HBR.ORG May 2012
reprinT r1205C
Spotlight on innovation For the 21St Century
Managing Your
Innovation
Portfolio
people throughout your organization are
energetically pursuing the new. But does all
that activity add up to a strategy? by Bansi Nagji
and Geoff Tuff
artwork ricky allman, We Can See You
2010, acrylic on panel, 12" x 16"Spotlight
2 Harvard Business Review May 2012
Spotlight on InnovatIon FoR tHe 21st CentuRy
Bansi nagji and geoff tuff
are partners at Monitor Group
and leaders of the firm’s global
innovation practice.
Managing Your
Innovation Portfolio
people throughout your organization are energetically pursuing
the new. But does all that activity add up to a strategy?
by Bansi Nagji and Geoff TuffPho
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For arTiCle reprinTs Call 800-988-0886 or 617-783-7500, or visiT hBr.org
May 2012 Harvard Business Review 3CopyRIGHt © 2012 HaRvaRd BusIness sCHool puBlIsHInG CoRpoRatIon. all RIGHts ReseRved.
ManageMent knowS it and so
does Wall Street: The year-to-
year viability of a company de-
pends on its ability to innovate.
Given today’s market expecta-
tions, global competitive pres-
sures, and the extent and pace
of structural change, this is
truer than ever. But chief exec-
utives struggle to make the case
to the Street that their manage-
rial actions can be relied on to
yield a stream of successful
new offerings. Many admit to
being unsure and frustrated.
Typically they are aware of a tremendous amount
of innovation going on inside their enterprises but
don’t feel they have a grasp on all the dispersed ini-
tiatives. The pursuit of the new feels haphazard and
episodic, and they suspect that the returns on the
company’s total innovation investment are too low.
Making matters worse, executives tend to re-
spond with dramatic interventions and vacillating
strategies. Take the example of a consumer goods
company we know. Attuned to the need to keep its
brands fresh in retailers’ and consumers’ minds, it
introduced frequent improvements and variations
on its core offerings. Most of those earned their
keep with respectable uptake by the market and
decent margins. Over time, however, it became
clear that all this product proliferation, while split-
ting the revenue pie into ever-smaller slices, wasn’t
actually growing the pie. Eager to achieve a much
higher return, management lurched toward a new
strategy aimed at breakthrough product develop-
ment—at transformational rather than incremental
innovations.
Unfortunately, this company’s structure and pro-
cesses were not set up to execute on that ambition;
although it had the requisite capabilities for envi-
sioning, developing, and market testing innovations
close to its core, it neither recognized nor gained the
very different capabilities needed to take a bolder
path. Its most inventive ideas ended up being di-
luted beyond recognition, killed outright, or crushed
under the weight of the enterprise. Before long the
company retreated to what it knew best. Once again,
little was ventured and little was gained—and the
cycle repeated itself.
We tell this story because it is typical of compa-
nies that have not yet learned to manage innovation
strategically. It demonstrates an all-too-common
contrast to the steady, above-average returns that
can be achieved only through a well-balanced port-
folio. The companies we’ve found to have the stron-
gest innovation track records can articulate a clear
innovation ambition; have struck the right balance
of core, adjacent, and transformational initiatives
across the enterprise; and have put in place the tools
and capabilities to manage those various initiatives
as parts of an integrated whole. Rather than hoping
that their future will emerge from a collection of ad
hoc, stand-alone efforts that compete with one an-
other for time, money, attention, and prestige, they
manage for “total innovation.”
Be Clear about
your innovation ambition
What does it mean to manage an innovation portfo-
lio? First, let’s consider how broad a term “innova-
tion” is. Defined as a novel creation that produces
value, an innovation can be as slight as a new nail
polish color or as vast as the World Wide Web. Most
companies invest in initiatives along a broad spec-
trum of risk and reward. As in financial investing,
their goal should be to construct the portfolio that
produces the highest overall return that’s in keeping
with their appetite for risk.
One tool we’ve developed is the Innovation Am-
bition Matrix (see the exhibit at right). Students of
management will recognize it as a refinement of a
classic diagram devised by the mathematician H.
