heidegger pph

MATTHIAS MAHLMANN HEIDEGGER’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE THEORY OF THE LIBERAL STATE ABSTRACT. The paper explores Martin Heidegger’s political philosophy and its rela- tion to the theory and ethical foundations of the liberal state. It first reconstructs the key doctrines of Heidegger’s philosophy formulated in Being and Time. It then turns to Heidegger’s later philosophy after the famous turning and investigates its relation to the fundamental ontology of Heidegger’s earlier years. In a third step, Heidegger’s much discussed Nazism and its link – by some commentators fervently defended and by others passionately denied – to his philosophy is the focus of attention. The findings about Heidegger’s philosophy are then critically assessed: firstly as to their philosophical merits concerning fundamental questions of epistemology, ontology or philosophical anthropo- logy and secondly as to their relations to the ethical and theoretical foundations of the liberal state. As a result some proposals are made as to whether or not it is justified to regard Heidegger’s work as part of the darker legacies of European thought. KEY WORDS: fundamental ontology, Heidegger, Heidegger’s Nazism, Kehre, liberalism, liberal state, Nazism, pragmatism, time and being Very different attitudes have been expressed about the philosophical work of Martin Heidegger. There have been – and right from the beginning of his growing fame – voices of serious commentators who declared that Heidegger’s work had no scientific merits at all and was nothing but an idle, pretentious play with words. A classic example for this attitude is Carnap who took Heidegger, in his famous critique of metaphysical thought, as a prime example of how philosophy should not be if it hopes to be taken seriously as a science.1 On the other hand, there are many voices that assert Heidegger’s impor- tance as a thinker of great originality and who rank him even among the great minds of the 20th century. It is noteworthy that among these thinkers are key figures of current philosophical debates that are highly critical of some aspects of Heidegger’s work, most notably his activities during the Third Reich.2 Given these kind of intellectual credentials it might be less 1 See R. Carnap, “Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache”, in Erkenntnis Bd. 2 (1931) S. 231. 2 This view is well illustrated by the summary of R. Rorty of his discussion of Heidegger’s Nazism: “In our actual world Heidegger was Nazi, a cowardly hypocrite, and the greatest European thinker of our time”, in R. Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope Law and Critique 14: 229–252, 2003. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 230 MATTHIAS MAHLMANN than obvious to discuss Heidegger under the heading of the dark legacies of European thought. Is his work not, to the contrary, part of the philosophical illumination emanating from European philosophy? Heidegger wrote about most of the great topics of the philosophical tradition. He made epistemological remarks, set out to renew ontology, framed a philosophy of language and provided a philosophical method that the most prominent advocates of deconstruction take as a methodolo- gical inspiration. The following remarks will concentrate on a particular topic within this framework, even though there will be some discus- sion of the general philosophical outlook that Heidegger was working in as well, namely on the political and ethical dimensions of Heidegger’s philosophy. The most obvious reason for this choice might seem to be Heidegger’s famous and much discussed attempt to put his philosophy in political practise by supporting the Nazis after their seizure of power. This kind of political action clearly raises the curious and perhaps bewil- dering question of how such an extraordinary action could be explained and whether or not it was rooted in Heidegger’s philosophy. Heidegger’s sympathies for Nazism will be discussed but they do not form the main focus of this paper. Rather, its main concern will be to extrapolate from Heidegger’s major works and, most notably from Being and Time, some anthropological assumptions in ontological disguise that are not high- lighted enough in many interpretations. This gap in the interpretation is particularly unfortunate because of the distinct political and ethical implic- ations anthropological theories often possess. The reason for this choice is the perception that the legacy of Heidegger’s thought is surely not the open sympathy for Nazism but the widely lauded main tenets of his philos- ophy. To assess Heidegger’s legacy means thus to assess the merits of his core philosophical doctrines, which may or may not explain his political actions. (London, 1999), 196. For Derrida’s defence of Heidegger against charges of Nazism compare J. Derrida, De l’esprit: Heidegger et la question (Paris, 1988). Habermas has made highly illuminating and critical remarks on Heidegger’s philosophy and its place in the history of thought; compare J. Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne (Frankfurt/M, 1988), 158ff, including an account of Heidegger’s Nazism, ibid., at 184ff. Compare on the same topic his remarks in ‘Heidegger – Werk und Weltanschauung’, in V. Farias, Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt/M, 1989), 11ff. Like Rorty, however, he emphasises the importance of Heidegger’s philosophy, most notably of Sein und Zeit and underscores the point that in his view Heidegger’s political activities cannot diminish the great substance of this work; compare ibid., at 14. The core of Habermas’ appreciation of Heidegger’s work is Heidegger’s critique of the philosophy of conscious- ness, which is in Habermas view a great achievement even though in the end not radical enough, Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne, at 177. HEIDEGGER’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 231 This kind of political and ethical anthropology implied in Heidegger’s work will then be the object of normative scrutiny. More concretely, I will assess whether Heidegger’s political and ethical philosophy has features that are detrimental to the ethical, political and, as a consequence, legal foundations of the liberal state. Clearly, this intended assessment presup- poses a certain ethical point of view, namely that the liberal state is actually a social arrangement whose merits somehow outweigh its considerable and much discussed deficits. This presupposition will become trans- parent, if not convincing, after some clarifications of the idea of a liberal state. At first, however, Heidegger’s work itself will be the focus of attention in order to clarify the general philosophical framework in which he was working and, more concretely, the political and ethical dimensions of his work. After that, an attempt will be made to assess the relation of the main features of Heidegger’s philosophy to the core foundations of the liberal state. Finally, there will be some proposals as to whether Heidegger is part of a dark, intellectual European tradition or, to the contrary, a continuous source of philosophical light. THE DAWN OF A NEW ONTOLOGY? HEIDEGGER’S PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK IN BEING AND TIME In later years Heidegger famously and significantly reframed the philos- ophy outlined in Being and Time. He never produced, however, an equally coherent alternative view of his later opinions. Therefore, Being and Time is rightly regarded as his major piece of work. In addition, Heidegger often referred in later works to Being and Time, trying to reinterpret it in the modified framework of his thought, but still taking it as a reference point of his discussions. Being and Time, therefore, is the most important text to assess Heidegger’s philosophy. If one tries to sum up in a nutshell the main point of Heidegger’s philos- ophy in Being and Time one might suggest as follows: Heiddeger tried to show the necessity to go back behind the fundamental moves of modern philosophy that made the subject and its mental world the prime focus of philosophical attention. This would allow the framing of a new ontology. It is difficult to delineate any epochs in the history of thought, with its fertile potential for old ideas becoming suddenly fresh and providing new insights. Traditionally, however, this move is connected with Descartes’ systematic doubt. This brought reflection back to the cogito, the thinking 232 MATTHIAS MAHLMANN subject as the only indubitable truth.3 From here onwards, modern theoret- ical philosophy took its course and became for a long time occupied with epistemological questioning of the foundations of human knowl- edge and their relation to the external world. Following Descartes, Leibniz developed the idea of innate ideas as the basis of human understanding,4 Locke outlined the core doctrines of empiricism,5 Berkeley challenged the assumption that there was demonstrative proof for the existence of an external world,6 Hume powerfully formulated the challenge of scepticism, shattering dogmatic beliefs about, for instance, causality, personal identity and space and time.7 Kant (for Heidegger, one of the main reference points in his argumentation) tried to find new ways beyond rationalism and empir- icism by pursuing the project of transcendental philosophy; bringing the philosophy of consciousness for many in its classical and nearly canonical form. The world of experience is a creation of the thinking subject framed by its modes of perception, categories and concepts of mind. The ‘things- in-themselves’ behind these creations of the mind are covered with – for human reason – impenetrable darkness.8 Heidegger radically challenges this whole tradition. He pursues a theoretical project that one might call a ‘reversed idealism’. Hegel tried to show that the world is actually spiritual (in fact, the Spirit itself in its dialectical unfolding of itself) thus challenging Kant’s view that there is an unknown and unknowable world beyond the thinking subject.9 In Hegel’s view, the world is Spirit. Heidegger, by contrast, does not make the non-spiritual disappear like Hegel but brings the subject back to the world. Heidegger makes the subject a primordial part of the world: the subject is not separated from the world by the unsurmountable epistemo- logical barriers that the philosophical tradition thought to be in place. In Heidegger’s philosophy the subject and the world are thus united again.10 The world and not Spirit becomes the key concept of philosophy. 