【英文】罗尔斯论目的论与道义论

Rawls on Teleology and Deontology Will Kymlicka Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 3. (Summer, 1988), pp. 173-190. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0048-3915%28198822%2917%3A3%3C173%3AROTAD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N Philosophy and Public Affairs is currently published by Princeton University Press. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/pup.html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. http://www.jstor.org Thu Aug 23 02:24:10 2007 WILL KYMLICKA Rawls on Teleology and Deontology It has become a commonplace that most contemporary liberal theory is "deontological," that is, gives priority to the right over the good, in contrast to its utilitarian predecessors, which were "teleological," that is, gave priority to the good over the right. Like so much else in the current vocab- ulary of political discourse, this distinction was made prominent by Rawls's Theory of jus t ice . Rawls, of course, argues that it is a great virtue of his theory that it gives priority to the right over the good. Critics, how- ever, have argued that this is liberalism's foundational flaw. The criticism is found not just among the old-style utilitarians Rawls was chiefly argu- ing against, but also among sociahsts and conservatives, communitarians and feminists. The desire to give priority to the right over the good is said to reflect unattractive or even incoherent assumptions about human in- terests and human community. The question of whether the right or the good is prior is now seen as a central dividing point for contemporary po- litical theories. I hope to challenge this view. I do not believe there is a real difficulty about whether the right or the good is prior. Critics and defenders of lib- eralism share the view that principles of right are a spelling-out of the re- quirement that we give equal consideration to each person's good. This is not a new suggestion. Ronald Dworkin has argued that Rawls and his crit- ics all share the same "egalitarian plateau"; they agree that "the interests of the members of the community matter, and matter equally."~ I hope to support Dworlun's contention by showing that the contrast Rawls claims to find between deontological and teleological theories is based on a seri- I am grateful to John Broome, G. A. Cohen, Alistair Macleod, and Michael A. Smith for comments on an earlier draft of this article. I . Ronald Dworkin, "In Defense of Equahty," Social Philosophy and Policy I , no. I (Au- tumn 1983): 24, See also chapter 6 of Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977). Philosophy G Public Affairs ous confusion of two distinct issues, neither of which concerns the priority of the right and the good. One issue concerns the definition of people's es- sential interests. The other issue concerns the principles of distribution which follow from supposing that each person's interests matter equally. Once these issues are distinguished, the debate Rawls claims to find over the priority of the right and the good disappears. Critics may still believe, of course, that liberalism relies on an unattractive view of human interests and community. But we get a clearer picture of what really separates crit- ics and defenders of contemporary liberalism when we drop the mislead- ing language of the priority of the right or the good. The first issue that Rawls sees as separating deontological and teleolog- ical theories is distribution. Not all political theories show the same con- cern with the equitableness of the distribution of the good. Utilitarianism is prepared to contemplate endlessly sacrificing one person's good in order to maxin~ize the overall good. But other theories put constraints on the sacrifices that can be asked of one person in order to promote the good of others-even if the effect of these constraints is to prevent maximization of the overall good. Political theories which take rights seriously will dis- allow trade-offs which deny some individuals their basic human needs or rights, even if those trade-offs would maximize the good overall. Rawls claims that utilitarianism fails to provide an adequate account of what it is to treat people as equals. To endlessly sacrifice one person's good because it maximizes happiness overall is to treat that person as a means, not as an end in herself. A proper account of people's moral equality would put constraints on the maximization of utility, constraints like the two principles of justice that Rawls affirms. Treating people as equals requires greater concern for the equality of distribution of the good being pursued than is present in utilitarianism. What does this have to do with the priority of the right and the good? Rawls claims that the reason utilitarianism allows the good of some to be endlessly sacrificed for the benefit of others is that it gives priority to the good over the right. That is, it has an independent account of the good (happiness), and the right is defined as the maximization of that good. People's rightful claims are entirely dependent on what best promotes the good, and hence the maximization of the good cannot be said to violate people's rightful claims. Rawls calls such theories, which give priority to the good over the right, "teleological." What makes his own theory preferable is that it gives priority to the right Rawls on Teleology and Deontology over the good. That is, it has an account of people's rightful claims that is not entirely derivative from the maximization of the good. Principles of right are prior to, and constrain, the pursuit of the good. Each person's good matters equally in a way that constrains the pursuit of the good; each person's good should have a standing that puts limits on the sacrifices that can rightfully be asked in the name of the overall good." Rawls calls such theories, which give priority to the right over the good, "deontological." According to Rawls, then, the debate over distribution is essentially a debate over whether we should or should not define the right as maximiz- ing the good. But is this an accurate characterization of the debate? Utili- tarians do, of