Igor Ansoff to help companies allocate funds among
growth initiatives. Ansoff’s matrix clarified the no-
tion that tactics should differ according to whether
a firm was launching a new product, entering a new
market, or both. Our version replaces Ansoff’s binary
choices of product and market (old versus new) with
a range of values. This acknowledges that the nov-
elty of a company’s offerings (on the x axis) and the
novelty of its customer markets (on the y axis) are
a matter of degree. We have overlaid three levels of
distance from the company’s current, bottom-left
reality.
In the band of activity at the lower left of the ma-
trix are core innovation initiatives—efforts to make
incremental changes to existing products and incre-
mental inroads into new markets. Whether in the
form of new packaging (such as Nabisco’s 100- calorie
packets of Oreos for on-the-go snackers), slight refor-
mulations (as when Dow AgroSciences launched one
of its herbicides as a liquid suspension rather than
4 Harvard Business Review May 2012
Spotlight on InnovatIon FoR tHe 21st CentuRy
Firms that excel at total innovation management simultaneously invest
at three levels of ambition, carefully managing the balance among them.
The InnovaTIon ambITIon maTrIx
a dry powder), or added service convenience (for
example, replacing pallets with shrink-wrapping to
reduce shipping charges), such innovations draw on
assets the company already has in place.
At the opposite corner of the matrix are transfor-
mational initiatives, designed to create new offers—
if not whole new businesses—to serve new markets
and customer needs. These are the innovations that,
when successful, make headlines: Think of iTunes,
the Tata Nano, and the Starbucks in-store experience.
These sorts of innovations, also called breakthrough,
disruptive, or game changing, generally require that
the company call on unfamiliar assets—for example,
building capabilities to gain a deeper understanding
of customers, to communicate about products that
have no direct antecedents, and to develop markets
that aren’t yet mature.
In the middle are adjacent innovations, which
can share characteristics with core and transforma-
tional innovations. An adjacent innovation involves
leveraging something the company does well into
a new space. Procter & Gamble’s Swiffer is a case in
point. It arose from a set of needs P&G knew well
and built on customers’ assumption that the proper
tool for cleaning floors is a long-handled mop. But it
used a novel technology to take the solution to a new
customer set and generate new revenue streams. Ad-
jacent innovations allow a company to draw on ex-
isting capabilities but necessitate putting those capa-
bilities to new uses. They require fresh, proprietary
insight into customer needs, demand trends, market
structure, competitive dynamics, technology trends,
and other market variables.
The Innovation Ambition Matrix offers no inher-
ent prescription. Its power lies in the two exercises
it facilitates. First, it gives managers a framework for
surveying all the initiatives the business has under
way: How many are being pursued in each realm, and
how much investment is going to each type of inno-
vation? Second, it gives managers a way to discuss the
idea in Brief
Firms pursue innovation
at three levels of ambi-
tion: enhancements to
core offerings, pursuit of
adjacent opportunities,
and ventures into trans-
formational territory.
analysis of innovation invest-
ments and returns reveals two
striking findings. Firms that
outperform their peers tend to
allocate their investments in a
certain ratio: 70% to safe bets
in the core, 20% to less sure
things in adjacent spaces, and
10% to high-risk transforma-
tional initiatives. as it happens,
an inverse ratio applies to
returns on innovation.
although never the dominant
activity, transformational initia-
tives are vital to a company’s
ongoing health, and firms
must recognize that they
demand unique management
approaches.
• talent should include a
diverse set of skills and be able
to deal with ambiguous data.
• teams should be separated
from day-to-day operations.
• Funding should come from
outside the normal budget
cycle.
• pipeline management
should focus on the iterative
development of a few promis-
ing ideas, not the ruthless
filtering of many.
• Metrics should recognize
nonfinancial achievements in
early phases.
