商业银行贷款利率竞争的影响【外文翻译】

商业银行贷款利率竞争的影响【外文翻译】 外文翻译 The Influence of Competition on Bank Business Loan Rates Material Source: Kluwer Academic Publishers Author: Tlmothy H.Hannan To attempt to distinguish between the effects of economic conditions and manage rial decisions on loss rates, we use analysis-of-variance and regression tests. Specifically, we compare banks across geographic regions and we compare money-center banks with regional ones. We assume that money-center banks face the same set of international and national economic conditions. In contrast, we assume that regional banks face the same set of money-market e.g., Treasury bill rates and national economic conditions asmoney-center banks but that they are more sensitive to regional economic factors e.g.,LOAN-LOSS EXPERIENCE AND RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOR 45those associated with energy, commodity, and real estate prices and less sensitive tointernational conditions. Within regions, our groupings serve only as partial controls forexternal factors affecting loan-loss experience. Hypotheses related to managerial decisions:the reward for risk-taking and coincident risk-taking:Adopting low credit standards a managerial decision is one way for lenders to generatehigh expected loan returns. Other ways include variation in the size, type, maturity, andmethod of repayment of the loan e.g., secured versus unsecured, long term versus shortterm, and amortized versus lump-sum. Our loan-loss rate is an ex post measure of loanperformance, after adverse external circumstances have been experienced. Prior to thisdeterioration, we should observe banks with higher loss rates to have had higher grossloan yields than banks with lower loss rates. Managers with a greater penchant forrisk-taking or fraud will be more likely to lower the bank's credit standards and adoptmore liberal lending practices with the expectation of increased profitsIn contrast,more conservative managers will select safer loans with lower returns. On balance, bankswith higher loss rates should have been rewarded with higher loan yields prior to therealized losses. In addition to focusing on the compensation for risk taking, we use three factors tomeasure coincident risk-taking by banks: 1 the ratio of loans to assets, 2 the ratio ofvolatile funds to total liabilities, and 3 the ratio of equity to assets The extent to which thrift institutions compete with commercial banks has been debated since at least the early 1970s. In United States vs. Connecticut National Bank 1974, the Supreme Court acknowledged that savings banks in Connecticut were "direct and vigor- ous" competitors with commercial banks in some submarkets, but cited several reasons why thrifts should not be considered full competitors of commercial banks for antitrust purposes. In its conclusion, the Court stressed the importance of the unique cluster of business services offered by commercial banks and noted that, because thrifts did not participate in the marketing of such services, it was unreasonable at that time to treat them as full competitors of commercial banks. Since that time, however, legislative changes have substantially expanded the powers of thrifts, making them potentially more like commercial banks. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, passed in 1980, substantially increased the ability of federally chartered thrifts to compete for consumer services, especially by authorizing the provision of consumer transactions accounts and consumer loans. Perhaps more importantly, the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982 significantly broadened the powers of federally chartered savings and loan institutions, most notably by enabling them to offer up to 10 percent of their assets in commercial loans. At the same time, some states expanded the powers of state