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IDEOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD ‘Incorporates a variety of political, social, cultural and economic factors and establishes solid links between ideas and action, ideology and political behavior.’ Carole Fink, Ohio State University ‘A wide-ranging survey covering the whole period from the French Revolution to the present day.’ M.S.Anderson, Emeritus Professor, University of London Cassels traces the part played by ideology in international relations over the past two centuries. Starting with the French Revolution’s injection of ideology into interstate politics, he finishes by addressing present-day pre- occupations with the legacy of nationalist discontent left by the collapse of communism and the resurgence of religious fundamentalism in world politics. Cassels includes discussion of Marxism—Leninism, Fascism and Nazism but, eschewing exclusive focus on totalitarian dogma, he also shows how the interplay of the less rigid belief systems of conservatism, liberalism and nationalism influence international affairs. The focus and emphasis given to ideology in an historical survey of such broad scope make this book unusual, and even controversial. Social scientific and philosophical discussions of ideology make only glancing reference to foreign policy. Historians have generally touched on ideology only within the context of the case study, while the realist theorists of international relations play down its influence. Alan Cassels is Emeritus Professor of History at McMaster University, Canada. He is also the author of Fascist Italy (1985) and Italian Foreign Policy, 1918–45 (1991). THE NEW INTERNATIONAL HISTORY Edited by Gordon Martel, University of British Columbia, Canada THE NEW INTERNATIONAL HISTORY SERIES Edited by Gordon Martel University of British Columbia, Canada EXPLAINING AUSCHWITZ AND HIROSHIMA History Writing and the Second World War, 1945–1990 R.J.B.Bosworth Forthcoming: WAR AND COLD WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST Edward Ingram NORTH EAST ASIA An International History John Stephan RUSSIA AND THE WORLD IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY Teddy Uldricks IDEOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD Alan Cassels London and New York First published 1996 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003. Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 © 1996 Alan Cassels All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data Cassels, Alan, 1929– Ideology and international relations in the modern world/Alan Cassels. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. International relations—Philosophy. 2. International relations—History. 3. Ideology. I. Title. II. Series. JX1391.C327 1996 327.1´01–dc20 95–43631 CIP ISBN 0-203-43055-7 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-203-73879-9 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-415-11926-X (hbk) ISBN 0-415-11927-8 (pbk) Why do the nations so furiously rage together? And why do the people imagine a vain thing? Georg Frideric Handel, Messiah vii CONTENTS Series editor’s preface ix Preface xi Introduction: Ideology—concept and use 1 1 Raison d’état meets the Enlightenment 9 2 The birth of ideology: the French Revolution 18 The first modern war of doctrine 18 The spread of ideology in the Napoleonic era 34 3 Conservatives, liberals and nationalist ideology 41 The Metternich ‘system’ 41 Romantic messianism 54 1848: zenith of liberal nationalism 58 4 Ideology and Realpolitik 65 Whig ideology and Little Englandism 65 The Napoleonic legend and Italy 69 Prussia and unitary nationalism 75 5 Ideology and mass democracy 85 Bismarck and monarchical solidarity 85 Populist ideologies 94 Counter-nationalist ideologies 108 6 Ideology and the Great War 114 Ideology and a bipolar balance 114 Ideology and the Third Balkan War 120 Total war and propaganda 126 7 Enter total ideologies 139 Lenin, Wilson and reaction 139 Fascism and Nazism 156 Popular fronts and appeasement 169 CONTENTS viii 8 A second global conflict: test of total ideologies 181 European war, 1939–41 181 America’s missionary role and Japanese ‘national polity’, 1941 188 Totalitarian ideologies rebuffed 198 9 Ideology and global politics 207 The Cold War 207 The Third World: decolonization and after 227 Conclusion: Power and ideas in international relations 240 Notes 247 Select bibliography 279 Index 285 ix SERIES EDITOR’S PREFACE What we now refer to as ‘international’ history was the primary concern of those whose work is now recognized as the first attempt by Europeans to conduct a truly ‘historical’ investigation of the past, and it has remained a central preoccupation of historians ever since. Herodotus, who attempted to explain the Persian Wars, approached the subject quite differently from his successor, Thucydides. Herodotus believed that the answers to the questions that arose from the confrontation between the Persians and the Greeks would be found in the differences between the two cultures; accordingly, he examined the traditions, customs and beliefs of the two civilizations. Critics have long pointed out that he was haphazard in his selection and cavalier his use of evidence. The same has never been said of Thucydides, who, in attempting to explain the Peloponnesian Wars, went about his task more methodically, and who was meticulous in his use of evidence. Over the next two thousand years, men like Machiavelli, Ranke and Toynbee have added to the tradition, but the underlying dichotomy between the ‘anthropological’ and the ‘archival’ approach has remained. Diplomatic historians have been condemned as mere archive-grubbers; diplomatic history as consisting of what one file-clerk said to another. The ‘world-historians’, the synthesizers, have been attacked for creating structures and patterns that never existed, for offering explanations that can never be tested against the available evidence. The aim of The New International History’ is to combine the two traditions, to bring Herodotus and Thucydides together. While drawing upon the enormous wealth of archival research conducted by those historians who continue to work in the political tradition of formal relations between states, the authors in this series will also draw upon other avenues of investigation that have become increasingly fruitful since the Second World War. Ideology and culture, immigration and communications, myths