外文翻译---资本流入亚洲：货币政策的作用

外文翻译---资本流入亚洲：货币政策的作用 中文2950字 本科毕业论文外文翻译 出 处:International Monetary Fund, 700 19th Street N.W., 外文题目: 作 者: 原 文: Capital Flows to Asia: The Role of Monetary Policy Abstract. Monetary policy played an important role in the Asian experience with capital inflows.Central banks used monetary policy to contain the threat of overheating, but the resulting increases in interest rates attracted additional inflows. Empirical measurement of these links shows that tight monetary policy was an 1 important source of inflows to Indonesia and Thailand in recent years, and that the independence of monetary policy decreased during the inflow period. Key s: Capital inflows, monetary policy. I. Introduction The magnitude of private capital inflows to developing countries increased sharply in recent years. Due to the macroeconomic pressures that these inflows generate,economists have devoted substantial attention to the issue of designing an appropriate policy response. The Asian experience with capital inflows offers some important lessons in this area. This paper reviews the capital inflow episode in Asia, and focuses in more detail on the experience of two countries: Indonesia and Thailand. Monetary policy played a key role in these countries, both as a response to capital inflows, when sterilization was used to limit the expansion 2 of monetary aggregates, and as a cause, when increases in interest rates to counter overheating attracted additional inflows. For this reason, and because the importance of monetary policy has been underemphasized in the literature,1 the paper analyzes the relationship between monetary policy and capital flows in some detail. It concludes that the Asian experience with capital inflows illustrates the difficulty of maintaining monetary independence with an exchange rate target and an open capital account. Under these conditions, monetary policy will decline in usefulness as capital mobility rises, and macroeconomic management will become more difficult.Consequently, countries should develop other means of responding to capital flows, such as fiscal policy or increased exchange rate flexibility. The Asian experience with capital inflows can provide valuable lessons to policymakers in other countries, for several reasons. First, capital inflows began earlier in Asia, and have endured longer. In Thailand, for example, the capital inflow episode has lasted nearly a decade. Inflows to 3 Asia showed little tendency to slow after the 1994 crisis in Mexico, in contrast to the pattern of capital flows to many Latin American countries. This experience offers valuable evidence to countries in which capital inflows have only recently begun. Second, inflows to Asian countries have been strong – Thailand has experienced average inflows of nearly 10 percent of GDP per year since 1988. The causes and effects of inflows of this magnitude are often more readily apparent. Third, faced with strong capital inflows, the countries considered here fashioned strong policy responses. They adopted conventional policies, such as tightening the fiscal stance, as well as unconventional policies, such as innovative means of monetary management, measures to limit credit growth, and measures to raise the cost of short-term capital movements. Fourth, and possibly as a result of the strong policy response, Asian countries avoided some of the concerns associated with large capital