chartered institutions. These changes prompted the Federal Reserve Board and other regulatory agencies to reconsider the competitive significance of thrift institutions in assessing the competitive impact of proposed bank mergers and bank holding company acquisitions.1 The role of competition from thrifts in the area of commercial lending has taken on particular importance in this reevaluation. One reason is the central role assigned to business services by the courts, as in the Connecticut National Bank case, in determining whether thrifts should be treated as full competitors of banks in antitrust analyses. Another reason involves the increased questioning in recent years of the view of banking as a unique cluster of services. If competition is to be assessed for each of the many different services that banks and thrift institutions offer, then commercial lending is one of the more important of these services to consider. On average, thrift institutions hold a far smaller percentage of their assets in commercial loans than do banks. This does not necessarily mean, however, that thrift institutions have a minimal competitive influence on bank commercial lending. Thrift institutions are large deposit gatherers and rank among the largest financial institutions in many markets. Thus, the threat that thrifts can channel their large deposit base to loans could have a competitive impact on bank lending behavior. In practical terms, the issue of how to treat thrift institutions in antitrust analyses concerns the weighting that thrifts should be given in calculating the level of market concentration both before and after a proposed merger. Including thrift institutions with a 100 percent weight would be equivalent to treating them as full commercial banks, while a weighting of zero percent would imply that only the presence in the market of commercial banks should be considered in assessing the structural change brought about by bank mergers. The Federal Reserve Board in initial assessments typically assigns to thrifts a weight of 50 percent, but assigns a weight of 100 percent in those cases in which thrifts are active commercial lenders. In contrast, the Department of Justice assigns thrifts a weight of 20 percent in their initial assessments. Previous research findings regarding the extent to which thrift institutions exert a competitive influence on commercial banks have been ambiguous. For example, using survey data for 1970, Hannah 1984 found that the presence of thrift institutions in local banking markets had a positive and significant impact on the rates that banks offered customers for passbook savings. In two separate studies, however, Rhoades 1979, 1987 found no relationship between the presence of thrift institutions in local banking markets and the profitability of banks in the same markets. Moreover, these studies are dated, and none addressed the role of thrift competition as a potential determinant of business lending behavior by banks.1. Theoretical considerations and hypotheses 2. Credit risk is one of the major risks faced by commercial banks; liquidity and interest-raterisks are other important ones. Realized credit risk manifests itself as loan losses ornonperforming oans or both. We postulate a general model in which the current loan-lossrate, LLRt, is a function of current and past economic conditions, ECt - k, current andpast managerial decisions, MDt-k, and random disturbances, RDt, that is, LLRt flECt-k, MDt-k, RDtI, k 0, 1, 2 T1The loss rate is expected to vary inversely with the quality of current and past economicconditions and managerial decisions. As these conditions deteriorate e.g., decliningenergy prices or bad loan decisions or both, the loan-loss rate should increase. Manage-rial decisions that affect the current loss rate include, among other things, the quality