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TransformaTIonal
developing breakthroughs
and inventing things for
markets that don’t yet exist
adjacenT
expanding from
existing business
into “new to the
company” business
core
optimizing existing
products for existing
customers
right overall ambition for the company’s innovation
portfolio. For one company—say, a consumer goods
producer—succeeding as a great innovator might
mean investing in initiatives that tend toward the
lower left, such as small extensions to existing prod-
uct lines. A high-tech company might move toward
the upper right, taking bigger risks on more-auda-
cious innovations for the chance of bigger payoffs.
Although this may sound obvious, few organizations
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May 2012 Harvard Business Review 5
think about the best level of innovation to target,
and fewer still manage to achieve it.
Strike and Maintain the right Balance
In contemplating the balance for an innovation
portfolio, managers should consider the findings of
research we conducted recently. In a study of com-
panies in the industrial, technology, and consumer
goods sectors, we looked at whether any particular
allocation of resources across core, adjacent, and
transformational initiatives correlated with signifi-
cantly better performance as reflected in share price.
Indeed, the data revealed a pattern: Companies that
allocated about 70% of their innovation activity to
core initiatives, 20% to adjacent ones, and 10% to
transformational ones outperformed their peers,
typically realizing a P/E premium of 10% to 20%
(see the exhibit “Is There a Golden Ratio?”). Google
knows this well: Cofounder Larry Page told Fortune
magazine that the company strives for a 70-20-10
balance, and he credited the 10% of resources that
are dedicated to transformational efforts with all the
company’s truly new offerings. Our subsequent con-
versations with buy-side analysts revealed that this
allocation is attractive to capital markets because
of what it implies about the balance between short-
term, predictable growth and longer-term bets.
A second research finding adds more food for
thought. In an ongoing study, we’re focusing on
more-direct returns on innovation. Of the bottom-
line gains companies enjoy as a result of their in-
novation efforts, what proportions are generated
by core, adjacent, and transformational initia-
tives? We’re finding consistently that the return
ratio is roughly the inverse of that ideal allocation
described above: Core innovation efforts typically
contribute 10% of the long-term, cumulative return
on innovation investment; adjacent initiatives con-
tribute 20%; and transformational efforts contrib-
ute 70% (see the exhibit “How Innovation Pays the
Bills”).
Together these findings underscore the impor-
tance of managing total innovation deliberately and
closely. Most companies are heavily oriented toward
core innovation—and must continue to be, given the
risk involved in adjacent and transformational initia-
tives. But if that natural tendency leads to neglect of
more-ambitious forms of innovation, the outcome
will be a steady decline in business and relevance to
customers. Transformational initiatives are the en-
gines of blockbuster growth.
Let us be clear: We’re not suggesting that a 70-
20-10 breakdown of innovation investment is a
magic formula for all companies; it’s simply an av-
erage allocation based on a cross-industry and cross-
geography analysis. The right balance will vary from
company to company according to a number of fac-
tors (see the exhibit “Different Ambitions, Different
Allocations”).
One important factor is industry. The industrial
manufacturers we studied have a strong portfolio of
core innovations complemented by a few breakouts,
and they come closest to the 70-20-10 breakdown.
Technology companies spend less time and money
on improving core products, because their market
is eager for the next hot release. Consumer pack-
aged goods manufacturers have little activity at the
transformational level, because their main focus is
incremental innovation. Of these three sorts of busi-
nesses, industrial manufacturers collectively have
the highest P/E ratio relative to their peers, perhaps
suggesting that they are closest to getting the bal-
ance right—for them.
A company’s competitive position within its in-
dustry also influences the balance. For example, a
lagging company might want to pursue more high-
risk transformational innovation in the hope of
creating a truly disruptive product or service that
would dramatically alter its growth curve. A strug-
gling Apple made this decision in the late 1990s, ef-
fectively betting its business on several bold initia-
tives, including the iTunes platform. A company that
wants to retain its leadership position or believes
the market for its more ambitious innovations has
cooled may decide to do the reverse, removing some
risk from its portfolio by shifting its emphasis from
transformational to core initiatives.
A third factor is a company’s stage of develop-
ment. Early-stage enterprises, especially those
funded by venture capital, must make a big splash.
