Paci ca Review, Volume 13, Number 1, February 2001
South Asia in China’s Foreign Relations
J. MOHAN MALIK*
(Asia–Paci c Center for Security Studies, Honolulu)
This article examines the key characteristics underlying China’s policy and perceptions
about South Asia and surveys China’s relations with South Asian countries in the 1990s and
beyond. Beijing’s South Asia policy is tied to China’s military security concerns vis-a`-vis
that of India and territorial disputes. Chinese leaders regularly visit Nepal, Bangladesh and
Sri Lanka to demonstrate a continuing determination to remain involved in South Asia and
to reassure China’s friends that improvement in Sino–Indian relations would not be at their
cost. Beijing insists on the resolution of bilateral problems and disputes in accordance with
the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and remains critical of India’s coercive
diplomacy to guard its security interests. Beijing’s entente cordiale with Pakistan continues
to ourish, underpinned by nuclear and missile co-operation. New Delhi continues to keep
a close eye on the political and strategic relations between China and India’s neighbours.
Current strategic and economic trends indicate that South Asia’s importance in China’s
national security calculus is likely to increase in the 21st century. A Sino–Indian rivalry in
southern Asia and the northern Indian Ocean may well be a dominant feature of future
Asian geopolitics.
South Asia ranks third in importance after the Northeast and Southeast Asian regions in
China’s Asia policy. China shares common borders with four (Bhutan, India, Nepal and
Pakistan) out of seven South Asian states (the other three are Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and
the Maldives), making it an integral part of South Asia. China’s military security concerns
vis-a`-vis South Asia’s largest and most powerful state, India, coupled with territorial
disputes and the need to protect its ‘soft strategic underbelly’, i.e. Tibet, provide a key to
understanding Beijing’s South Asia policy.1 In the last decade, China’s relations with India
have gone through a rollercoaster from the highs of the early and mid 1990s to the lows
of the late 1990s. Sino–Indian relations remain poor, with or without a risk of confrontation,
despite a dramatic increase in bilateral exchanges at the political, economic, military, and
cultural levels including some high-level visits. Beijing’s entente cordiale2 with Pakistan
continues to ourish, underpinned by nuclear and missile co-operation. Chinese leaders
regularly visit Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka to demonstrate a continuing determination
to remain involved in South Asia and a desire to reassure China’s friends in the region that
improvement in Sino–Indian relations would not be at their cost. New Delhi keeps a close
eye on the political and strategic relations between China and India’s neighbours. This
article begins by outlining the key characteristics underlying China’s policy and perceptions
about South Asia before surveying China’s relations with South Asian countries in the
1990s and beyond.
* The views in this paper are those of the author and do not re ect the of cial policy or position of the Asia–Paci c
Center for Security Studies, the US Department of Defense, or the US government.
1 Swaran Singh, ‘Sino–South Asian Ties: Problems & Prospects’, Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), 24,1 (2000),
p. 31.
2 John W. Garver, ‘China and South Asia’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 519
(1992), p. 79.
ISSN 1323-9104 print/ISSN 1469-9974 online/01/01/0073-18 Ó 2001 Taylor & Francis Ltd
DOI: 10.1080/13239100120036054
74 J. Mohan Malik
Key Characteristics of China’s South Asia Policy
A key feature of Beijing’s South Asia policy has been its ‘India-centric’ approach, which,
in turn, has seen military links with India’s neighbours dominating the policy agenda. The
major objective of China’s Asia policy has been to prevent the rise of a peer competitor,
a real Asian rival to challenge China’s status as the Asia–Paci c’s sole ‘Middle Kingdom’.