course, believe that the right act maximizes happiness, un- der some description of that good. And that requirement does have potentially abhorrent consequences. But do utilitarians believe that it is right because it maximizes happiness? Do they hold that the maximiza- tion of the good defines the right, as teleological theories are said to do? Let us see why Rawls believes they do. Rawls says that utilitarianism is teleological (that is, defines the right as the maximization of the good) be- cause it generalizes from what is rational in the one-person case to what is rational in many-person cases. Since it is rational for me to sacrifice my present happiness to increase my later happiness if doing so will maximize my happiness overall, it is rational for society to sacrifice my current hap- piness to increase someone else's happiness if doing so maximizes social welfare overall. For utilitarians, utility-maximizing acts are right because they are maximizing. It is because they are maximizing that they are ra- tional. Rawls objects to this generalization from the one-person to the many- person case because he believes that it ignores the separateness of per- sons.? Although it is right and proper that I sacrifice my present happiness for my later happiness if doing so will increase my overall happiness, it is wrong to demand that I sacrifice my present happiness to increase some- one else's happiness. In the first case, the trade-off occurs wi th in one per- son's life, and the later happiness compensates for my current sacrifice. In the second case, the trade-off occurs across lives, and I am not compen- sated for my sacrifice by the fact that someone else benefits. My good has simply been sacrificed, and I have been used as a means to someone else's 2. John Rawls, A Theory ofJz~s t ice(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, rg71), p. 31 3. Ibid., p. 27. Philosophy G Public Affairs happiness. Trade-offs that make sense within a life are wrong and unfair across lives. Utilitarians obscure this point by ignoring the fact that sepa- rate people are involved. They treat society as though it were an individual, as a single organism, with its own interests, so that trade-offs between one person and another appear as legitimate trade-offs within the social organ- ism. Scott Gordon echoes this interpretation of utilitarianism when he says that utilitarians adopt the view "that 'society' is an organic entity and contend that i ts utility is the proper objective of social policy." This view, he says, "permits flirtation with the grossest form of anti-individualistic social philosophy."4 This, then, is Rawls's major example of a "teleological" theory which gives priority to the good over the right. His rejection of the priority of the good, i n this context, is just the corollary of his affirmation of the sepa- rateness of persons: promoting the well-being of the social organism can- not be the goal from which people's rightful claims are derived, since there is no social-organism. Since individuals are distinct, they are ends in them- selves, not merely agents or representatives of the well-being of the social organism. This is why Rawls believes that utilitarianism is teleological, and why he believes that we should reject it in favor of a deontological doctrine. But Rawls misdescribes utilitarianism, and hence misdescribes the debate over distribution. The most natural and compelling form of utilitarianism is not teleological, and does not involve any "antiindividualistic" generali- zation from the individual to society. Rawls's characterization of utilitar- ianism represents, at best, just one interpretation of that doctrine, and misses an important element in many justifications of it, an element that is not teleological at all.5 In fact, Rawls conflates these different elements in utilitarianism, and thereby creates an artificially teleological formula- tion of that doctrine. Rawls has legitimate objections to utilitarianism even when presented as a nonteleological doctrine, but those objections are best understood in terms other than the priority of the right and the good. On one interpretation utilitarianism is a procedure for aggregating in- dividual interests and desires, a procedure for making social choices, spec- 4. Scott Gordon, Welfare, Justice and Freedom (New York: Columbia University Press, rg80), p. 40. See also Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 19741, PP. 31-32, 5. Ronald Dworkin makes a similar distinction between teleological and nonteleological forms of utilitarianism. See "What is Equality? Part I : Equality of Welfare," Philosophy G Public Affairs 10, no. 3 (Summer 1981): 244-46. Rawls on Teleology and Deontology ifying which trade-offs are acceptable. It is a moral theory because it pur- ports to treat people as equals, with equal concern and respect. It does so by counting everyone for one, and no one for more than one. This justifi- cation of utilitarianism does not falsely generalize from what is rational in the one-person case, and hence does not fail to respect the distinctness of persons in that sense.6 Individuals are of course distinct, with distinct and potentially conflicting preferences. The problem, on this interpretation of utilitarianism, is how to treat distinct people fairly. The standard solution is to give each person's interests equal weight. Each person's life matters equally, from the moral point of view, and hence each person's interests deserve equal consideration. To give some people's interests more weight is to treat others as less than equals. Now, this idea of treating people with equal consideration is very imprecise, and it needs to be spelled out if it is to be a real guide for our actions. One obvious, and perhaps initially ap- pealing, way of doing so is to give equal weight to each preference of each person, regardless of the content of the preference or the material situa- tion of the person. That is, we count everyone for one, no one for more than one. If we decide how to act on this basis, then utility is maximized. But max- imization of utility is not the direct goal. Maximization occurs, but as a by- product of a decision procedure that is intended to aggregate people's pref- erences fairly. Not all utilitarians desire maximization because they treat rational social choice on the model of rational individual choice. On the contrary, it is the concern with equal consideration that clearly underlies Bentham's argument7 and is explicitly affirmed by recent utilitarians such as John Harsanyi and James Griffin8 And while this is not his preferred method, R. M. Hare too claims that one could defend utilitarianism by ref- erence to a foundational premise of equal consideration. Hare, in fact, finds it difficult to imagine how equal consideration for people could mean anything else.9 6. Other aspects of the question of the distinctness of persons are discussed below. 