2014乌克兰局势

Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Steven Woehrel Specialist in European Affairs February 26, 2014 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL33460 Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Congressional Research Service Summary Many observers have expressed concern about Ukraine’s democratic development, including the government’s use of the courts to neutralize opposition leaders, most notably former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, who was sentenced to a seven-year prison term in 2011. The government’s effort in November 2013 to violently disperse pro-European Union protests backfired, resulting in mass demonstrations in Kyiv and elsewhere in Ukraine. For over two months, the government alternated between attempted crackdowns against the protestors and conciliatory gestures. The most serious violence has occurred during and after a massive government crackdown on February 18-20, resulting in at least 88 deaths, mainly among protestors but also including some police officers. The violence led to a collapse in support for the government of President Viktor Yanukovych, who fled from Kyiv, as did many of his supporters, and the seizure of power by opposition parties, with the support of the protestors. The parliament is expected to approve a new, pro-reform, pro-Western government by early March. The parliament has scheduled new presidential elections for May 25, 2014. Ukraine’s new government will face serious economic problems. Ukraine has long-standing problems in attracting foreign investment, in part due to rampant corruption and other shortcomings in the rule of law. Living standards for many Ukrainians remain low. In the near term, the government’s dwindling foreign exchange reserves have raised the prospect of a default on sovereign debt later this year, unless the government can secure new loans quickly. The Obama Administration reacted positively, but cautiously, to the revolution in Kyiv, saying it could be a step forward to the U.S. goal of a strong, prosperous, unified, and democratic Ukraine. The Administration is working with the EU, the IMF, and other international financial organizations to support a new Ukrainian government committed to reforms. Last year, the Obama Administration requested $95.271 million in U.S. bilateral aid for Ukraine for FY2014. President Obama and Administration officials have made statements that appear to be aimed at dissuading Moscow from seeing the situation in Ukraine as a geopolitical competition between the United States and Russia. However, this effort has met with limited success, judging by the harsh public reaction from Moscow over the fall of the Yanukovych regime. Although it formally expresses support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, some experts have expressed concern that Russia may take steps to “punish” the new leadership in Kyiv by imposing economic sanctions or encouraging separatism in Ukraine’s Crimea region. Congress has considered legislation on the current crisis in Ukraine. On January 7, 2014, the Senate passed S.Res. 319. The resolution urges the United States and EU to work together to promote a peaceful resolution of the crisis that moves Ukraine toward a future in the Euro- Atlantic community and states that, in the event of further government violence against peaceful protestors, the President and Congress should consider targeted sanctions, including visa bans and asset freezes, against individuals responsible for ordering or carrying out the violence. On February 10, 2014, the House approved H.Res. 447. The resolution is broadly similar to S.Res. 319. The resolution expresses support for the visa bans that the United States has already imposed on Ukrainian officials responsible for violence against protestors, and urges the Administration to consider additional sanctions against those responsible for the use of force. After the collapse of the Yanukovych regime in February 2014, congressional action may shift from a focus on possible sanctions to how the United States should aid the new Ukrainian government to achieve stability and conduct reforms. Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Congressional Research Service Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Congressional Research Service Contents Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1 Current Political Situation ............................................................................................................... 3 Current Economic Situation............................................................................................................. 5 Ukraine’s Foreign Policy ................................................................................................................. 6 European Union ......................................................................................................................... 6 Russia ........................................................................................................................................ 7 Energy Issues ....................................................................................................................... 9 U.S. Policy ..................................................................................................................................... 10 U.S. Reaction to Anti-Government Protests ............................................................................ 10 Congressional Response .......................................................................................................... 12 U.S. Aid to Ukraine ........................................................................................................... 12 Other Legislation ............................................................................................................... 13 Policy Issues ............................................................................................................................ 