inflows. In particular, the inflows had a limited impact on inflation and the real exchange rate; and most importantly, the inflows financed a surge in investment rather than consumption.The effect of capital inflows was not completely benign, however, as many of these countries now face higher levels of external 4 debt, as well as concerns over the intermediation of external borrowing through the domestic financial system. The Asian experience demonstrates an additional, extremely important point: that in countries with pegged exchange rates, an increase in capital flows complicates monetary management. Although over a longer horizon, policymakers were concerned with the potential effects of inflows on final targets such as economic activity and inflation, on a day-to-day level, they attempted to manage the economy by controlling intermediate targets such as interest rates or monetary aggregates. Many countries experienced downward pressures on interest rates and upward pressures on monetary aggregates as the pace of capital inflows increased, and policymakers often felt that their ability to control these key variables had declined.In this way, capital flows complicated the task of central banking. This fact illustrates an important link between monetary policy and capital flows under pegged exchange rates, familiar from standard texts on open economy macroeconomics. Capital flows constrain monetary policy because monetary policy draws capital flows. In particular, 5 an attempt either to contract monetary policy, or to sterilize a reserve inflow, will raise interest rates and attract more capital inflows.2 The paper relies on a simple model to illustrate this relationship.The model, developed over 20 years ago by Kouri and Porter (1974), provides useful insights into the causes of capital flows to countries with pegged exchange rate regimes. It can be used to quantify empirically both the constraints that international capital mobility imposes on monetary management, and the proportion of capital inflows due to contractionary monetary policy. The paper uses the cases of Indonesia and Thailand to demonstrate the importance of these links in practice. There are important similarities between these two countries’ experiences with capital inflows. Each country, after undergoing a period of structural adjustment and economic liberalization in the mid-1980s, received a surge in capital inflows around the turn of the decade. Each country maintained a fairly open capital account and an exchange rate target,3 and thus had a limited number of policy instruments to respond to the surge in inflows. Despite the exchangerate regime, each country tightened monetary 6 policy to limit the effects of capital flows, and periodically sterilized inflows of reserves; these policies were important sources of additional inflows. Finally, each of these countries, concluding that a monetary response alone was insufficient, also relied on other policies to maintain macroeconomic control. In brief, both countries tightened fiscal policy, while Indonesia gradually increased exchange rate flexibility – standard policy prescriptions in response to a rise in capital inflows. The experiences of Indonesia and Thailand during the capital inflow episode thus provide examples of the use, effectiveness, and limitations of some of the most important policy instruments. The discussion in this paper is limited to the Asian