ofpast loan decisions, current loan portfolio monitoring policies and practices, current andpast loan and credit policies, and managerial and employee honesty and attitudes towardrisk-taking. Scale economies in banking have long been of interest to financial economists, and this interest has been heightened in recent years by two developments. The first is increased concern about the survivability of small community banks in an era of bank consolidation. This theme was the subject of a March 2003 conference at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and formed the basis for a special Journal of Financial Services Research March 2004 issue of the The second development is recent academic research suggesting that small banks may have both an information advantage over large banks, as in Nakamura 1993, Mester, Nakamura, and Renault 2001, and Carter and McNulty 2004, and an incentive to use this information advantage in the lending process. Berger et al. 2002 provide evidence on the second point. They suggest that small banks may have a comparative advantage in developing and using the "soft" information often associated with small business lending. PROFEFF is an econometric financial performance measure that indicates how actual financial performance compares to a theoretical best-practice frontier Considering differences in, and sources of, profit efficiency PROFEFF by bank size groups can help shed light on the issue of which banks use their capital more efficiently provided profits are normalized by equity, which is the approach we take in this paper. Most studies done in the 1980s and early 1990s suggest that scale economies are slight or nonexistent beyond asset sizes of $50 to $100 millionSome early examples are Benston, Hanweck, and Humphrey 1982, Gilligan, Smirlock, and Marshall 1984, Clark 1984, Nelson 1985, and Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey 1987. Using 1984 data, Berger and Humphrey 1991 find that economies of scale at the fLrrn level are exhausted beyond $200 million in asset size. Since this influential study, which found that gains from reducing cost inefficiencies dominate gains from realizing scale economies, the focus of most studies has shifted to inefficiencies and hence away from optimum sizeHowever, using cost efficiency, Berger and Mester 1997 conclude that scale economies are exhausted well before $10 billion in asset size. Since these studies estimate cost economies, they cannot directly address the possibility that revenues may be more than proportionately higher for larger banks. However, another related Irend in this literature has been increased recognition that profit efficiency is a more appropriate technique to use in evaluating bank performance than cost efficiency since PROFEFF incorporates both revenues and costs. Recent profit efficiency studies include Altunbas, Evans, and Molyneux 2001, Akhigbe and McNulty 2003, Berger and Mester 1997, 2001 , DeYotmg and Hasan 1998, and DeYoung and Nolle 1996, among others. Other recent studies of U.S. banking efficiency include Barr, Kilgo, Siems, and Stiroh 2000, Zimmel 2002, Berger and DeYoung 2001, and Wheelock and Walker 1999, 2000. The keynote paper at the above-mentioned conference, by DeYoung, Hunter, and Udell 2004, argues that small banks and large banks have a different focus and a different business model-- personalized service and customized fmancial services e.g., small business loans in the case of small banks and efficient distribution of relatively uniform types of financial services e.g., credit cards and home equity loans in the case of large banksThe business model of the small bank requires relatively high cost, while larger banks can keep cost low. Under this line of reasoning, both types of banks should have a role to play in the future financial services marketplace. Nonetheless, differences in PROFEFF are important because ultimately small and large banks compete for capitalFor example, the decision of a smaller bank to join or not to join a large banking organization through a merger is ultimately a subjective decision about how its capital can be best employed. 