13 Contacts Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 14 Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Congressional Research Service 1 Background Ukraine, comparable in size and population to France, is a large, important, European state. The fact that it occupies the sensitive position between Russia and NATO member states Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania adds to its geostrategic significance. Many Russian politicians, as well as ordinary citizens, have never been fully reconciled to Ukraine’s independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, and feel that the country belongs in Russia’s political and economic orbit. The U.S. and European view (particularly in Central and Eastern Europe) is that a strong, independent Ukraine is an important part of building a Europe whole, free, and at peace. From the mid-1990s until 2004, Ukraine’s political scene was dominated by President Leonid Kuchma and oligarchic “clans” (groups of powerful politicians and businessmen, mainly based in eastern and southern Ukraine) that supported him. His rule was characterized by fitful economic reform, widespread corruption, and a deteriorating human rights record. Ukraine’s 2004 presidential elections were marred by electoral fraud, which triggered massive street protests. The oligarchs chose Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych as their candidate to succeed Kuchma. The chief opposition candidate, former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, was a pro-reform, pro-Western figure. After a November 21 runoff vote, Ukraine’s Central Election Commission proclaimed Yanukovych the winner. Yushchenko’s supporters charged that massive fraud had been committed. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets, in what came to be known as the “Orange Revolution,” after Yushchenko’s chosen campaign color. They blockaded government offices in Kyiv and appealed to the Ukrainian Supreme Court to invalidate the vote. The court did so and set a repeat runoff vote. Yushchenko won the December 26 re-vote, with 51.99% of the vote to Yanukovych’s 44.19%. The “Orange Revolution” sparked a good deal of interest in Congress and elsewhere. Some hoped that Ukraine could finally embark on a path of comprehensive reforms and Euro-Atlantic integration after years of half-measures and false starts. However, subsequent events led to disillusionment among Orange Revolution supporters, both in Ukraine and abroad. President Yushchenko soon fell into squabbling with Yuliya Tymoshenko, his main backer during the Orange Revolution and his first prime minister. Yanukovych, who also served briefly as prime minister during this period, also was involved in this infighting. As Ukrainian leaders engaged in this three-sided political battle, an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians grew disgusted with the Ukrainian political class, according to opinion polls. What little remained of the ideals of the Orange Revolution came to an end with the victory of Yanukovych over Tymoshenko in the presidential election of February 2010. Yanukovych won 48.98% to Tymoshenko’s 45.47%. As in past elections, the results showed a sharp regional split, with Yanukovych winning in Russian-speaking eastern and southern Ukraine, while Tymoshenko prevailed in central and western Ukraine, where Ukrainian nationalism is stronger. International monitors praised the conduct of the election. Yanukovych’s government was criticized over its human rights record. In particular, U.S. and EU officials expressed strong concern over the government’s targeting of opposition leaders for selective prosecution. In the most prominent case, in October 2011 Tymoshenko was convicted of abuse of power arising out of her role in signing a natural gas supply agreement with Russia and sentenced to seven years in prison. Ukraine’s October 2012 parliamentary elections fell short of international standards, according to international election observers. Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Congressional Research Service 2 After the elections, the Party of Regions was able to form a working parliamentary majority with the help of the Communist Party and independent deputies. Ukrainian commentators noted that the new government formed after the election included several new figures that were part of the personal entourage of the President and his son, Oleksandr (colloquially known as “the Family.”) These analysts claimed that these moves marked the “Family’s” consolidation of political power, which has in turn assisted the group’s ongoing efforts to seize control of a large share of Ukraine’s economic assets. Until a few months ago, many observers have believed that, despite growing dissatisfaction with the government, there was little likelihood of public unrest in Ukraine, given widespread disillusionment with the outcome of the Orange Revolution. However, this situation changed suddenly in November 2013. On November 21, the government made a last-minute decision to not sign an Association Agreement with the European Union, due to Russian pressure. The about- face sparked anti-government demonstrations. The first demonstrations in Kyiv in late November were relatively modest in size. However, on November 30, Ukrainian special police attacked and viciously beat peaceful protestors (many of them young people) in Kyiv’s central Maidan Nezalezhnosti, or Independence Square. The action outraged many Ukrainians, and resulted in a massive upsurge in participation in the protests in Kyiv. Smaller protests occurred in other Ukrainian cities, mainly in opposition strongholds in western and central Ukraine. According to some observers, the turnout in Kyiv at times even exceeded those during the Orange Revolution. Observers noted that demonstrators were not just protesting against Ukraine’s failure to sign the Association Agreement, but against the government’s lack of respect for the basic human dignity of Ukraine’s citizens, as exemplified in the November 30 beatings, but also in other areas, such as the rampant corruption among government officials. An attempt by riot police to clear the square on December 10 failed due to the resistance of the protestors. By mid-January, the Maidan protests were continuing, but with fewer protestors than at their peak in early December. Perhaps seeing a chance to “restore order,” on January 16, the Party of Regions and its allies in the Ukrainian parliament rapidly approved, by a show of hands, a series of laws sharply increasing criminal penalties for many of the activities associated with the protests, such as seizing public buildings, wearing helmets, setting up tents or a stage, etc. Another law requiring all organizations receiving foreign funding to register as foreign agents appears to be based on a similar Russian law. The new measures were fiercely condemned by the opposition parties and the protestors as the “dictatorship laws.” After their adoption, violence between the most militant of the protestors and police increased sharply. At least four persons were killed in the violence, while scores of others were brutalized by police. Several government ministry buildings in Kyiv were either blockaded or seized by protestors. In addition, protestors seized control of or blockaded government buildings outside of Kyiv, mainly in western and central Ukraine, but also in some places in the east. After this setback, the government again appeared to adopt a strategy of backpedaling and playing for time. On January 28, Prime Minister Mykola Azarov resigned. On the same day, the Ukrainian parliament voted to repeal the “dictatorship laws” and adopted a law to give amnesty to the protestors. Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Congressional Research Service 3 Current Political Situation After pausing for several weeks to gather its forces once again, on February 18 the government embarked on its most violent crackdown attempt against the Maidan, one that quickly resulted in the regime’s own demise. Elite “Berkut” riot police attempted to clear protestors from the Maidan and other areas of Kyiv, with the support of roving gangs of street thugs hired by the government. 88 persons, mostly protestors but also some police officers, were killed on the 18th, 19th and 20th. Many hundreds more were injured. Many casualties were caused by firearms, mainly used by the police, including by snipers. The government reportedly had plans to use snipers much more extensively and also unsuccessfully tried to order the army to join the crackdown. The death toll may have caused support in the Ukrainian parliament for the crackdown and the regime to collapse. On February 20, it approved a resolution calling for the pullout of the Interior Ministry and military forces from Kyiv to their bases and a ban on the use of firearms. Of the 450-member body, 239 were present for the vote; 236 voted for the resolution. Once the police and military complied with the resolution, groups of protestors seized key government buildings. Yanukoyvch and scores of his supporters in the government and parliament fled the capital by the 21st, many heading for the eastern and southern parts of the country, while others continued into Russia. The Ukrainian parliament, now composed mainly of opposition deputies, has rapidly passed sweeping measures with little or no opposition. The parliament deposed Yanukovych as President on February 22 for abandoning his duties. On the same day, Yuliya Tymoshenko was released from prison. Oleksandr Turchynov, a long-time top aide of Tymoshenko, was elected as speaker of the parliament, replacing the resigned incumbent from the Party of Regions. The parliament also voted to make Turchynov acting president until new presidential elections are held, which the parliament set for May 25. The parliament restored the provisions of the 2004 Ukrainian constitution, eliminating changes made by Yanukovych to strengthen the presidency. Ex-President Yanukovych and dozens of other top officials of the former regime are being sought by police for their part in killing and injuring Maidan protestors and other regime opponents. Yanukovych was last seen in Crimea, and his Key Parties in Ukraine’s Parliament Party of Regions: Until February 2014, the party of the ruling regime and by far the largest faction in the Ukrainian parliament. It has drawn its support from eastern Ukraine, where suspicion of Ukrainian nationalism is high and support for close ties with Russia is strong. It defends the economic interests of powerful oligarchic business groups. Since the collapse of the Yanukovych regime in February 2014, scores of deputies have fled from Kyiv or left the party, with most of the rest apparently unwilling or unable to offer serious resistance to the new leadership, at least for now. Fatherland: Founded by Yuliya Tymoshenko, Fatherland has run on a populist, anti-corruption platform. It draws its support from western and central Ukraine, where Ukrainian nationalism is strongest. After the collapse of the Yanukovych regime in February 2014, Fatherland effectively became the leading faction in Ukraine’s parliament. Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR): Founded by heavyweight boxing champion Vitali Klitchko (the acronym “UDAR” means “punch” in Ukrainian), UDAR relies chiefly on the personal popularity of Klitchko. Its platform, while expressing opposition to the former regime’s corruption, has been criticized for lacking in specifics. Freedom: A party espousing extreme Ukrainian nationalism and economic populism, Freedom receives its support from western Ukraine, where Ukrainian nationalism is strongest. Some observers have attributed its success to disillusionment with the Fatherland and other opposition groups rather than a surge in support for extreme Ukrainian nationalism. Its activists played a key role in fighting against riot police in the Maidan protests. The party is led by Oleh Tyahnybok. Communist Party: The Communist Party has been overtaken by the Party of Regions in its eastern Ukraine strongholds and has a largely elderly electorate. It opposes market economics and favors strong ties to Russia. Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Congressional Research Service 4 present whereabouts are unknown. Meanwhile, Yanukovych-appointed governors and other local officials have resigned in many regions of Ukraine, although mainly in western and central Ukraine. The parliament has dismissed the members of the former government, and parties in the parliament are putting together a “government of national trust” to govern the country, at least until a new president is elected. The proposed choices for a new government were presented to a crowd of tens of thousands in the Maidan on February 26. They include both representatives of the opposition parties and Maidan activists. Fatherland leader Arseniy Yatsenyuk was nominated as Prime Minister. Ukraine’s new government will face serious political challenges. One is maintaining the support of the social and political forces that have emerged from the Maidan. Throughout the protests, the opposition parties have been playing catch-up with sentiment on the streets. Observers have witnessed expressions of scorn at times from demonstrators as opposition party leaders spoke at the Maidan. On February 21, the foreign ministers of Poland, Germany, and France brokered an agreement between the regime and the main opposition party leaders that appeared to Maidan protestors to all