日本产品开发策略

132 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & INDUSTRIAL MARKETING, VOL. 13 NO. 2 1998, pp. 132-154 © MCB UNIVERSITY PRESS, 0885-8624 Historical perspective of Japanese product development The post-war Japanese competitive strategy evolved from one of low wages (1945-1950s; labor-intensive industries such as textiles), to capital-intensive scale economies as rising wage rates eroded the advantage of low labor rates (1960s–early 1970s; market penetration and automation-steel, shipbuilding, autos, consumer electronics), to focussed production (late 1970s and 1980s; high-volume segments and establishing a production facility that minimized complexity), to flexible production (producing a range of products on the same production line using just-in-time inventory techniques to provide both lower cost and greater variety in a shorter time and with a shorter life cycle) (Musselwhite, 1990). This was done by absorbing foreign technologies and making continuous improvements while maintaining quality consciousness (Best, 1990). Taiichi Ohno, Chief Engineer at Toyota during the 1950s, learned many valuable lessons from Detroit which would later be instrumental in the way the Japanese economy prospered. He found a way to reduce the time required to change dies from a day to three minutes. He discovered that it cost less to make small batches, since making small batches eliminated the carrying costs of huge inventories required by mass production techniques. Making only a few parts before assembling them caused mistakes to show up almost immediately. This caused Ohno to concentrate on quality to eliminate the waste of large numbers of defective parts. To make this system work, Ohno needed both an extremely skilled and a highly motivated work- force. As a result of a post-war strike, an agreement was worked out between the company and the union: employees were guaranteed lifetime employment and their pay would be steeply graded by seniority rather than by specific job function and was to be tied to company profitability through bonus payments. This essentially made the employees members of the Toyota family, with rights of access to Toyota facilities (housing, recreation, clubs, etc.). The employees also agreed to be flexible in work assignments and to initiate improvements rather than merely respond to problems. Hence, the Japanese labor policy was born (Womack et al., 1990). Japanese companies tend to market technology-intensive products. First, R&D focusses on continual incremental improvement, which naturally extends product technology. This can push the most mundane products (automobiles, watches), over time, into the arena of high technology. Second, new technologies provide the best possibilities for serving market niches and fragmenting larger, more homogeneous markets (Pine, 1993). Japanese firms emphasize meeting consumers’ needs with good quality and reliable products at competitive prices. Japanese companies appear more adept at exploiting strategic windows-opportunities created by new market segments, changes in technology, or new distribution channels. Japanese product development strategies Laurence Jacobs Professor of Marketing, University of Hawaii-Manoa, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA Paul Herbig Professor of Marketing, Graduate School of International Trade and Business Administration, Texas A&M International University, Laredo, Texas, USA Post-war Japanese competitive strategy Birth of Japanese labor policy Technology-intensive products An executive summary for managers and executives can be found at the end of this article Factors in the Japanese product development strategy The eight factors discussed in this section contributed to Japan’s speedy and flexible post-war development process. Top management as a catalyst Top management plays a key strategic role in new product development in the typical Japanese company. Management provides the initial kickoff to the development process by signaling a broad strategic direction or goal for the company. This is done by constantly monitoring the external environment (competitive threats and market opportunities) and evaluating company strengths and weaknesses. The Japanese firm continuously scans the globe for new ideas and is able to assess with more foresight the technologies that have a large future growth and diffusion potential. Top management rarely hands down a clearcut new product concept of a specific work plan. Rather it intentionally leaves considerable room for discretion and local autonomy to those in charge of the development project. A certain degree of built-in ambiguity is considered healthy, especially in the early stages of development of the product or technology. Management also implants a certain degree of tension within the project team. This tension, if managed properly, helps cultivate a must-do attitude and a sense of cohesion among members of the crisis-solving team. A Japanese company comes in contact with an appropriate series of generic technologies through in-house research and a considerable capacity to integrate the latest scientific developments. Such contact becomes possible through high-level collaboration with university laboratories, public and private research and information organizations, and other companies (Giget, 1988). Outside research is analyzed to provide material for directing in-house applied research programs. All this is guided subtly by top management. Self-organizing project teams A new product development team, consisting of members with diverse backgrounds and temperaments, is hand picked by top management and is given a free hand to create something new. Members of this team often risk their reputation and sometimes their career to carry out their role as change agents for the organization at large. To become self-organizing, a group needs to be completely autonomous; it must come up with its own challenging goals and then try to keep elevating those goals. It cannot be content with incremental improvements alone, being in constant pursuit of a quantum leap, and it is usually composed of members of diverse functional specialization so that the whole becomes much more than the sum of its parts. Cross-fertilization then occurs. Ambiguity is tolerated. Sharing of information is encouraged. Decision making is intentionally delayed to extract as much up-to-date information as possible from the marketplace and technical communities. Sharing of responsibilities is accepted by all group members. For all of the advantages that this group consensus provides, it also has some potential drawbacks. For example, collective thought often leads to