商业银行贷款利率竞争的影响 资料来源: Kluwer学术出版者 作者:Tlmothy H.Hannan 为了试图区分经济条件和贷款损失管理决策的影响,我们使用方差和回 归分析。具体来说,我们比较不同区域的银行和区域性的货币银行。我们假设货 币中心银行面临相同的国际和国家经济条件。相反的,我们假设区域银行面临着 同样的货币市场(例如,国库券利率)以及国家经济条件作为货币中心银行,但他 们是较为敏感的区域经济因素(例如,贷款损失经验和风险行为,与能源商品相关 的存款和房地产价格)以及不敏感的国际条件。在区域内,我们的组织只有对外部 因素进行局部控制来影响贷款损失的经验。 有关管理部门的决定假说:对于风险跟巧合风险的补偿采用较低的信贷 (管理决策)是其中一个使贷款人的贷款产生较高预期回报的方法。其他方式 还有大小,类型,成熟度以及贷款的还款方式的差异。(例如,担保与无担保,长期 与短期的,摊销与一次性)。我们的贷款损失率是在经历不利的外部环境时的贷款 事后性能。在此之前的恶化,我们必须遵守损失率较高的银行比银行贷款损失率 低的要有更高的毛收入。一个更大的风险采取倾向(或欺诈经理)并采取增加的利 润预期更宽松的贷款做法将更有可能降低银行的信贷标准。相比之下,较为保守 的经理会选择更安全的回报率较低的贷款。总的来说,损失率较高的银行应该在 提供更高回报率贷款之前意识到损失。 此外关于承担风险补偿的重点,我们由银行的三个因素来衡量一致的风险:(1)资产贷款的比例,(2)挥发性资金占负债总额的比率,(3)股权资产的比率。 至少在70年代初储蓄机构在很大程度上已经开始了与商业银行的竞争。最高法院承认在康涅狄格州储蓄银行与在美国康涅狄格州国民银行(1974)是跟市场和商业银行具有一样竞争力和活力的竞争对手。但他阐述了为什么储蓄机构不应该被认为可以与反垄断的商业银行全面竞争的几个原因。在其结论中,法院强调了由商业银行提供商业服务的独体群体重要性,并指出,由于储蓄机构没有参与这种服务营销,将他们当作有充分竞争力的商业银行是不合理的。 然而从那时起,立法改革大大扩大了储蓄机构的权利,因为他们可能更喜欢商业银行的决策。于1980年通过的存款机构放松管制和货币控制法,特别是为消费者服务的授权消费者交易账户和消费贷款的规定,大幅增加了联邦特许储蓄机构的竞争能力。也许更重要的是Garn-St。1982年法圣日尔曼显着扩大了联邦特许储蓄和贷款机构的权力,最显著的,是使他们能够提供多达资产10%的商业贷款。同时,一些国家扩大国家特许机构的权力。 这些变化促使美国联邦储备委员会和其他监管机构重新评估银行合并的建议,银行控股公司收购有竞争力的储蓄机构来提高自身竞争力。对储蓄机构商业贷款领域竞争作用的重新评估具有特殊的重要性。原因之一是法院的核心作用,如在康涅狄格州国民银行而言,在决定储蓄机构是否应被视为银行的全面竞争对手的反垄断分析中,法院起到重要作用。另一个原因涉及到今年来被银行认为受到质疑的独特群体服务的增加。如果竞争的目的是为了评估许每个银行和储蓄机构提供的许多不同服务,那么商业贷款更是这些服务考虑的重要因素之一。 平均而言,储蓄机构持有商业贷款的资产远远小于银行所持有的比例。但是这并不意味着储蓄机构的商业贷款竞争力的影响小于银行。储蓄机构是大型采矿场和在市场中排名前面的金融机构。因此,储蓄存款渠道的大型基础贷款可能对银行贷款的行为构成威胁,从而提高其竞争力。 具体而言,如何看待反托拉斯分析的问,是储蓄机构应在计算市场集中度前后合并时的水平给予加权。储蓄机构占100%,等于将他们当作全面的商业银行,而当比重为0意味着只有商业银行占有市场,应该考虑银行合并时所带来的对评估结构的影响。美国联邦储备委员会在初步评估,通常指派给储蓄机构的百分之五十的比重,但是分配比率为100%的案例中,储蓄机构的商业贷款一直是活跃者。相反的,司法部在其初步评估中分给储蓄机构20%的比重。 以往的研究结果,对于在何种程度上储蓄机构对商业银行的竞争力施加了影响一直很含糊。例如,使用汉娜(1984年)的数据调查时发现,在当地银行市场中存在储蓄机构对银行提供活期储蓄客户的利率产生了一个积极并重要的影响。但是在两个独立的研究中,罗兹(1979,1987)并没有发现存在银行中的储蓄机构与银行在市场上盈利的关系。此外,这些研究报告过期了,并没有讨论商业银节俭贷款行为在潜在竞争中的决定性作用。 信贷风险是商业银行所面临的主要风险之一;其他的重要风险包括流动性和利率风险。信贷风险现为贷款损失或本身不良贷款或两者兼而有之。我们假定一个普通模式,由目前的贷款损失率,LLRt,是当前和过去的经济条件函数,ECt?k,当前和过去的管理决定,MDt-k,以及随即扰动,RDt,得出: 损失率预计将与当前和过去的经济状况和管理决策的质量成反比。由于这些条件恶化(例如,能源价格下降和不良贷款或者两者兼顾的情况),贷款损失 率会增加。管理决策影响除了包括目前的损失率以外,还有过去贷款决定的质量,目前的贷款祝贺监测的政策和做法,当前和过去的贷款和信贷政策,管理层和员工对承担风险的诚信和态度。 为了试图区分经济条件和损失率管理决策的影响,我们使用分析的方差和回归测试。具体来说,我们比较不通地里区域的银行和区域性的货币银行。我们假设货币中心银行面临相同的国际和国家经济条件。相反的,我们假设区域银行面临着同样的货币市场(例如,国库券利率)以及国家经济条件作为货币中心银行,但他们是较为敏感的区域经济因素(例如,贷款损失经验和风险行为,与能源商品相关的存款和房地产价格)以及不敏感的国际条件。在区域内,我们的组织只有对外部因素进行局部控制来影响贷款损失的经验。 银行经济一直是金融经济学家感兴趣的,而近几年这种兴趣有发展的趋势。因此在银行合并时代,首先关注的更多是小型社区银行的生存。这一主题是一个2003在芝加哥举行的联邦储备银行会议的主题,形成了2004年一个特殊金融服务研究的基础。 第二个进展是最近的学术研究显示,在贷款过程中小银行利用信息优势对大银行进行激励,如Nakamura 1993, Mester, Nakamura, and Renault 2001, and Carter and McNulty 2004。伯杰等(2002年)提供关于第二点证据。他们认为,小型银行可能已将在开发和利用“软”信息给小企业贷款上具有优势。PROFEFF是一个计量经济学的财务绩效衡量标准,它表现实际财务业绩和理论业绩之间的差距。考虑到分支,来源利润效率,银行规模组(PROFEFF)可以帮助阐明其银行资金使用效率这一问题。 在八十年代和九十年代初完成的大部分研究表明,超越5000万到1亿的 资产规模的规模经济是基本不存在的。一些早期的例子是斯顿,Hanweck,和汉弗莱(1982),吉利根,Smirlock,马歇尔(1984),克拉克(1984),尼尔森(1985),和伯杰,Hanweck和汉弗莱(1987)。利用1984年数据,伯杰和汉弗莱(1991)发现,在企业层面超过2亿美元资产的规模经济已经没有了。由于这个降低成本,效率低下的垄断收益的影响研究结果发现,大多数研究的重点已经转移到效率低下原理最佳规模的案例。但是伯杰和美斯特(1997年)得出结论,规模经济在10亿元资产规模是枯竭。 由这些研究报告估计,成本经济收入可能会超过比例较大的银行没有直接解决的可能性。然而,另外一种与Lrend已经日益认识到,利润效率是在评估银行的成本效益比率时比较恰当的技术,因为RPOFEFF包括收入和执行的费用。最近的利润效率研究包括阿尔通巴什,埃文斯和莫利纽克斯(2001年),阿基贝和麦克纳尔蒂(2003年),伯杰和美斯特(1997年,2001年),DeYotmg和哈桑(1998年),和迪扬和提出撤回(1996年),等等。另一些研究是关于美国银行效率的研究,包括巴尔Kilgo,西姆斯和Stiroh(2000年),齐梅尔(2002年),伯杰和迪扬(2001年),沃克和会德丰(1999,2000)。 会议上叙述的主旨是,小银行和大银行都有不同的重点和不同的商业模式,小银行的个性化服务,在大银行和金融种类相对一致的高效率的分配情况定制服务。在小银行的商业模式要求成本较高,而较大的银行可以保持低成本。根据这一推理在未来的市场金融服务里这两种类型的银行应发挥作用。然而因为小型和大型银行的资本竞争中PROFEFF差异是很重要的。例如,一个较小的银行是否决定通过大型银行进行合并,最终是怎样的资本结构最好可以采用主观方式决定。