As an old Chinese saying goes, ‘one mountain cannot accommodate two tigers’. Beijing has
always known that India, if it ever gets its economic and strategic acts together, alone has
the size, might, numbers and, above all, the intention to match China. In the meantime,
perceiving India as weak, indecisive and on the verge of collapse, Beijing took the view that
all that was needed was to keep New Delhi under pressure by arming its neighbours and
supporting insurgency movements in India’s minority regions. All of India’s neighbours
have obtained much of their military arsenal from China—indeed 90 per cent of China’s
arms sales go to countries that border India. For its part, Beijing has justi ed military
relations between itself and South Asian countries as legitimate and normal state-to-state
relations well within the purview of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.3
Second, boundary disputes have shaped China’s relations with South Asia. Whilst
Beijing has resolved its disputed boundaries with Nepal and Pakistan, territorial disputes
with India and Bhutan are yet to be resolved. Much like China, the states of South Asia are
multiethnic, multireligious, multilingual and multicultural. All South Asian states have
historic, cultural, linguistic, and religious ethnic links with India and they all share borders
with India rather than with each other. The postcolonial geopolitical landscape has created
a number of overlapping ethnoreligious and linguistic problems in South Asia. For example,
Bengalis live in Bangladesh as well as in India; Kashmiris, Sindhis and Punjabis live in
both India and Pakistan; more Tamils live in India than in Sri Lanka; Nepalese live in Nepal
as well in India and Bhutan; and Tibetans live in China as well as in India, Nepal and
Bhutan. Internal security issues in one state inevitably have external security rami cations.
Broadly speaking, India’s relations with South Asian states have been guided by two major
concerns: (1) geostrategic concerns, that is, a desire to insulate the Subcontinent from
adverse external forces that might ‘ sh in troubled waters’ and thus destabilise India’s
security environment; and (2) geopolitical concerns, that is, a desire to ensure that
geographical proximity and ethnoreligious af nities do not lead to instability on or near its
borders, particularly as they inevitably affect India’s domestic, ethnic, religious and political
relationships, and could give rise to secessionist demands within India. To achieve these
policy objectives, India has since independence resorted to a combination of diplomatic,
economic and military means to establish (order) in South Asia. For instance, in 1949–
1950, India signed treaties with Bhutan, Nepal and the small protectorate of Sikkim to
strengthen its close links with the Himalayan kingdoms, and it took on the responsibility
of securing their northern frontiers with China. However, South Asian states have always
resented India’s hegemonic ambitions in the region and have tried to resist the imposition
of the Indian version of the Monroe Doctrine by seeking to build security links with
extraregional powers, mainly China and the United States, as a counterweight to India’s
domineering role. This has led to ongoing con ict between South Asia’s largest state and
its smaller neighbours.
China insists that problems and disputes should be handled strictly according to the Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence without resorting to force or other means. From
3 Garver, ‘China and South Asia’, p. 73. Interestingly, China saw the former Soviet Union’s military alliances with
Mongolia, Vietnam and Afghanistan not as part of ‘normal state-to-state relations well within the purview of the
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ but as ‘containment’ and made an end to such alliances a precondition
for normalisation of Sino–Soviet relations in the 1980s.
South Asia in China’s Foreign Relations 75
Beijing’s perspective, ‘whether China and Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, or Pakistan wish
any particular relations is exclusively for them to decide. For India to attempt to dictate or
limit those relations is unacceptable.’4 In their meetings with these countries, the Chinese
continue to bemoan India’s ‘big brotherly’ and ‘hegemonic attitude’. Emphasising that ‘all
countries, big or small, should be treated equally’, Beijing has long been critical of the use
of coercive strategies aimed at ensuring New Delhi’s security interests are not compromised
by their ties with China.5 Because of the asymmetry in size and might, India is invariably
drawn into the big-brother syndrome or small state versus big state (David versus Goliath)
syndrome in relation to its smaller neighbours. Whenever South Asian countries have tried
to play ‘the China card’ in their relations with India, problems have arisen between India
and China as well as between India and its South Asian neighbours.
Third, of all China’s relations with South Asian states, those with Pakistan outweigh
and overlay any other bilateral relationship. No other Asian country has armed another
in such a consistent manner over such a long period of time as China has armed Pakistan.6
The Beijing–Islamabad ‘special relationship’ is part of China’s grand strategy that moulds
the South Asian security environment. It provides a good example of using China as
a counterweight to what smaller South Asian regimes perceive as India’s attempts at
bullying them. It demonstrates that much like Pakistan, other South Asian countries
can follow an ‘independent’ policy and need not allow India to in uence their decision
making.