experience with large capital inflows through the end of 1995, and the usefulness of macroeconomic policy tools in this environment. Consequently, the regional slowdown in 1996, and the financial crisis which erupted in 1997, are not covered here. The paper is organized in the following way. The next section defines some terminology used throughout the paper. Section III discusses the overall Asian experience with capital inflows, and reviews the main results and policy 7 conclusions of the literature on the subject. Section IV reviews a simple model which clarifies the relationship between monetary policy and capital flows. To illustrate the points the model makes, Section V discusses the Indonesian experience with capital inflows, while Section VI discusses the Thai experience. Section VII provides quantitative estimates of the constraints capital mobility imposes on monetary management, and the contribution of monetary policy to capital flows in Indonesia and Thailand. Section VIII summarizes and concludes. II. Definitions Some discussion of the terminology used here is in order, given the recent changes in balance of payments accounting methodology.4 As in previous literature on the subject, the term “capital inflow” in this paper refers to a decrease in the net national asset position of the private and public sectors (excluding the central bank) over a certain period of time. Thus, increases in external debt or net sales of equity will be recorded as capital inflows. In practice, capital inflows are measured by the surplus on the financial account in the new presentation of the balance of payments, plus errors and 8 omissions.5 The financial account equals the sum of net flows of foreign direct investment, portfolio investment (in debt and equity securities), and other investment, of which banking flows are an important element. Errors and omissions is a residual category which ensures that the balance of payments sum to zero; it is included in measures of capital flows under the assumption that movements in this category are more likely to represent unrecorded international asset transactions, rather than mismeasurement of official reserve transactions or items on the current account. Using this definition, the familiar balance of payments accounting identity implies that capital inflows equal the current account deficit plus the increase in official international reserves.6 Higher capital inflows correspond to higher current account deficits, increases in reserves, or both. The exchange rate regime determines the extent to which capital inflows will increase reserves. Under a purely floating exchange rate, in which the central bank does not intervene in the foreign exchange market, a capital inflow will not be associated with an increase in reserves.In contrast, under pegged exchange rates, the central bank will intervene to 9 keep the currency from appreciating, and capital inflows will generally be associated with increases in reserves. This relationship will be important in the analysis below. III. An Overview of the Asian Experience The features and macroeconomic effects of capital inflows to Asia have been discussed in the literature in some detail;7 consequently, this section presents only a brief overview of these issues as a backdrop for the analysis to follow. Figure 1 shows the average balance on the financial account (plus errors and omissions) for five Asian countries. These countries – Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand – account for about two-thirds of total capital flows to developing Asia during 1990–95, and will be the focus of this section.8 As a comparison,the figure also graphs average capital flows to four Latin American countries:Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. 