Kizlyar Khasavyurt Botlikh Prokhladny Malgobek Nadterechnaya Kalinovskaya Kamyshev Kargalinskaya Chervlennaya Argun Shali KirovauyaSovetskoyeVladikavkaz Alagir BeslenTerek Terek Terek Novyy Terek Staryy Terek Assa Sunzha Argun Sula k And iysk oye Ka ysu January–February 5, 2000 Vedeno Serzhen-Yurt Russians in Region MoD 40-55K MVD 30-45K West Army Bamut Shatili PHASE TWO East Army Intense Urban Fighting North Army TOS-1 in Chechnya • Mounted on T-72 chassis • 220mm rocket tubes • Unguided • 4 warheads: napalm, FAE, thermobaric, thermite Russian More-Than-Lethal 82 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century These graphics depict the Chechen counterattack on New Year’s Eve 1994. The Russians were moving in a single column through the city with no supporting infantry. The Chechens attacked the front and rear vehicles. Once they were disabled, the other vehicles had little room to maneuver. The Chechens then moved down the line de- stroying the remaining Russian vehicles. The Russian forces pan- icked and could not launch a counterattack. Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 83 ` 84 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century Chechen Urban Tactics • Fought as light 25-man highly mobile teams • Urban ambushes would rarely involve more than 75 fighters • Would attack Russian units and break them into smaller pieces • Owned the night The Chechens made use of (and sometimes discarded) the often plentiful stock of captured Russian equipment. This included Rus- sian Night Vision Devices (NVDs) for maneuver at night, maneuver often completed while under Russian bombardment. The Russians normally did not move at night or during periods of heavy fog while operating in the city. The Chechens used fog to mask their move- ment. They also keyed on the Russian use of smoke as an obscurant, taking it as an indicator of Russian movement. The Chechens would fire into the smoke with positive effect during Russian displace- ments. Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 85 Chechen Tactical Formations 8-Man Fighting Group 2 Heavy Machine Guns 2 RPGs 1 Scout/Sniper 1 Rifleman/Medic 1 Rifleman/Radioman 1 Rifleman/Ammo Highly Mobile No Body Armor 25 8 88 The Chechens centered their eight man subgroups (armor hunter- killer teams—squad equivalent) on the RPG (“Chechnya’s national weapon”). Each subgroup contained three riflemen/automatic riflemen/ammunition bearers, two RPG gunners, one sniper, and two machine gunners. The sniper was also often employed as a spotter. 86 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century Chechen Urban Ambush Tactics 8 8 8 8 2525 8 = Landmine In the conduct of armor and personnel ambushes, the Chechens configured their forces into 75-man groups. These were further bro- ken down into three 25-man groups (platoons). These platoons were further broken down into three equal-sized teams of six to eight fighters each (squads). Each squad had two RPG gunners and two PK (machinegun) gunners. The 75-man unit (company) had a mortar (82mm) crew in support with at least two tubes per crew. The Chechens did not move by flanking maneuvers against the Russians but instead incorporated chess-like maneuvers to hit them. They used buildings and other structures as navigation and signal points for maneuvering or initiating ambushes/assaults against the Rus- sians. Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 87 Chechen Urban Ambush Tactics 8 8 8 8 2525 8 Attack Russian Group Block Re-enforcements = Landmine The Chechens only occupied the lower levels of multistory buildings to avoid casualties from rockets and air-delivered munitions coming through the upper levels. One 25-man platoon comprised the “killer team” and set up in three positions along the target avenue. They had responsibility for destroying whatever column entered their site. The other two 25-man platoons set up in the buildings at the assumed entry points to the ambush site. They had responsibility for sealing off the ambush entry escape or interdict efforts to reinforce the ambushed unit. 88 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century Chechen “Hugging” • Stayed close to Russian infantry in urban areas, usually less than 50 meters • Would rather take chances with infantry than suffer from Russian artillery or air The Chechens utilized “hugging” techniques to reduce casualties from indirect fires. They would set up positions within 25 to a maxi- mum of 100 meters of Russian positions in order to render Russian artillery and rocket support ineffective. Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 89 Chechen Infrastructure • Relied heavily on stolen, captured, or purchased Russian supplies • Every 8-man team had a Motorola hand-held radio • Constructed extensive bunkers throughout the city The primary communications device used by the Chechens was a small hand-held Motorola radio. It was used at all levels below “Headquarters” (national equivalent). At this higher level they had access to INMARSAT for communications with the outside world but kept these communications to a minimum because of the monetary cost involved. The Chechens had a ratio of about six combatants to each Motorola radio—but had they been able to afford more radios they would have issued every fighter one during the conduct of urban operations. The Chechens did not use any encryption or sepa- rate tactical nets. They maintained communications security by using their native language. Every Chechen could speak Russian but few Russians understood Chechen. 90 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century The National Weapon of Chechnya: The RPG • Widely used in Grozny • Two dedicated RPG gunners per 8-man team • Disable first then destroy • Engaged armor with multiple weapons • Best RPG gunners 13–16 years old • Effectiveness greatly increased in urban environment The standard Russian Rocket-Propelled Grenade (RPG) warhead needed four rounds on target to penetrate a tank—the Chechens altered the RPG-7 round by removing the detonator cap and increas- ing the explosive components in such a way that they could pene- trate a tank’s (to include the T-72) armor and “blow the turret off” in one shot. The Chechens found the RPG to be an extremely effective weapon in urban warfare. Its simple use and wide availability earned it the nickname “The National Weapon of Chechnya.” The Chechens employed the RPG against a wide range of targets, including bunkers, vehicles, personnel, and buildings. The RPG was successfully fired from multiple launchers against Russian armor. The Chechens tar- geted the thinly armored areas in the rear, top, and sides of Russian vehicles. Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 91 4 STORY BUILDING 3 STORY BUILDING Machine Gun Fire Sniper Fire 4 STORY BUILDING 3 STORY BUILDING Machine Gun Fire 92 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century 4 STORY BUIDLING 3 STORY BUILDING 4 STORY BUILDING RPGs 4 STORY BUIDLING 3 STORY BUILDING 4 STORY BUILDING Appendix C: Arthur L. Speyer, III 93 Urban Sniping • Widely used by both sides in Grozny • Second most deadly urban weapon for the Chechens • Used as scouts as much as for sniping • Russians employed in support of infantry; Chechens also depl oyed independently • Best source of tactical intelligence in urban area The most effective Chechen weapon system employed against “pure” Russian infantry was the SVD sniper rifle employed by a trained Chechen sniper. The SVD was not only effective as a casualty pro- ducer, but also as a psychological weapon that reduced morale among Russian ground troops. The Russians diverted significant combat power to search for Chechen snipers but were unsuccessful. A major reason for this was that the Chechens had prepared infantry positions to provide supporting/covering fire against Russian forces engaged in countersniper operations. 94 Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the 21st Century Chechen Weaknesses • Internal divisions hindered effort • Could not conduct an extensive engagement • Many part-time fighters • Limited