Fourth, China remains a major economic aid donor to Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and
Sri Lanka. Beijing’s economic ties with South Asian states supplement and reinforce its
military security objectives and goals. China’s use of economic means in its rivalry with
India for in uence in Nepal and Bangladesh is a case in point. Despite some improvement
in Sino–Indian ties since the early 1990s, Beijing has not lost its motivations to prop up
these smaller states against India. However, in contrast with Southeast and Northeast Asia,
the interplay between economics and security is rather weak in South Asia, since
geostrategic considerations predominantly shape China’s policy towards the region.
China and India: Bound to Collide?
As ancient civilisations, China and India coexisted in peace and harmony for millennia.
However, as postcolonial modern nation states, with the exception of a very short period
of bonhomie (the ‘Hindi–Chini bhai bhai’ era) in the early 1950s, relations between the two
Asian giants have been marked by con ict, mutual suspicion, distrust, estrangement,
containment and rivalry. Just as the Indian subcontinental plate has a tendency to constantly
rub and push against the Eurasian tectonic plate causing friction and volatility in the entire
Himalayan mountain range, India’s bilateral relationship with China also remains volatile
and tense. Is there a fundamental clash of interests rooted in geopolitics between the two
Asian giants? Is it a clash of civilisations? Or, is it a temporary divergence of interests
between two rising powers with overlapping strategic interests? To understand the present
and future roles of China and India on the international stage, we rst need to return to
history to gain an understanding of the roles they played on the world stage and vis-a`-vis
each other several millennia ago.
4 Garver, ‘China and South Asia’, p. 72.
5 Garver, ‘China and South Asia’, p. 68.
6 The China–Pakistan type of nuclear/missile cooperation, in particular, is unprecedented in the history of post-1945
international relations. Even the United States and Britain did not share such a relationship. See Amitabh Mattoo,
‘Shadow of the Dragon’, in Gary K. Bertsch, S. Gahlaut and A. Srivastava (eds), Engaging India (New York and
London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 219–220.
76 J. Mohan Malik
Past Perfect: Ancient Civilisations
China and India are the two oldest civilisations, each with the quality of resilience which
has enabled them to survive and prosper through the ages against all odds. During the past
3000 years every one of the Asian countries—some situated on the continental landmass,
others being offshore islands—has at some stage been directly in uenced by one or both
of these two great civilisations. Much like China in eastern Asia, modern India has
inherited, and recognises, a long historical and cultural tradition of Indic civilisation in
southern Asia. Since the future originates in the impulses of the past, it is appropriate to
consider some of the in uences that this history and culture and the physical facts of
geography and demography may have upon the Chinese and Indian worldviews and their
roles in the international system. The burden of history indeed weighs very heavily on the
policy-making elites in China and India. The discourse of civilisation is also critical for the
construction of Chinese and Indian identities as modern nation states.
Both nations have a long, rich strategic tradition: Sun Zi’s treatise on The Art of War
(Sun Zi Bingfa) in China and Kautilya’s Arthshastra (a treatise on war, diplomacy, statecraft
and empire) in India were written over 2000 years ago. The traditional Chinese concept of
international relations was based upon concentric circles from the imperial capital outwards
through variously dependent states to the barbarians on the outside. It bears remarkable
resemblance to the Indian concept of mandala or circles outlined in Arthashastra, which
postulated that a king’s neighbour is his natural enemy, while the king beyond his
neighbour is his natural ally. The Chinese dynasties had followed a similar policy of
encircling and attacking nearby neighbours and maintaining friendly relations with more
distant kingdoms (yuan jiao jin gong). Much like Imperial China, the rightful fruit of
victory in ancient India was tribute, homage, subservience and not annexation.