and stereotypes, trade and finance have come to be regarded by contemporary scholars as elements essential to a good understanding of international history, and yet, while these approaches are to be found in detailed monographs and scholarly journals, many of their discoveries have not been presented in a readable and accessible form to SERIES EDITOR’S PREFACE x students and the public. The New International History, by providing books organized along thematic, regional or historiographical lines, hopes to repair this omission. Almost all historians who write on the subject of international history find themselves referring to ‘ideology’. But it is a concept that is as elusive as it is pervasive, and perhaps for this reason there has been no attempt to treat it in a systematic, rigorous manner. While nodding in the direction of political philosophies, and the symbols and images, the myths and legends that are used to sustain them, historians of international relations have, more often than not, preferred to focus their attention on the realities of those relations. The ‘realities’ of who said what to whom, of who was making the decisions and how they made them, can be documented and detailed: and it is still documents in which most historians prefer to deal. Alan Cassels has dared to go beyond these limits, to attempt to bring some order out of the chaos and to apply some rigour to these concepts. Few historians would be bold enough to undertake such a task, and few of us have either the expertise or the range to accept such a challenge. Like its predecessor, Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima, this is a stimulating treatment of a provocative subject. I believe that historians and their students will be grateful to the author for taking on the task. Gordon Martel xi PREFACE That ideology has played an important part in modern international relations is generally taken for granted. Yet the precise role played by ideology on the world stage has never been systematically analysed. Social scientific and philosophical works on ideology make only glancing and generic reference to foreign policy. On the other hand, historical studies which touch on the role of ideology do so only within the framework of case studies, and in addition tend to use the term ideology in a rather vague way. The present book aims to identify the ideological component in the actual conduct of international affairs on a broad canvas. However, it should be understood from the start that this is not a matter of exploring specific ideologies, certainly not in any detail. In this book frequent reference is made to the great ‘isms’ of modern times—liberalism, conservatism, socialism, Bolshevism and communism, nationalism, Social Darwinism, imperialism, racism, Fascism, National Socialism or Nazism, among others. To say that the definition of most of these ideologies is contentious would be a massive understatement. It is not the function of this work to enter into hermeneutic debate, and therefore it is assumed that the reader has a rough understanding of what is meant by the wellknown ‘isms’. And, in truth, this study is not so much concerned with the content of ideologies as with the more generic phenomenon of ideological thinking, and with how the cast of mind recognizable as ideological has shaped foreign-policy making. The starting point is the late eighteenth century because coinage of the word ideology in the French Revolution signalled also the onset of the use of ideas for political ends within a context of mass politics. We shall first consider the evolution of those general, relatively unstructured sets of beliefs and attitudes which informed international affairs in the nineteenth century. Then we shall examine their transformation into, or replacement by, the rigidly exclusive and all-embracing world views that have shaped— many would say poisoned—global politics in the twentieth century. Also observable along the way will be less coherent foreign policies of PREFACE xii conviction, especially those bearing a nationalistic stamp, which none the less betray the ideological mentality. In other words, we shall be dealing with what have been called ‘partial’ ideologies or mentalités as well as ‘total’ ideologies. Unfortunately, the concept of ideology and ideological thinking is a slippery one. Hence no one should write on the subject without first attempting some definition, if only to explain how one plans to use the terms. This I have sought to do in an introductory chapter which recounts the genesis of ideology, its appropriation by Karl Marx and his followers, and finally the connotation it has acquired in the twentieth century. After this preliminary excursus into the history of an idea, attention shifts to the political impact of ideology and the ideological mentality on the international scene. The rest of the book traces ideology in diplomatic history more or less chronologically over some two hundred years. Most of the subject matter concerns, if only for reasons of space, the major powers, and the concentration is on European issues for the simple reason that until the mid-twentieth century Europe remained the hub of world affairs. The final chapter, however, recognizes the new extra-European foci of international relations and ideologies since the end of Europe’s second Thirty Years War, 1914–45. All of which necessarily involves a certain amount of historical narration (after all, this is intended as a work of history rather than international relations theory). However, the narrative is limited and directed as far as possible to illustrating those analytical themes regarding ideology in world politics which are then resumed in the conclusion. J.H.Hexter in his book On Historians (1979) divides them into ‘lumpers’ and ‘splitters’. Lumpers seek a grand synthesis; splitters refine the lumpers’ broad theses by archival research. Given this present project’s temporal and spatial scope, the end product plainly falls into the former category. The nature of the task constrains the lumper historian to pronounce on many historical matters without benefit of specialist knowledge. In consequence, I have frequently sought the help of generous friends and colleagues who gave of their time to render advice on topics where my own comprehension was superficial at best. Collectively, they have saved me from many grievous errors of fact and opinion and, needless to