isolation and élitism (as is the case for Japan and the Japanese people themselves). However, in the Japanese view of the team and teamwork, workers are encouraged to have multiple skills and are valued and paid for their versatility (the number of different roles they can play within the team). This allows teams to assume major responsibilities and to solve problems spontaneously as they arise rather than asking the engineers for a new blueprint and the staff for new work procedures. The work is more varied, flexible, and challenging and may make levels of supervision JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & INDUSTRIAL MARKETING, VOL. 13 NO. 2 1998 133 Strategic role of top management Change agents for the organization superfluous. The Japanese search for goal congruence is continuous and never ends until consensus is reached. Overlapping development phases The concept of division of labor is not well adopted in Japan; rather, redundancy (excess information sharing), and shared division of labor are the norms with every phase of innovation generation loosely connected and overlapping, expanding and contracting as necessary. The unique characteristic of Japanese enterprise is that, rather than dividing each phase and operating remotely, every phase is made to overlap in a process that moves through the joint efforts of the participants. As a result, the time required to develop an idea is halved in many projects. However, information redundancy can nurture groupthink as well a hesitancy to submit creative ideas. The Japanese innovation generation process has an unusually high cost associated with it in terms of the generation of problems and solutions, high degree of social interaction (work is the reason for existence and family often gets shortchanged), human exhaustion and overwork (karoshi), mental exhaustion, and burnout (Nonaka, 1990). Considerable overlap exists in the phases of the new product development process in Japan. This overlap between R&D and marketing enhances shared responsibility and cooperation, stimulates involvement and commitment, sharpens a problem-solving focus, encourages initiative taking, develops diversified skills, and heightens sensitivity to market conditions. Phase management is holistic and overlapping rather than analytical and sequential. The search for information and experimenting at all points delays until the last moment the narrowing of options. In an overlapping program, many groups are working on a project at the same time. The overlapping approach has both merits and faults. The obvious merits include: • faster development; • increased flexibility; and • information sharing. This approach also helps foster the more strategic view of a generalist, enhances shared responsibility and cooperation, stimulates involvement and commitment, sharpens a problem-solving orientation, encourages initiative taking, develops diversified skills, creates grounds for peer recognition, and increases the sensitivity of everyone involved to changes in market conditions. On the other hand, the burden of managing the process increases exponentially. By its nature, the overlapping approach amplifies ambiguity, tension, and conflict within the group. The burden to coordinate the intake and dissemination of information also increases, as does management’s responsibility to carry out ad hoc and intensive on-the-job training (Rosenberg, 1986). As a result, the division of labor often becomes ineffective. Multilearning An almost fanatical devotion to learning occurs in a Japanese institution, both within organizational membership and among outside members of the network. Learning, for the typical Japanese person, is something that takes place continuously in a highly adaptive and interactive manner. These continuous interactions with outside information sources allow workers to respond rapidly to changing market preferences. The constant encouragement to acquire diversified knowledge and skills helps create a versatile team 134 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & INDUSTRIAL MARKETING, VOL. 13 NO. 2 1998 Innovation generation process Overlap between R+D and marketing Devotion to learning capable of solving a wide array of problems in a relatively short period of time. Learning is institutionalized by the Japanese practice of job rotation. Subtle control Subtle control is exercised by management to prevent looseness, ambiguity, tension, or conflict from getting out of control. The emphasis is on self- control and on peer pressure. Management selects the right people for the team, constantly monitoring the balance and adding or deleting specific members if deemed necessary. An open and visible working environment requires one to think about what is best for the group at large. Management also encourages team members to extract as much information from the field and to share the information with other team members. The Japanese evaluation system, which is based on group rather than individual performance, encourages the formation of a self-organizing team, fosters multilearning among team members, and builds trust and cohesion, and peer pressure. Management establishes overriding values shared by everyone in the organization. Organizational transfer of learning Technology and knowledge are transferred to other divisions or subsequent projects and become institutionalized over time. Personnel are rotated as well. Successful, highly visible projects will be studied and copied by others in the company. Because of the Japanese emphasis on lifelong learning and the job rotation which exists in most every large Japanese corporation, the organizational transfer of learning to other individuals or to entire other groups can be accomplished easily, quickly, and cooperatively. Japanese teamwork According to Peter Drucker (1993), three potential types of teams exist. One is the baseball or cricket team, in which all players play on the team but they do not play together as a team. Each team member has a fixed position. This version of a team has great strengths, specific tasks, measurable performance, and players that are well trained for the specific position the player has. This is excellent for repetitive tasks and for work in which the rules are well known. It is also the model on which modern mass production was organized. As team members get information from the situation, each receives information appropriate to his or her task. Traditionally, most work in large American companies was organized in this way. The second type of team is analogous to a soccer team or the symphony orchestra, all with fixed positions which work as a team. This requires a conductor or coach and a score as well as endless rehearsals. This type of team has great flexibility if the score is clear and the team is well lead. Information comes largely from the coach or conductor. This is the typical Japanese model of work. The third type of team is the doubles tennis team, or executive committee. This type of team is small and flexible with the players rapidly adjusting to each other. This team only functions well when the members adjust to the strengths and weaknesses of other player(s). This is the strongest team of all three types. The performance of the team is greater than the sum of the individual team members. This version of the team, however, requires enormous self-discipline and time together to work well. Information comes largely from each player or team member. This is the team most suitable for the information age of the twenty-first century. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & INDUSTRIAL MARKETING, VOL. 13 NO. 2 1998 135 Emphasis is on self-control Three potential types of teams exist Lean production Lean production is a comprehensive information system that makes it possible for everyone in the plant to respond quickly to problems and to understand the plant’s overall situation. The shusa system pioneered by Toyota (or LPL – large project leader – as it is called at Honda) is one such example. Shusa is the boss, the leader of the team, whose job it is to design and engineer a new product and to get it fully into production. The shusa assembles a small team, which is assigned to the development project for life. Techniques of lean design include leadership, the shusa, teamwork, communication (resolving critical design tradeoffs at the beginning), and simultaneous development. Product development – Japanese style Product development Japanese style is the dynamic and continuous process of adaptation to changes in the environment. The key elements of this effort are self-organizing development teams (autonomy given to the groups to define their own activities, which entails members from diverse functional backgrounds), facing challenges collectively, overlapping development phases, and a commitment to continuous learning. Project teams are assigned to pursue a broad strategic product development goal instead of a specific new product concept. The Japanese are known for their commitment to “gaining, maintaining, and expanding market share around the world through the use of product innovation strategies” that challenge their resources and technology (Coe, 1990, p. 22). They invest heavily in research and development, spending 3 percent of their GNP to create and develop non-defense related products. Since 1983, Japan has gained shares in total patents issued in 38 out of 48 product categories (Dumaine, 1991, p. 57). The Japanese product research is market driven. Japanese organizations must pay for 98 percent of their research from their own revenues (Moffat, 1991, p. 88). The Ministry for International Trade and Industry (MITI) coordinates the keiretsu members to help on the research and development of products for global markets. However, it is the individual Japanese companies and their cooperative efforts which, for the most part, must end up doing the actual research and paying for its development. Direct government funding is extremely limited. Japanese companies spend more time than Americans do in planning (40 percent versus 25 percent), suffer development setbacks in a smaller proportion of products (28 percent versus 49 percent), and waste less of their time debugging finished products (5 percent versus 15 percent) than does the average American company (Dumaine, 1991, p. 59). Japanese companies also invest more of their managerial time in new products (50 percent versus 40 percent) and receive more revenues from them (44 percent versus 28 percent) than the typical American company (Fortune, December 2, 1991, p. 59). The considerable amount of preplanning is spent on gaining a consensus among the team members and employees on what the product is – its features, color, shape, price, etc. However, once decided, the company sticks to those specs and implementation proceeds speedily since consensus has already been achieved. As a result, Japanese firms experience far fewer interruptions during development and fewer problems after launch. The Japanese believe in settling on specifications as late as possible and then sticking to them. In that way, people can spend more time planning, discussing, and debating the product’s characteristics, and afterward, everyone knows that a change would seriously delay the project. Conflict 136 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & INDUSTRIAL MARKETING, VOL. 13 NO. 2 1998 Techniques of lean design Product research is market driven More time spent in planning resolution is accomplished by broad consultation prior to decisions and at lower levels of the organization for successful firms. In other words, lots of up front time spent researching, analyzing, and building consensus leads to an accelerated development and production schedule since almost all potential conflicts have been resolved in advance. As a result, the average Japanese company receives 44 percent (versus 28 percent for a similar American company) of revenue from its new products (defined as less than five years old). Adherence to proper etiquette (form) often can be equated with morality and sometimes takes precedence over truthfulness and intellectual honesty (function). The Japanese focus on customer satisfaction is also evident in their search for product improvement and development. They continually survey their product users to target problems or newer features their customers want. The Japanese also test their products on potential adopters to evaluate what is needed from the customer’s point of view. This zero feedback time allows the Japanese to determine customer satisfaction with their products and act on the improvements suggested by the feedback. The Japanese also use zero improvement time, which allows them to improve their products on a continuous basis, so their products will remain the leader in the market segment. The frequency of engineering changes in the typical American firm is as much as twice that of a Japanese company. This has negative implications for the American firm since engineering change orders are increasingly disruptive to higher volume production. Owing to fierce competition, Japanese companies use multiple-track development. They are reluctant to pin their hopes on one technology or product. Japanese corporations will often fund several groups, both to stimulate internal competition