China and India coexisted peacefully for millennia, each with its own sphere of
in uence, with the mighty barrier of the Himalayas separating the two empires. Political
contacts between ancient China and India were few and far between. In the cultural sphere,
it was mostly a one-way street—from India to China: Hindu and Buddhist religious and
cultural in uence spread to China (and then to Korea and Japan) and Chinese scholars were
sent to Indian universities at Nalanda and Taxilla. The Chinese and Indian civilisations also
existed in close juxtaposition in Southeast Asia, greatly modifying the indigenous cultures
of the region. Though Chinese and Indian civilisations reacted to one another during the
rst few centuries of the Christian era, the process of religious–cultural interaction on any
signi cant scale ceased after about the 10th century AD. Since then, the two countries lived,
as it were, oblivious of each other’s existence for over a thousand years until about the
advent of the 19th century, when both came under the in uence of European powers. In
fact, until the 15th century China and India were far ahead of Europe in almost all aspects
of life, and the ow of manufactured goods and technological know-how was mostly from
east to west. Before the age of European colonisation, China accounted for about 33 per
cent of the world’s manufactured goods and India for about 25 per cent. China under the
Song dynasty was the world’s superpower. Under the Moguls, India’s economic, military
and cultural prowess, too, was an object of envy. Then in a complete reversal of fortune,
the mighty Asian civilisations declined, decayed and disintegrated, and were eventually
conquered by European powers.
Present Imperfect: From Civilisations to Nation States
The gradual westward expansion over the centuries had extended imperial China’s in uence
over parts of Central and Inner Asia (Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang). In contrast, India
South Asia in China’s Foreign Relations 77
lacked a central authority and did not engage in the physical subjugation of neighbouring
countries. India’s boundaries shrank further following the 1947 Partition that broke up the
strategic unity of the subcontinent, which goes back 2000 years to the rst Mauryan empire.
Then came the Chinese occupation of the buffer state of Tibet in 1950, as a result of which
the two nations for the rst time came in close physical contact and clashed. These two
developments in the middle of the 20th century also allowed China to extend its reach and
in uence in South Asia, where historically, culturally and civilisationally it had exercised
no in uence at all.
As a result, China–India relations have been tense ever since. A territorial dispute
became a full-scale war in 1962 and the two countries came close to ghting another war
in 1987. Several rounds of talks over the last 20 years have failed to resolve the disputed
border claims.7 Agreements on maintaining peace and tranquillity on the disputed border
were signed in 1993 and 1996. While Chinese leaders counsel patience in resolving the
boundary dispute ‘left over from history’, Indians want the dispute to be resolved
expeditiously and ‘not left to history again’. The prospects of a negotiated settlement of the
Sino–Indian border dispute in the near future, however, seem remote. Tensions caused by
the territorial dispute have been compounded by rivalry between the two for power and
in uence in Asia. Nor can China brush aside third-party (its ally, Pakistan’s) interests in the
territorial dispute. This was not the case with the settlement of China’s territorial boundaries
with Russia or Vietnam. For, a resolution of the Sino–Indian border dispute would lead to
the deployment of India’s military assets on the India–Pakistan border, thereby tilting the
military balance decisively in India’s favour, much to Pakistan’s disadvantage. This would
deprive Beijing of powerful leverage in its relations with Pakistan and undermine its old
strategy of keeping India under strategic pressure on two fronts. The result is that the 4,004
kilometre frontier, one of the longest interstate borders in the world, remains the only one
not de ned, let alone demarcated, on maps or delineated on the ground, following the
negotiated settlement of China’s territorial disputes with Russia, the Central Asian states
and Vietnam in the late 1990s.
Even if the territorial dispute were resolved, China and India would still retain a
competitive relationship in the Asia–Paci c region. Other factors, apart from the territorial
dispute, contribute to the fractious and uneasy relationship. These include China’s ties with
India’s South Asian neighbours, especially Beijing’s military alliances with Pakistan and
Burma; unrest in Tibet and Kashmir; differences over Sikkim;8 terrorism;9 multipolarity and
UN Security Council expansion; their ties with the United States and Russia; power
asymmetry; Chinese encroachments into what India sees as its ‘sphere of in uence’, as
evident in Beijing’s plans for a naval presence in the Indian Ocean and India’s counter-
moves to establish closer strategic ties with Vietnam and Japan; and, more recently, nuclear
and missile proliferation issues.
Chinese policy makers’ preference for a balance-of-power approach in interstate
relations has led them to provide military and political support to those countries that can
serve as counterweights to Beijing’s perceived enemies and rivals. Beijing’s rhetoric about
the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence notwithstanding, classic Chinese statecraft
7 The Indian position is that China continues to illegally occupy 38,000 km2 of Indian territory in Kashmir, besides
the 5180 km2 ceded by Pakistan to China. On its part, Beijing lays claim to 90,000 km2 of territory in Arunachal
Pra