3 R. Descartes, “Discours de la Me´thode”, in Adam and Tannery, eds., Œuvres de Descartes (Vrin C.N.R.S., 1964–1976). 4 G.W. Leibniz, Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain (Frankfurt/M, 1996). 5 J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding (London, 1997). 6 G. Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (London, 1997). 7 D. Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature (Oxford, 1978). 8 I. Kant, Die Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Akademie Ausgabe, Bd. III, 1904). 9 Compare Hegel’s definition of reason to be the certainty of consciousness to be the whole reality, ‘Gewissheit des Bewusstseins ‘alle Realität zu sein’, Phänomenologie des Geistes (Frankfurt/M, 1986) at 179. 10 Martin Heidegger makes this point repeatedly throughout Being and Time (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), compare, e.g., pp. 61, 132, 164. He even asserts that this is the HEIDEGGER’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 233 Heidegger’s enquiries are motivated by one fundamental question: What is the meaning of being, as such, beyond the particular things existing?11 To answer this question Heidegger chooses a particular entity as the object of his analysis: The human being. In Being and Time the term for human beings is Dasein, a term that is used in the English discussion as well.12 He chooses Dasein because in his view it has a privileged status that makes it the key to the understanding of being as such. Dasein has an ontically and ontologically distinguished status. First, as existence, it is naturally concerned with being as such. Second, it is itself ontological because of this concern. Third, it is the precondition of asking ontological questions about the non-human world.13 If one carefully analyses Dasein and, thus, human existence one finds what Heidegger calls existentials that are fundamental ontological facts about Dasein or human beings, in contrast to existentiell features that concern only the individual lives.14 Thus, Heidegger provides a fundamental ontology with the means of an existential analysis of Dasein.15 The result of his attempts is to shatter the view that being as such is existing in something like an eternal present – a view Heidegger identifies with the traditional view held since antiquity. Instead, he argues, being is itself temporal.16 The temporality of Dasein and thus of being as such is the final perspective of Being and Time. But this is no more than a perspective as the book stayed a fragment; unfinished by its author who, in many ways, modified his philosophy after his famous turn, his Kehre in the early thirties of the last century.17 Heidegger is self-confident about the fundamental nature of his philos- ophy. In his view, the fundamental ontology provides the basis on which all particular sciences and, most notably, the natural sciences unknowingly positive result of Kant’s philosophy, even though Kant clearly asserted the exact opposite, ibid. n. 8, at 10f. 11 Heidegger, Being and Time (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), at 2ff. Heidegger’s language is notoriously idiosyncratic. The translation used in this paper is the translation of John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. The references, however are to the German original that is cross-referenced in the Macquarrie/Robinson translation. 12 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, supra n. 11, at 11. 13 Heidegger, ibid., at 13. In Heidegger’s view there is a productive circle in this argument: an analytic of Being presupposes an analytic of Dasein as the key to Being. An analytic of Dasein, however, presupposes an understanding of Being, as Dasein is concerned with Being as a fundamental property of its existence, ibid., at 8. On the “hermeneutical circle” in general ibid., at 148ff. 14 Heidegger, ibid., at 12. 15 Heidegger, ibid., at 13. 16 Heidegger, ibid., at 17ff, 231ff. 17 Heidegger, ibid., at 437. 