译 文: 资本流入亚洲:货币政策的作用 摘要:伴随着资本流入的亚洲经验中货币政策扮演了一个 10 重要的角色。央行采用货币政策来抑制经济过热的威胁，但导致了利率的上升和吸引了额外资本德流入。从过去的这些实践经验表明，近几年来从紧的货币政策是资本流入印度尼西亚和泰国的重要根源，而且货币政策的独立性在流入期间效果下降了。 关键词:资本流入;货币政策 1、简介 在最近几年私人资本流向发展中国家流入的规模急剧增加。这些流入的资本对宏观经济造成了压力，经济学家们为解决这一问题投入了大量的精力去设计一个适当的政策回应。资本流入亚洲的经历为我们提供了一些在这一领域的许多重要的经验教训。本文回顾了资本流入亚洲的一些片段，并着重详细的介绍了两个国家的经验:印度尼西亚和泰国。货币政策在这些国家扮演着一种关键角色，既作为应对资本流入的一种回应，又当货币总量扩张时用来限制的一种习惯性手段，并作为当柜台利率提高时候能吸引了更多过热的资金流入的一种手段。基于这个原因，所以货币政策的重要性已列在了文献中，本文分析了货币政策和资本流动在一些细节上的关系。它的结论是，资本流入亚洲的经验表明，资本帐户开放条件下对汇率的冲击使保持货币政策的独立性变得更加困难。在这些条件下，伴随着资本的流动性的上升货币政策的效用将下降，宏观经济管理将变得更加困难。因此， 11 各国应制定应对资本流入的其他手段，如财政政策，或增加汇率浮动的灵活性。 资本流入亚洲的经验可以向其他国家的决策者提供宝贵的经验教训，有以下几个原因。第一，在亚洲资本流入开始较早且已经忍受了很长的时间。以泰国为例，资本流入已持续了近十年。资本流入亚洲的趋势在1994年的墨西哥金融危机，之后已经放缓，与亚洲相比资本流入拉美国家的形式却变得多样化。这方面的教训向资本最近才开始流入的国家提供了有价值的经验。第二，资本流入亚洲国家一直比较强劲，自1988年以来的近10年泰国经历了平均每年资本流入量占了国内生产总值近百分之十，这个原因使资本流入的影响程度往往更容易显现出来。第三，面对强大的资本流入，许多国家认为可以使用老式的强有力的政策反应。他 们采取财政紧缩政策等传统的政策，以及非传统的政策，如货币管理的手段创新，采取措施限制信贷增长，和采取措施提高短期资本流动的成本。第四，可能是由于强烈的政策反应的结果，亚洲国家预防着一些大规模资本流入带来的一些问题。特别指出，资本流入了虽然对通货膨胀和实际汇率的影响有限，但最重要的是，资金的流入使投资激增，而不是消费。而资本流入的效果并非完全是良性的，但是，由于很多这些国家现在面临更高层次的对外债务，以及担忧国内通过金融体系为中介在向外进行的借款。 12 亚洲的经验表明了一个极为重要的观点:在实行固定汇率的国家，资本流入的增加会使货币管理复杂化。虽然从更长的眼光看，政策制定者关注的是潜在的对最终目标的影响程度，如从某一天到另一天的经济活动和通货膨胀的水平，他们尝试通过控制诸如利率或资本流入总量对货币政策影响的压力增加的对象的管理，以及货币资本流入的步伐总量的压力增大，政策制定者常常觉得自己控制这些关键变量的能力已经下降。通过这种方式，资金流动已使中央银行的任务很复杂了。 这一事实说明了货币政策与固定汇率制度下流动资本之间的重要联系，类似于在开放型宏观经济学上的阐述那样。资本流动强迫货币政策，因为货币政策驱使着资本流动。特别是，一种尝试去控制货币政策或限制资本流入，都将引起利率上升和吸引更多的资本流入。本文依赖于一个简单的模型来说明这种关系。该模型由20年前的科里和波特(1974)共同发明，用提供的有用信息去洞察资本流动的根源与汇率挂钩的国家的汇率制度之间的关系。它可以量化我们的经验，包括货币管理管理者可以用它来测算国际资本流动的速度，以及由于资本流入使用紧缩性的货币政策的程度。 本文利用印度尼西亚和泰国的例子来说明实践中两者的的重要性。这两者之间的相似之处就是资本流入带来的他们国家的应对经验。每个国家，经过一段时间结构调整和80年 13 代中期的经济自由化，收到了一个在十年间资本不停流入的结果每个国家维护着一个适度开放的资本帐户和汇率目标，从而在有限的政策工具中选择来应对在资本的大量流入。尽管在不同政权下的汇率制度不尽相同，但每个国家都以收紧货币政策来限制资本流动的影响，并定期对储备中的额外的资本流入的重要来源进行消除。最后，每个国家得出结论，一个单独的货币反应不够，还依赖于其他政策来保持对宏观经济的控制。总之，这两个国家中泰国是以收紧财政政策为应对，而印尼逐渐增加汇率的灵活性,即以标准的政策处方来对增加 的资本流入进行回应。印度尼西亚和泰国的经验为我们提供一个资本流入怎样有效应对的范例，以及最重要的政策工具具有的局限性进行了说明。 在本文的讨论仅限于对1995年底流入亚洲的大规模资本带来的经验，和在这种环境中的宏观经济政策工具的效用。因此，在1996年区域经济放缓，以及在1997年金融危机爆发后的事在这里我们没有涉及。 本文的组织方式如下。接下来的部分定义了一些在整个文章中使用的术语。 第三节讨论了整个亚洲应对资本流入的经验，并回顾了关于这个课题的文献中的主要成果和政策结论。第四节讲述一个简单的模型，以阐明货币政策和资本流动之间的关系。为 14 了说明这个模型的制作。第五节讨论了印度尼西亚应对资本流入的经验，而第六节讨论了泰国的经验。第七节提供在货币管理手段中对资本流动规模的数量估计，和货币政策对资本流入印尼与泰国的贡献。第八节总结，并得出结论。 二、定义 这里使用过往常用的一些专业术语，给出一些最近改变支付账户的方法运用在平衡中。正如在以前关于这一问题的文献中，“资本流入“在本文是指一个国家在一段时间里私营和公共部门(不包括中央银行)的资产状况净减少额。因此，外债增加或净销售额的权益增加将被为资本流入。在实践中，资本流入的测量是通过盈余的金融账户在新的国际收支平衡表中显示，加错误和遗漏。金融帐户等于外国直接投资以及证券投资(债务和股本证券)和其他投资的净流量的总和，其中银行流动是一个重要因素。错误与遗漏是剩余的类别，以确保国际收支平衡总和为零，这是包括在资本流动的单位的假设下，这种移动类别可能更能代表国际未记录资产交易的汇报，而不是测量不准的官方储备交易或经常账户上的项目。 使用这个定义，熟悉国际收支会计等式的平衡意味着大量资金的流入等于经常账户的赤字加上增加官方国际储备。更高的资本流入对应更高的账户赤字，储备的增加，或两者兼 15 而有之。汇率制度的确定在某种程度上确定了资本流入将会增加储备。在一个纯粹的浮动汇率制度下，而中央银行不干预外国外汇市场，资本流入将不会与储备增加联系在一起。相反，在固定汇率，央行将介入不断升值的货币和资本流入将一般与外汇储备的增加联系在一起。这种关系将是在下面重点分析。 三、亚洲的经验概述 这个特点和资本流入亚洲对宏观经济的影响一起在一些文章的细节处进行了讨论，因此，本章只进行简单的概述，如对背景的进行分析如下。图1显示了五个亚洲国家的金融账户(加上错误和遗漏)的平均余额。这些国家是印度尼西亚，韩国，马来西亚，菲律宾和泰国 ，在1990-95亚洲约占三分之二的总资本额的三分之二流向发展中国家，这也将是本节的重点，图中数据的平均资本也流向拉美四国:阿根廷，巴西，智利和墨西哥。 百度搜索“就爱阅读”,专业资料,生活学习,尽在就爱阅读网92to.com,您的在线图书馆 16