They may feel that a disproportionate investment
in transformational innovation is warranted, both
to attract media attention, investors, and custom-
ers, and because they don’t yet have much of a core
business to build on. As they mature and develop a
stable customer base, and as protecting and growing
the core becomes more important, they may shift
their emphasis toward that of a more established
company.
The point is that a management team should ar-
rive at a ratio that it believes will deliver better ROI in
the form of revenue growth and market capitaliza-
70%
Core
10%
tranSForMational
20%
adjaCent
Is There a
golden raTIo?
10%
Core
70%
tranSForMational
20%
adjaCent
how InnovaTIon
pays The bIlls
analysis reveals that the
allocation of resources
shown below correlates
with meaningfully higher
share price performance.
For most companies, this
breakdown is a good start-
ing point for discussion.
among high performers
that invest in all three
levels of innovation, we find
the following distribution of
total returns. as it happens,
this ratio is the inverse of
the resource allocation
ratio we discovered in high-
performing companies.
6 Harvard Business Review May 2012
Spotlight on InnovatIon FoR tHe 21st CentuRy
tion, should discover how far its current allocation
is from that ideal, and should come up with a plan
to close the gap.
organize and Manage the total
innovation System
Targeting a healthy balance of core, adjacent, and
transformational innovation is a vital step toward
managing a total innovation portfolio, but it imme-
diately raises an issue: To realize the promise of that
balance, a company must be able to execute at all
three levels of ambition. Unfortunately, the mana-
gerial toolbox required to keep innovation on track
varies greatly according to the type of innovation in
question. Few companies are good at all three.
Companies typically struggle the most with
transformational innovation. A study by the Corpo-
rate Strategy Board shows that mature companies
attempting to enter new businesses fail as often as
99% of the time. This reflects the hard truth that to
achieve transformation—to do different things—an
organization usually has to do things differently.
It needs different people, different motivational
factors, and different support systems. The ones
that get it right (GE and IBM are notable examples)
have thought carefully about five key areas of man-
agement that serve the three levels of innovation
ambition.
Talent. The skills needed for core and adjacent
innovations are quite different from those needed
for transformational innovations. In the first two
realms, analytical skills are vital, because such ini-
tiatives call for market and customer data to be inter-
preted and translated into specific offering enhance-
ments. Procter & Gamble, for example, deploys a
cadre of 70 senior employees around the world to
help identify promising adjacencies. These “tech-
nology entrepreneurs,” as the company calls them,
are responsible for researching a variety of sources,
including scientific journals and patent databases,
and for physically observing activities in specific
markets in order to find new ideas that can build on
P&G’s core businesses. The company credits its tech-
nology entrepreneurs with uncovering more than
10,000 potential offerings for review.
Transformational innovation efforts, by con-
trast, typically employ a discovery and concept-
development process to uncover and analyze the
social needs driving business changes (what’s desir-
able from a customer perspective), the underlying
market trends (what kinds of offers might be viable),
and ongoing technological developments (what is
feasible to produce and sell). These activities require
skills found among designers, cultural anthropolo-
gists, scenario planners, and analysts who are com-
fortable with ambiguous data. Thus, when Samsung
different ambitions, different allocations
on average, high-performing firms direct 70% of their innovation resources to enhancements of core
offerings, 20% to adjacent opportunities, and 10% to transformational initiatives. But individual firms
may deviate from that ratio for sound strategic reasons. Here are three allocations we have seen that
made sense for firms in various circumstances.
a MidStage
teChnology
FirM
45%
Core
15%
tranSForMational
40%
adjaCent
a leading
ConSuMer
goodS CoMpany
80%
Core
2%
tranSForMational
18%
adjaCent
a diverSiFied
induStrialS
CoMpany
70%
Core
10%
tranSForMational
20%
adjaCent
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May 2012 Harvard Business Review 7
decided to compete on the basis of innovative design,
it recognized that it needed new and different skills.
The company moved its design center from a small
town to Seoul in order to be closer to a valuable pool
of young design professionals. It also teamed with
a number of outside firms with strong design skills
and created an in-house school, led by industrial
design experts, to hone the abilities of