234 MATTHIAS MAHLMANN operate.18 In order to buttress his far reaching claims, he is inspired by the phenomenological method of his teacher, Husserl.19 He asserts that the main methodological point of phenomenology is to let the funda- mental facts of Dasein appear in their disclosedness (Erschlossenheit).20 He admits the possibility of error but defends the view that, in principle, Dasein has direct access to the things of the world.21 Dasein is not defined by a fixed set of properties. The essence of human beings is not formed by some anthropological attributes or – in traditional terms – a species character.22 It creates itself by a Entschluss, a resolution. The essence of human beings is, in consequence, their existence as some- thing that creates itself by a resolution. The content of this resolution can be, in principle, anything. It is not predetermined by, e.g., a human nature. The content of the resolution is created by the resolution itself.23 The starting point of Heidegger’s further analysis is Alltäglichkeit, everydayness; the every day world of human beings in its pre-theoretical mode and concreteness.24 An important existential is Befindlichkeit of everyday Dasein, its state-of-mind. For Heidegger it is a crucial obser- vation: human beings are always in a certain mood; they feel something during every moment they live.25 This analysis of the particular state- of-mind in which human beings always live is the basis of another core concept that became a central inspiration of the hermeneutic tradition and the work of influential authors like Gadamer: the concept of Verstehen, or understanding. Understanding is the way Dasein has access to the world: Dasein interprets the world. This understanding is not scientific understanding of the abstract world of mathematical natural sciences. It is coloured by the state-of-mind: it has always an emotional dimension.26 This emotionally coloured understanding is in Heidegger’s view the prim- 18 Heidegger, ibid., at 11: “As ways in which man behaves, sciences have the manner of being which this entity – man himself – possesses”. 19 Heidegger, ibid., at 27. 20 Heidegger, ibid., at 38. 21 Heidegger, ibid., at 27ff. 22 “(W)e cannot define Dasein’s essence by citing a ‘what’ of the kind that pertains to a subject-matter (eines sachhaltigen Was), and because its essence lies rather in the fact that in each case it has its Being to be and has it as its own, we have chosen to designate this entity as ‘Dasein’, a term which is purely an expression of its Being”, Heidegger, ibid., at 12. 23 Heidegger, ibid., at 298. 24 Heidegger, ibid., at 43ff, 50. 25 Heidegger, ibid., at 134ff. 26 Heidegger, ibid., at 142ff. HEIDEGGER’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 235 ordial way to interpret the world.27 Scientific understanding is only a particular mode of understanding, based on a particular state-of-mind: the clear, only seemingly neutral mood of theoretical reflection.28 In the disclosed world of everydayness things are not primarily objects of theoretical reflection. They are, to the contrary, determined by their purpose for human action: they are zuhanden, ready-to-hand.29 Dasein is dealing with these things in circumspective concern.30 Beyond their use for human purposes things are just vorhanden, present-at-hand. This is important as this analysis is one of the bases for Heidegger’s claim that there are more basic ways to understand the world than by the methods of (empirical) sciences, that the latter are just a derivative mode of accessing the world. Thus, the doctrine of readiness-to-hand leads to a new epistem- ological assessment of the natural sciences. They have no privilege of providing unique and superior understanding of the world.31 Given the existential of Befindlichkeit, of state-of-mind, it is not surprising that further existentials – that finally lead to the core of the ontological structure of Dasein and thus to being as such – are described by concepts with a clear emotional connotation: Angst und Sorge, anxiety and care. The latter translation is slightly misleading, as it lacks the connotation of worries that the German word Sorge can possess. Anxiety is a core concept for Heidegger.32 He claims that this existential has a very important function. It discloses the fact of the naked existence, its thrownness into existence,33 the uncanniness of the world and Dasein’s existence34 and leads the way to understand that the basic ontological structure of Dasein is Sorge: the constant worried concern about itself and its future.35 For Heidegger Sorge is an important illustration of the temporality of Dasein, as in Sorge the three modes of temporality forming time (past, present and future) are present. 27 Heidegger, ibid., at 138. 28 Heidegger, ibid., at 138. He insists that this does not mean that science becomes a matter of emotions, ibid., at 138. It is not quite clear – and not explained – how he avoids this consequence. 29 Heidegger, ibid., at 69. Things ready-at-hand are the things in-themselves (Seiendes an-sich), ibid., at 71. 30 Heidegger, ibid., at 68. 31 Compare, e.g., Heidegger, ibid., at 147, 153. 32 Heidegger, ibid., at 186ff. 33 Heidegger, ibid., at 135 on “Geworfenheit”. 34 Heidegger, ibid., at 189. 35 Heidegger, ibid., at 192: “Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in-(der-Welt-)als Sein-bei (inner- weltlich begegnendem Seienden)”. 236 MATTHIAS MAHLMANN Heidegger formulates in Being and Time a theory of estrangement. Dasein can lack Eigentlichkeit, authenticity.36 It is even a constituent feature of human existence to live estranged.37 Most notably Dasein is corr