add, bear no responsibility for those that remain. In this connection my special thanks are due Robert H.Johnston and Kendrick A.Clements, both of whom read substantial portions of the text. I would also like to recognize here the scholarly assistance of Virginia Aksan, David P.Barrett, Robert L.Haan, Richard A.Rempel, James Stone, Wayne Thorpe, Thomas E. Willey, and also my wife, Nancy Gardner Cassels. And last but not least, I would be remiss if I did not point out that Gordon Martel, editor of the series in which this volume appears, has been a far from passive spectator. The idea of linking PREFACE xiii ideology and foreign policy originated with him, and his constructive participation throughout is gratefully recognized. A.C. September 1995 1 INTRODUCTION Ideology—concept and use Ideology is an enigmatic phenomenon. ‘One of the most equivocal and elusive concepts…in the social sciences’ is one expert opinion. Another writer has advanced its claim to ‘a prize for the most contested concept’. And a third begins his study, Nobody has yet come up with a single adequate definition of ideology… This is not because workers in the field are remarkable for their low intelligence, but because the term ‘ideology’ has a whole range of useful meanings, not all of which are compatible with each other.1 Dictionary definitions are more impressionistic than exact, and faintly disapproving. A ‘science of ideas’ is an agreed lexicographical description, which suggests something more coherent and rigorous than any casual set of beliefs. But secondary definitions tend to undermine any notion of scientific rigour: typical phraseology includes ‘visionary speculation’, ‘idle theorizing’ and ‘impractical theory’.2 Such contradiction reflects at once the nebulousness of the concept of ideology and its shifting connotations over two centuries. The word idéologie came into use in the French revolutionary era in order to characterize the beliefs of certain anti-metaphysical philosophes who followed Locke and Condillac in contending that all knowledge derives from sensation. The idéologues postulated a sure and encyclopedic form of knowledge upon which social engineering could be based. They endorsed the revolution as an opportunity to construct an ideal commonwealth founded on Enlightenment precepts of empiricism, human reason and natural law, although it was not until 1795 that their views won official approbation. They looked to the newly established Institut National to ‘save the nation’ by imposing from above proper rules of conduct. Indeed, one of its first acts was to launch a public competition on the topic ‘What are the institutions for establishing morality in a people?’ The principal voice of the idéologues and author of Eléments d’idéologie (1804), Destutt de Tracy, spoke frankly of ‘regulating society’.3 Thus, from the start, ideology had a INTRODUCTION 2 sociopolitical purpose. To this day virtually every commentator is agreed that ideology’s natural habitat lies in the realm of social and political action. The French Revolution was in part an attack on organized religion, and in the new revolutionary age ideology was to lay down moral guidelines previously supplied by the churches. It has often been suggested that the invention and rise of ideology was a collective psychic response to the waning of traditional religion in the West. In one scholar’s shrewd words, ideologies ‘did not arise until man decided that the “self” ceases to exist at death and that no supernatural explanation of the origin of the universe or man is necessary’.4 And so ideological certitude replaced Christian dogma, and Europe’s intellectuals became the new priests. Parallels between religious and ideological beliefs are easy to find—in the passion with which ideas that demand a ‘leap of faith’ are held or in the presumption to explain all phenomena by reference to a single theology. Yet, if ‘all religion is ideology,…not all ideology is religion’. In fact, virtually all ideologists from the French Revolution onwards have been resolutely secular, their object the manipulation of power to create the perfect society in this world, not the next. In a well-worn phrase, modern ideologies are ‘secularized religions’.5 The heyday of the French idéologues was brief, for Napoleon I denounced them as impractical visionaries out of touch with reality and their theorizing as ‘shadowy metaphysics which subtly searches for first causes on which to base the legislation of peoples, rather than making use of laws known to the human heart and the lessons of history’.6 In spite of the emperor’s fall shortly thereafter, his blast was sufficient to put ideological theories out of fashion for some two generations. It was Karl Marx who brought the word back into intellectual circulation. No one can be sure why he decided to revive the concept of ideology, although the Napoleonic stricture of it as unscientific gives a clue, for under the rubric of ideology Marx and Engels developed the famous thesis of ‘false consciousness’. To Marx, reality consisted first and foremost in the material conditions of life, in the ownership and control of the current modes of production, and in the resultant class relationships. This provided the base of the social order, upon which rested a superstructure of morality, religion, law and, of course, the political system—all conditioned by and responsive to the basic material realities. To describe the whole complex of intellectual assumptions and behavioural attitudes associated with the superstructure Marx appropriated the word ideology. The first full statement of Marxism (1846) expounded the role of ideology by means of a famous metaphor. This compared it to that of a camera obscura which depicts the world by means of an upside-down image.7 From the imagery used two things can be inferred. First, that ideology was formulated at least one remove from the material base, although whether it was part of or somehow distinct from the INTRODUCTION 3 superstructure has always been a subject of Marxist debate. Second, that ideology dealt in distortion and illusion, and thus deserved the title of ‘false consciousness’. Ideology constituted a ‘false consciousness’ because reality began in ‘the material process, not in the ideological reflex it left in the minds of the participants’.8 It was Engels, not Marx, who actually invented the phrase ‘false consciousness’ and, in due course, established its place