7, See Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. J. H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart (London: Methuen, 1982), pp, xlvi-vii. 8. See John Harsanyi, "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Com- parisons of Uthty," Journal of Political Economy 63, no. 4 (August 1955): 315-16; and James Griffin, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance (Oxford: Ox- ford University Press, 1986), esp. pp. 167-70, 208-15, 239-42, 295-301. 9. R. M. Hare, "Rights, Utility and Universalization: Reply to J. L. Mackie," in Utility and Rights, ed. R. Frey (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), pp. ro&rz. Philosophy G Public Affairs I think that utilitarianism, viewed as a theory of equal consideration, is subject to decisive objections. Although from the moral point of view peo- ple's interests matter equally, it does not follow that the best spelling-out of that idea is to give each preference of each person the same weight, re- gardless of the content of ;he preference or the material welfare of the per- son. There may be better ways of spelling out the idea (pace Hare, who thinks that utilitarianism is logically derivable from it). Rawls's "original position" is one potential way, as is Dworkin's equality of resources scheme. Rawls believes that his conception of justice is a better way of spelling out the idea that from the moral point of view people's interests matter equally, and I agree. Nevertheless utilitarianism is one way of spell- ing out that idea, and it is as "deontological" as any other, since it demands that people's equal standing be respected at all costs in the decision pro- cedure. If people's preferences have not been counted equally, then we have treated them unjustly, as less than equals. Their legitimate claims to equal consideration have not been met. But, of course, for utilitarians to say that, as many do, they must recognize, rather than deny, that individ- uals are distinct persons, with their own rightful claims. That is, in Rawls's classification, a position that affirms the priority of the right over the good. Rawls's theory is more egalitarian, on one level, since it puts greater constraints on the differences that can legitimately arise in people's life situations. A theory that favors equal welfare would put even more con- straints on such differences. But all these theories are deontological in that they spell out an ideal of fairness or equality for distinct individuals. This, I think, is the best way to characterize the debate between Rawls and utilitarians over distribution: does the difference principle or the util- ity principle provide a better account of what it is to give equal considera- tion to each person's interests? It is not an issue of "deontology versus te- leology," since neither side believes that the good is prior to the right in Rawls's sense; neither side defines the right as the maximization of the good. There is, however, another interpretation of utilitarianism, one that seems more in line with Rawls's characterization of the debate. On this second interpretation, maximizing the good is primary, and we count in- dividuals equally only because that maximizes value. Our primary duty is not to treat people as equals, but to bring about valuable states of affairs. Rawls on Teleology and Deontology As Bernard Williams puts it, people are viewed merely as locations of util- ities, or as causal levers for the "utility network": "the basic bearer of value for Utilitarianism is the state of affairs. . . . as a Utilitarian agent, I am just the representative of the satisfaction system who happens to be near cer- tain causal levers at a certain time."Io Utilitarianism, on this view, is pri- marily concerned not with persons, but with states of affairs. This second interpretation is not merely a matter of emphasizing a dif- ferent facet of the same theoretical structure. Its distinctiveness becomes clear if we look at some utilitarian discussions of population policy, like those of Jonathan Glover and Derek Parfit. They ask whether we morally ought to double the population, even if it means reducing each person's welfare by almost half (since that will still increase overall utility). They think that a policy of doubling the population is a genuine, if somewhat repugnant, conclusion of utilitarianism. But it need not be if we view util- itarianism as a theory of treating people as equals. Nonexistent people have no claims-we have no moral duty to them to bring them into the world. As John Broome says, "one cannot owe anyone a duty to bring her into existence, because failing in such a duty would not be failing any- one."" So what is the duty here, on the second interpretation? The duty is to maximize value, to bring about valuable states of affairs, even if the ef- fect is to make all existing persons worse off than they otherwise would have been. To put the difference another way, if I fail to bring about the best state of affairs, by failing to consider the interests of some group of people, for example, then I can be criticized, on both interpretations, for failing to live up to my moral duty as a utilitarian. But, on the second interpretation, those whose interests are neglected have no special grievance against me. I do not have to apologize to them more than to anyone else for my failure to maximize the good, because, on this second interpretation of uti